An openness towards the other: paradox, aphorism and desire in the writings of Novalis and Derrida by Kennedy, Clare
Clare Kennedy
An Openness Towards the Other:
Paradox, Aphorism and Desire in theWritings
of Novalis and Derrida
Ph.D.
The University of Edinburgh
2006
I declare that I have composed this thesis, that the work it embodies is




This study is a comparative reading of the texts of Friedrich von Hardenberg
(Novalis) and Jacques Derrida. The main focus is on the importance Novalis and
Derrida accord to paradox and on the role of the Other in their texts. The introduction
considers questions of reading and misreading, and examines the ways in which both
writers seek to complicate oppositional thinking, concluding that this is the key to
wide variations in the reception of their works. Chapter 1 deals with the philosophy
of consciousness and the paradoxical status of the absolute or the absolutely-other
('tout-autre'). The second chapter examines the opposition between philosophical
and literary writing, and the emergence of 'literary theory' in the era ofGerman
Romanticism. Chapter 3 focuses on literature, and the ways in which it subverts
notions of representation and totality, through the strategies of nonclosure,
fragmentation and self-referentiality. The final chapter looks at similarities in the
way Novalis and Derrida articulate the interrelation between separation, language
and desire, and compares their ways of describing the structures through which we
relate to other people in love and friendship. Building on recent investigations into
the modernity of early German Romanticism, the aim of the study is not simply to
apply poststructuralist theory to an early Romantic writer, but rather to provide close
readings of selected texts in order to identify affinities between Novalis and Derrida.
As well as respect for alterity and affirmation ofparadox, there are remarkable
similarities in their perspectives on philosophy, literature and representation, and on
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Over the last thirty years or so, European Romanticism has been subject to an
extensive critical reappraisal. Much attention has been focused on early German
Romanticism and, in particular, on the works ofNovalis and Friedrich Schlegel. In
general, this criticism can be said to be a re-evaluation of the 'modernity' of
Romantic thought. Developments in twentieth-century literary theory - in particular,
those associated with the name of poststructuralism - have not only provided critics
with a new framework and fresh critical vocabulary for considering Romanticism but
have also paved the way to new insights into the Romantics' own thinking on
language, identity and literature. Some critics, such as Andrew Bowie and Manfred
Frank,1 are engaged in rewriting the history of the phenomenon we have come to call
'literary theory' and pointing out that its origins are to be found not only in
Saussurean linguistics but also in the age of Romantic reflection ushered in by Kant.
I would like to narrow the field considerably by limiting my comparative
study to just two thinkers: Novalis, as a representative of Romanticism, and Derrida,
as a representative of poststructuralism. Strictly speaking, though, it is not a question
of considering these authors as 'representative' of wider movements. In many ways,
1
See Manfred Frank, Das Problem 'Zeit' in der deutschen Romantik: Zeitbewufitsein und Bewufitsein
von Zeitlichkeit in derfriihromantischen Philosophic und in Tiecks Dichtung (Miinchen: Winkler,
1972) and Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy ofGerman Literary
Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).
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they stand outside their respective movements, and undoubtedly one of the most
important similarities between them is the difficulty they present to any attempts at
categorization. As we will see, especially in Chapter 2, the question of definitions
and the naming of concepts is a particular concern of both Romantic and
poststructuralist theory. However, I feel that a detailed comparison ofDerrida and
Novalis will provide a contribution to the wider debate on Romanticism's
relationship to modern theory as well as to our understanding of modernity and
postmodernity. It will, therefore, be important at times to place both writers in the
more general context of literary theory.
I am going to begin by surveying some of the critical literature concerned
2with the modernity of early German Romanticism. Concepts such as nonclosure,
"2
allegory, irony, and 'the de-mystified self have shaped several revisionist
investigations ofRomantic theory and practice. It is now becoming something of a
critical commonplace for fleeting parallels to be drawn between Romantic theory and
poststructuralist theory, and sometimes specifically between Novalis and Derrida.
For instance, Margaret Mahony Stoljar, in her introduction to a translation of some of
Novalis's philosophical writings, tells us:
For contemporary readers [...] Novalis's writings can seem uncannily
pertinent. They address issues that in recent years have continued to expand the
parameters of our thinking on truth and objectivity, language and mind, symbol
and representation, reason and the imagination. In form and style, too,
Novalis's manuscripts demonstrate the associative fluidity of thought
characteristic ofNietzsche. They proceed by intuitive and imaginative
2 See Alice A. Kuzniar, Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and Holderlin (Athens, GA, and
London: University of Georgia Press, 1987).
3 See Paul de Man, 'The Rhetoric of Temporality', in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of
Contemporary Criticism (London: Methuen, 1971, 1983), pp. 187-228.
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reasoning, rather than sustained systematic argument, in a manner that has
become familiar in the writings of Derrida and others of our time.4
So there is certainly a consensus that the theory of the early German Romantics
shares many of the features of poststructuralist theory. However, critics are far from
agreement about the extent to which certain aspects of early Romantic theory can be
regarded as postmodern or, indeed, whether Romanticism can rightly be regarded as
a forerunner of postmodernism or poststructuralism.5 And it is over this question that
a discernible split in opinion emerges. Often, comparisons with poststructuralist
theory are followed by qualifying statements which tend to play down - even refute
- the modernity of the Romantics. Nicholas Saul, in a discussion of Romantic irony,
concedes that 'many see early Romanticism as postmodernism avant la lettre' but
adds immediately that 'it is wrong to ascribe the postmodern sense ofmetaphysical
void to the yearning for metaphysical plenitude which Romantic irony connotes'.6 I
cite Saul here because his remark gets right to the core of the matter. It is this
opposition of'metaphysical void' and 'yearning for metaphysical plenitude' which I
want to look at more closely. Saul's formulation implies that the postmodern
awareness ofmetaphysical void is totally incompatible with a so-called longing for
metaphysical plenitude. I describe this drawing of a clear distinction as an 'either/or
4
Margaret Mahony Stoljar (trans.), 'Introduction', Novalis: Philosophical Writings (Albany: State
University ofNew York Press, 1997), p. 2.
5 In comparisons ofRomanticism with twentieth-century theory there is a tendency to conflate
poststructuralism and postmodernism. This does not really present a problem for my study because a
clear distinction between the two is neither possible nor desirable. In any case, German critics in
particular, when they refer to 'Postmodernismus', often mean Barthes and Derrida, rather than, say,
Lacan or Lyotard.
6Nicholas Saul, 'Aesthetic Humanism (1798-1830)', in The Cambridge History ofGerman
Literature, ed. by Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 202-
71 (p. 203).
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alternative'. As we shall see, it is not the only 'either/or' opposition to be found in
readings ofGerman Romantic literature.
The Romantic Writer: Ironist or mystified self?
In his general introduction to a critical anthology ofGerman Romantic theory,
Jochen Schulte-Sasse identifies the opposition of yearning for plenitude to awareness
ofmetaphysical void as the central issue in the debate over the continuing relevance
ofRomanticism. I find his way of summarizing the opposing positions very useful.
In order to clarify a highly complex argument, we can say that Schulte-Sasse
borrows from Paul de Man two opposing ways of reading Romanticism. The
Romantic writer can be read as either an 'ironist' or a 'mystified self. The latter
interpretation (and this would appear to underpin readings such as Saul's) would be
governed by what de Man calls an 'aesthetic ideology'. Schulte-Sasse defines such
an ideology as:
an ideology - or, more precisely, an institutionalized discursive practice -
that seeks to suppress the structurality of structures in favor of an illusive
experience ofwholeness. To use Lacanian terminology, the aesthetic enables
the subject to establish an imaginary relationship between self and text. Art
serves here as a mirror in which the subject experiences itself as unified and
as possessing an equally unified, privileged consciousness.7
7
Jochen Schulte-Sasse, 'Romanticism's Paradoxical Articulation ofDesire', in Theory as Practice: A
Critical Anthology ofEarly German Romantic Writings, ed. by Jochen Schulte-Sasse et al.
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1997), pp. 1-43 (p. 2).
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He points out that many artistic movements, as well as many conventional readings
of Romantic writers, have been susceptible to such an aesthetic ideology and
identifies a tradition of what he describes as 'misreadings' of Romanticism, by critics
ranging from Hegel to Benjamin. These so-called misreadings seek to emphasize the
Romantic desire for unity at the expense ofmoments at which the very impossibility
of this unity is articulated. Schulte-Sasse regards de Man's 1969 essay 'The Rhetoric
of Temporality' as the first reading to question this and to deal adequately with the
Romantics' acknowledgement of the impossibility of transcendence or unity. The
concepts of irony and allegory (as opposed to the concept of symbol which rests on
the notion of an inherent unity between the symbol and its meaning) are central to de
Man's argument, being as they are modes of discourse which admit to a radical
disjunction between signifier and signified. Schulte-Sasse finds de Man particularly
interesting for the way his discourse has a 'tendency to slide from statements
o
concerning representation to ones concerning the self. This close relationship
between representation and subjectivity is one of the main themes ofmy thesis.
Chapter 1, for instance, deals with the role of representation in Novalis's version of
self-consciousness, and in the final chapter, we will look at how representation and
subjectivity interact in our attempts to relate to and communicate with other people,
other subjects. De Man says that irony 'reveals the existence of a temporality that is
definitely not organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and
difference and allows for no end, for no totality'.9 Schulte-Sasse remarks that the
Romantics, thus read, are 'radical structuralists, accepting the inevitability of
structural, that is, spatial and temporal, difference, and consequently the
8
Ibid., p. 4.
9 De Man, Blindness and Insight, p. 222.
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impossibility of constructing a subject identical with itself.10 However, Schulte-
Sasse goes on to question the validity of such a clear distinction between the two
critical stances and to hint at a different way of reading, of circumventing what
amounts to a stand-off between critics like Saul, on the one hand, and de Man, on the
other. But before exploring this different approach, I want to look at some of the
defining characteristics of the opposing approaches and at a few Novalis critics who
seem to fall into each category. These critics are specifically concerned with the
modernity of Romanticism - indeed, two of them actually seek to consider Novalis
in relation to Derrida. By highlighting one or two issues from their texts, we can see
how each critic defines explicitly his or her own position in terms of its opposition to
the other stance. I am, therefore, going to retain the terms for a while longer because
they are convenient designations, useful signposts for mapping the ways in which
diametrically opposed views can emerge from an 'either/or' approach to reading
Romanticism.
The two opposing ways of interpreting and defining the modernity of early
German Romanticism can be seen as a manifestation of a more general divide in the
field of literary criticism. Oversimplifying to an extent, we might say that the critics
of one camp posit or attempt to locate an extra-linguistic ground, origin or other form
of presence. These readers subscribe to what Derrida terms the 'transcendental
signified'. As both origin and telos, outside of and/or anterior to language, it is the
transcendental signified which in the last instance guarantees meaning or truth.




characterize the early Romantic writer as a 'mystified self in search of the elusive
absolute or metaphysical plenitude. Members of the opposing faction, to whom
Bowie gives the name 'anti-foundationalists', are held to be intent upon tracing the
play of signifiers, without attempting to find any central foundation or transcendental
signified.
Geza von Molnar is one critic who seems to want to rescue Novalis from the
clutches of critics who would proclaim him a 'radical structuralist'. His book,
Romantic Vision, Ethical Context: Novalis andArtistic Autonomy is, as its title
suggests, devoted to demonstrating that Novalis's theories on self-consciousness and
language, for all their modernity, remain firmly rooted in the idea ofmoral freedom
which is vital for both Kant and Fichte. This freedom is unthinkable without an
essential self-identity - the self-identity of the ego must remain intact in the flow of
time and circumstance. Molnar's argument is highly complex and subtle. He actually
highlights many of the striking similarities between Novalis and Derrida. He even
goes so far as to say that, in some respects, Novalis's concept of Poesie can be
equated with Derrida's ecriture, observing at one point: 'Not only does he [Novalis]
lay his text open to deconstruction but he appears to deconstruct it himself.'11
However, and once again this is anticipated by the title, Molnar persists in
identifying Derrida as an 'autonomist', who 'demands' the nonreferentiality of the
19
artistic statement, and would have us believe, moreover, that we can never escape
the 'prison walls of language'.13 This characterization of Derrida is by no means
11 Geza von Molnar, Romantic Vision, Ethical Context: Novalis andArtistic Autonomy (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 156.




restricted to Molnar and, as we shall see, it is evidence of a general and very
persistent misreading of the texts of Derrida.
Paul de Man could be said to belong to the other category of critics, those
who emphasize what they see as the Romantics' own deliberate articulation of the
illusory nature of such notions as unity, identity and totality. But, as Schulte-Sasse
points out, de Man is one of the very first critics of Romantic literature to do so. I
would suggest, therefore, that he emphasizes difference and temporality in order to
question the dominant conception of the Romantic poet as 'mystified self. Another
critic who might be described as seeking to read the Romantic writer as ironist and
radical structuralist is Alice Kuzniar. Her study, Delayed Endings, defines its
argument very clearly in terms of a binary opposition between, on the one hand, her
own insistence on 'radical temporality', and on the other, the contentions of older
Novalis criticism which emphasizes unending Romantic progression towards
transcendence and fulfilment. For her, as we will see in Chapter 3, 'nonclosure' is
something radically different to the idea of unending progression. She questions the
ways in which Novalis critics have in the past sought to imbue the narrative
structures in his work with non-religious, but nonetheless transcendental,
significance. These readings she describes, in an article of 1988 entitled 'Reassessing
Romantic Reflexivity', as 'theologically restorative'.14 Like this article, Delayed
Endings was written almost twenty years ago and, as with de Man, the very force of
her counter-argument stems partly from a need to shake up the dominant
14 See Kuzniar, 'Reassessing Romantic Reflexivity,' Germanic Review, 63 (1988), 77-86 (78). Like de
Man, she suggests here that this theologically restorative tendency of Romantic scholarship - even its
'deconstructive strain' - can be traced to Walter Benjamin.
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interpretation ofNovalis as the archetypal Romantic poet, filled with an
indeterminate longing for the golden age.
The tendency to work in terms of such oppositions is in a certain way
inevitable. If poststructuralism has taught us anything it is that all texts can give rise
to different - even diametrically opposed - readings. However, when reading
Novalis and Derrida - both separately and together - adhering too strongly to one of
the two positions outlined above might obscure the extent to which these writers
continually and consciously complicate such oppositions, preferring instead to trace
the contours of the strange folds and paradoxes by which the 'either' and the 'or' are
linked. In fact, I argue in this thesis that the most important and interesting similarity
between Derrida and Novalis is their affirmation of paradox.
Critical Implications
Certain critics are very much aware of the importance of paradox and also of its
implications for any reading which seeks to bring together Romanticism and
poststructuralism. Herbert Uerlings, for instance, takes issue with Kuzniar's Delayed
Endings, in particular with her assertion that Novalis, and the other early Romantics,
as well as Holderlin, renounce all teleology in favour of 'discontinuous seriality'.15 A
certain impatience with such black-and-white distinctions - and not just those of
Kuzniar - can be detected when Uerlings comments that: 'Alternativen wie
15 Kuzniar, Delayed Endings, p. 8.
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"Dekonstruktion oder Utopie" oder "Diskontinuitat oder Teleologie" sind zu
heuristischen Zwecken brauchbar; fur eine differenzierte Interpretation des
Hardenbergschen Werkes im historischen Kontext sind sie viel zu schroff.'16
Uerlings suggests a solution to such a dichotomy - and he makes the point that this is
Novalis's own alternative. This solution is the paradoxical 'Teleologie ohne Telos\17
and he shows how Novalis reacts to the loss of a telos through a strategy which
jo .
Uerlings terms 'narrative Konstruktion immanenter Transzendenz'. This phrase is a
way of naming the Romantics' conscious fictionalization of the absolute. I hinted
above that Schulte-Sasse finds Paul de Man's distinction between 'ironist' and
'mystified self ultimately inadequate, and even misleading, to the extent that it fails
to emphasize the central paradox ofRomanticism itself- namely that an explicitly
futile desire for an impossible absolute is still shown to be necessary,19 Schulte-Sasse
points to the importance of the word 'Schein' - translated by de Man as 'fiction' -
and sees the Romantics' emphasis on concepts such as 'belief, fiction, and illusion'
as being the key to appreciating the central paradox of Romanticism outlined in the
following quotation:
The Romantic 'believes' in a 'future unity' in the sense that he consciously
constructs such unity as a fiction, an illusion that enables him to construct or
'synthesize' himself as unified, while always remaining aware that every
construction is preliminary and incomplete.20
16 Herbert Uerlings, Friedrich von Hardenberg genannt Novalis: Werk und Forschung (Stuttgart:
Metzler, 1991), p. 624. The epilogue [pp. 616-25] takes as its title the question 'Konstruktion oder
Dekonstruktion?' and I have found it very helpful in situating Novalis in relation to literary studies
today.
17 Ibid., p. 622.
18
Ibid., p. 624.




The Romantics operate in a situation of profound tension between these two
apparently contradictory positions, maintaining simultaneously a belief in future
plenitude and the awareness of its impossibility. Schulte-Sasse describes this as
'Romanticism's paradoxical articulation of desire' and his description corresponds to
'narrative Konstruktion immanenter Transzendenz' as described by Uerlings. This
recognition of the importance ofparadox is in my opinion the most productive and
interesting way to approach any comparison between Romantic and poststructuralist
thought.
As I have indicated, the tendency to work in terms of oppositions such as the
one between 'longing for metaphysical plenitude' and 'awareness ofmetaphysical
void' is almost impossible to avoid. One can therefore detect oppositional thinking
even in works which otherwise strive to avoid it. Significantly, this applies to
interpretations ofDerrida as much as ofNovalis. Andrew Bowie, as I mentioned
above, recognizing the broad split in literary criticism and philosophy, refers to 'anti-
foundationalists', but I take issue with the fact that he seems to want to count Derrida
among them. Derrida has his own way of describing the two apparently incompatible
ways of reading which we are considering here. Bowie cites Derrida's identification
of two 'interpretations of interpretation'. One type 'dreams of deciphering a truth or
an origin that escapes the play and order of the sign', and the other 'affirms play and
21tries to go beyond man and humanism.' However, I would argue that here Derrida
21
Bowie, p. 47. Bowie translates Derrida from L 'ecriture et la difference: 'II y a done deux
interpretations de 1'interpretation, de la structure, du signe et du jeu. L'une cherche a dechiffrer, reve
de dechiffrer une verite ou une origine echappant au jeu et a l'ordre du signe, et vit comme un exil la
necessite de l'interpretation. L'autre, qui n'est plus tournee vers l'origine, affirme le jeu et tente de
passer au-dela de l'homme et de l'humanisme ...]. Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference (Paris: Seuil,
1967), p. 427.
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is concerned with Nietzsche and does not explicitly align himselfwith the latter
version of interpretation. It is true that Derrida never ceases to question the existence
of a 'transcendental signified', but this does not mean that he has no interest in such
questions as truth, 'man', the subject and, consequently, the complicated relationship
between subjectivity and language. Later, Bowie returns to the two 'interpretations of
interpretation'. He makes the following point:
It should already be clear, then, that Derrida's model of the 'two
interpretations of interpretation' in modernity, the one seeking the origin and
foundation ofmeaning, the other delighting in the infinite play of
signification, is inadequate to the real tension in question here, because it
does not give sufficient space to other ways in which conceptions of language
and meaning are explored.22
However, a remark of Bowie's hints that he is not entirely happy with his own
characterization of Derrida. In the concluding chapter of his book, he qualifies the
above with the observation that 'in recent years' Derrida has moved away from the
first position ('which affirms play and tries to go beyond man and humanism').
Bowie continues:
The second position, that Derrida has increasingly come to espouse in recent
years, sees truth as an ethical obligation inherent in communication with the
Other, which leaves space to connect truth to what can be revealed by
'ii
aesthetic modes of articulation.'
22 Bowie, pp. 92-93.
23 Ibid., p. 282.
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Derrida has always been interested in the Other - as productive 'force'24 of
difference and differance - and to say that, in the earlier works, he is only interested
in the play of signifiers is to accuse him falsely of a kind of (Nietzschean)
scepticism. I said above that all writers can be read in different ways, and no doubt
Derrida can be read with great emphasis on his interest in the never-ending play of
signifiers. However, such a one-sided interpretation can only obscure the extent to
which he is not only interested in the play of signifiers. Bowie succumbs to this only
at times, but we have already looked at Geza von Molnar's unequivocal rejection of
what he calls Derrida's attempts to prove that we can never escape the 'prison walls
of language'. This is a fundamental misunderstanding ofDerridean thinking, and it is
significant that Molnar has a certain amount of trouble in supporting such a
characterization with quotations from Derrida's work. It seems particularly ironic,
given that Romantic Vision, Ethical Context is an attempt to rescue Novalis from the
clutches of those critics who would see him as the archetypal Romantic solipsist, that
Molnar makes precisely the same type of mistake with regard to Derrida. The kind of
one-sided interpretations which can be seen in readings of Derrida are of the same
order as those which account for the diametrically opposed views which constitute
Novalis criticism.
Novalis and Derrida are more likely than other writers to inspire such
decisively conflicting interpretations because of the role of paradox and aporia in
241 have chosen to place the word 'force' in inverted commas because it is particularly difficult to find
ways of describing differance without running the risk offixing something which is never stable,
which is itself subject to differance. Derrida says that differance is neither a 'word' nor a 'concept',
and he often uses the word 'force' as a matter of convenience. For him 'force' has echoes of
Nietzsche, and it is thus particularly apt for describing differance because, if a force is anything, it is a
play of differences and quantities in motion. See the essay 'La differance', in Marges de la
philosophie (Paris: Minuit, 1972), pp. 1-29.
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their works. We have already seen how two Novalis critics acknowledge this with
their own formulations: Uerlings speaks of 'Teleologie ohne Telos' and Schulte-
Sasse's term is 'Romanticism's paradoxical articulation of desire'. Building on the
work of critics like Schulte-Sasse, this study seeks to show that only readings which
are attuned to paradox can do justice to the complexity of early Romantic thinking on
identity, language, literature and philosophy, and to suggest, furthermore, that such
readings can better appreciate Romanticism's proximity to poststructuralist thought.
Along with Schulte-Sasse, other critics such as Bowie, Kuzniar, Gail
Newman, Mary Strand, Lisa Roetzel, Manfred Frank, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and
Jean-Luc Nancy have investigated the paradoxes inherent in Romantic thought and
begun to demonstrate affinities with twentieth-century literature and theory. I have,
therefore, sought to build on their critical insights and have supported my thesis with
quotations from their work, especially at the points where they are content to
'endure' - Derrida's word - aporia and paradox, to read and misread at the same
time, and this in the interest of respecting the intricacies of both Romanticism and
poststructuralism. But, ultimately, it is the texts ofDerrida and Novalis themselves
which have provided the model for my reading which tries to, if not avoid, then at
least to complicate an either/or approach. I have therefore quoted both writers
extensively, letting their texts - their writings which are also readings - speak for
themselves, in order to reveal striking resemblances in their affirmation and
celebration of paradox. This affirmation of aporia is felt in all the various aspects of
living and thinking, loving and writing, which are the themes ofmy thesis. The
resemblances between these two writers are, at times, uncanny, and reading Novalis
14
responsibly with Derrida, after Derrida, before Derrida, is not only interesting but has
much to teach us about both.
Methods of (Mis)reading
I propose to undertake close comparative readings of some of the works ofNovalis
and Derrida in order to identify the most interesting and important affinities between
them. We will find that it is through the affirmation of paradox that their writing
corresponds most closely. In view of this, it seems to me that for critics to take an
either/or approach is fundamentally disloyal to both writers, precisely because they
themselves question such an approach. John Neubauer expresses the hope that 'ein
[...] besser verstandener oder besser angewandter Postmodernismus zu einem
9 S
besseren Novalis-Bild beitragen konnte.' " I agree entirely with Neubauer on this
point and hope that a close comparison of the writings ofNovalis and Derrida will
indeed lead to a better understanding of both Romanticism and poststructuralism.
But what does it mean to strive for a 'better' understanding? I have used the
word 'misunderstanding' more than once and also cited critics such as Bowie, Culler
and Schulte-Sasse who all use the term 'misreading'. We need to turn our attention to
the 'mis-' ofmisunderstanding and misreading. I said above that poststructuralism
has given us a new horizon and new ways of conceptualizing the modernity of
Romanticism and its role in the emergence of literary theory today. These new ways
25 John Neubauer, 'Novalis und der Postmodernismus', in Geschichtlichkeit undAktualitdt: Studien
zur deutschen Literatur seit der Romantik: Festschriftfiir Hans-Joachim Mahl, ed. by Klaus-Detlef
Miiller et al. (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1988), pp. 207-20 (p. 208).
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of reading have naturally had an impact on the critical terminology which we now
use and my own study is no exception. This critical terminology, however, brings
certain difficulties. In terms of deconstruction, difficulties arise when we are
deploying Derridean terminology to discuss other writers, but they also crop up when
writing about Derrida. This pertains whether or not we — to set up yet another
opposition - use 'traditional' or 'deconstructive' ways of reading and writing.
Derrida would question this opposition and, as for the 'traditional' ways, he would
probably want to stop at this point and question the phrase 'writing about Derrida'.
He might ask what it means to say 'writing about' and he would certainly ask what it
means to say 'Derrida'. Do we mean Derrida the man, Derrida the philosopher or the
body of writings which can be assembled under the signature 'Jacques Derrida'? And
almost every single term used throughout this dissertation could be similarly
questioned. However, it is impossible not to continue using words like 'idea' or
'concept' or even 'word'. Derrida has never failed to admit this, contrary to the
various interpretations of deconstruction which emerge from the work of critics who
censure him, and also, interestingly, from his most enthusiastic devotees. He explains
that we cannot simply throw away our existing terms, recognizing that philosophical
discourse only emerges through oppositional logic, through precisely the same
'either/or' thinking which we have been discussing. Derrida uses the phrase 'all or
nothing oppositions'. He says: 'Every concept that lays claim to any rigor
whatsoever implies the alternative of all or nothing. [...] It is impossible or
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illegitimate to form aphilosophical concept outside this logic of all or nothing.'
26 See Derrida, 'Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion', Limited Inc, trans, by Samuel Weber
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 111-60. (For the discussion of oppositional
logic, see especially pp. 116-17.) Limited Inc collects for the first time the essays - some unpublished
in French - which represent Derrida's most sustained engagement with Anglo-American speech act
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Indeed, he has always stressed that we cannot simply do away with old terms in
favour of new ones, because we would then run the risk ofmaking these new terms —
including differance or the supplement - into master terms, as though they were then
themselves exempt from questioning and deconstruction. The attempt to posit
differance or the supplement in order to oppose oppositional logic is constricted by
an internal contradiction, a kind of double bind: how does one oppose opposition?
Recognizing the double bind, Derrida says:
To this oppositional logic, which is necessarily, legitimately, a logic of 'all or
nothing', I oppose nothing, least of all a logic of approximation [...]; rather I
add a supplementary complication that calls for other concepts, for other
thoughts beyond the concept and another form of 'general theory', or rather
another discourse, another 'logic' that accounts for the impossibility of
concluding such a 'general theory'.27
Derrida argues that words like 'concept' or 'idea' must continue to be used but 'sous
rature' or 'under erasure' - a sort of retaining while re-inscribing and complicating.
So in a thesis which questions 'words' and 'concepts' such as 'representation',
'philosophy' and 'literature', I have at times used these terms without comment or
qualification, partly as a matter of convenience, but also because, in a more profound
sense, there is no alternative.
theory. The original 'Signature Evenement Contexte' was first published in French in Marges de la
philosophic (1972), and later re-published in a translation by Samuel Weber and Geoffrey Mehlman in
the journal Glyph, I (1977). John Searle's article, 'Re-iterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida',
which appeared in Glyph's second volume (1977), refers to the Weber-Mehlman translation as does
Derrida's response, the essay 'Limited Inc a b c ...' (translated by Weber). LimitedInc includes a new
afterword by Derrida, 'Toward an Ethic of Discussion', also translated by Weber. I have chosen to
quote in English from Limited Inc, with the exception of 'Signature Evenement Contexte' - I cite the
French version of this text first published in Marges de la philosophie.
27 Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 117.
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On the other hand, this means that, while Derridean concepts such as
differance, the re-mark and the logic of supplementarity have provided a useful
framework for identifying similarities, it is vital to stress that this study does not
represent an attempt to apply poststructuralist theory to Novalis. There is no doubt
that the texts ofNovalis could be 'deconstructed' in order to demonstrate the warring
significations that seem to emerge from them. A reading of this kind, however,
would operate on the assumption that Derrida, as the more 'knowing' writer, can
somewhow 'demystify' Novalis as Romantic poet. The problem with such a
perspective is that it is bound to overlook the extent to which Novalis is himself
consciously thematizing the contradictions and paradoxes in his work and can,
therefore, only obscure the very modernity of the Romantic position. Having said
that, however, ifwe take Jonathan Culler's following definition of deconstruction,
my reading has been informed by deconstructive methods of reading. Culler regards
one of the principal effects of deconstructive criticism as precisely its disruption of
the 'historical scheme that contrasts romantic with post-romantic literature and sees
the latter as a sophisticated or ironical demystification of the excesses and delusions
of the former'. He continues:
Like so many historical patterns, this scheme is seductive, especially since,
while providing a principle of intelligibility that seems to insure access to the
literature of the past, it associates temporal progression with the advance of
understanding and puts us and our literature in the position of greatest
awareness and self-awareness. The strategy ofmany deconstructive readings
has been to show that the ironic demystification supposedly distinctive of
post-romantic literature is already to be found in the works of the greatest
romantics - particularly Wordsworth and Rousseau - whose very force leads
them to be consistently misread.28
28 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism (London: Routledge
&KeganPaul, 1983), p. 248.
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In this sense, then I have undertaken a 'deconstructive' reading ofNovalis.
However, and Derrida has always insisted on this, one of the steps in a
deconstructive reading is to tease out elements in a text which already appear to be at
odds with one another. This does not apply only to texts which thematize these
apparent contradictions or, to put it another way, which 'deconstruct themselves'. As
we shall see when we come to Rousseau, texts which are 'blind' to these warring
significations can nonetheless be read as saying something other than the author
intended. (Derrida is sometimes regarded as dismissing out of hand authorial
intention. This image has perhaps arisen from too close an identification with Roland
Barthes and his famous essay on the death of the author.) Deconstruction is, in
Culler's words, a kind of 'writing with both hands', a writing which produces a
constant shifting between perspectives without seeking a synthesis but rather
9Q
allowing an 'irresolvable alternation of aporia' to stand. When I use Derridean
terms in order to appreciate the deconstructive elements in Novalis's texts and his
awareness of aporia, this does not mean that I wish to join the ranks of critics who
would claim Novalis as a 'radical structuralist' or 'poststructuralist'. JohnNeubauer
warns against precisely this and attacks critics who randomly collect an arsenal of
citations from Novalis's work in order to fashion their 'Novalis-Bild nach eigenen
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Zwecken'. (Significantly, many critics have said the same of their fellow critics'
readings of Derrida.) I have quoted extensively from the texts of both writers and
have, of course, been selective in the texts I have chosen and, indeed, the quotations
- this, too, is unavoidable. I would respond to Neubauer's warning by saying that
Derrida reminds us that every quotation is, by its very nature, out ofcontext.
29




For me, the interest in a comparative study lies more in examining similarities
than differences. That Derrida and Novalis are different goes without saying. Apart
from the fact that enumerating all the similarities and differences in their respective
bodies ofwork would take a lifetime, it would, in fact, contribute very little to the
debate on the relationship between poststructuralism and Romanticism. In looking at
similarities, my purpose is not to claim Novalis for a particular type of criticism or
literature. I have not tried to gather ammunition to defend a critical school or
movement. By outlining above the work of several important critics, I have simply
tried to identify and set out at this early stage the two broadly discernible - and
seemingly incompatible - approaches which divide much criticism ofRomanticism:
the Romantic writer as either 'mystified self, yearning for plenitude, as Saul would
have it, or as de Man's knowing 'ironist'. These two positions provide a backdrop for
my own readings, being instances of precisely the type of 'either/or' approach to
reading which I, following in the steps of Schulte-Sasse, Strand, Newman and others,
have sought to avoid.
Derrida has always insisted that a text can give rise to different readings. This
is why we cannot dismiss either of the two critical stances as /w'sreadings or
misunderstandings, even though critics like Schulte-Sasse do not hold back in doing
so. Because we would have to then ask: what would be the opposite of a misreading?
A reading? A true reading? An objective reading? Derrida has long reminded us that
any claim to objectivity is every bit as suspect as a so-called 'biased' reading or
misreading. I know that, like every reading, my thesis will inevitably be a
misreading. However, adhering strictly to an either/or approach can only fail to do
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justice to Novalis and Derrida precisely because paradox is so important in their
texts. When discussing Novalis and Derrida, it is somehow inappropriate to insist too
much on the distinction between reading and misreading. Both of them remind us
that texts can live on only through misreadings which are also writings. Rather than
think of the text as an 'original', intact and self-identical before it is read or
'translated', we must follow Novalis and Derrida in thinking of the reader's response
as opening the very possibility of the text itself- the text always already awaits the
other. This makes it even more important to understand that literary criticism is at
once 'serious' and 'a game'. Ifwe are to attempt to read faithfully and with respect,
it cannot be otherwise. Both Derrida and Novalis speak of reading as a kind of
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writing. Novalis tells us: 'Der wahre Leser muB der erweiterte Autor seyn', the
word 'muB' resonating with Derrida's demand when he says:
S'il y a une unite de la lecture et de l'ecriture, comme on le pense
facilement aujourd'hui, si la lecture est I'ecriture, cette unite ne designe ni la
confusion indifferienciee ni l'identite de tout repos; le est qui accouple la
lecture a Tecriture doit en decoudre.
II faudrait done, d'un seul geste, mais dedouble, lire et ecrire. Et celui-
la n'aurait rien compris au jeu qui se sentirait du coup autorise a en rajouter,
e'est-a dire a ajouter n'importe quoi. II n'ajouterait rien, la couture ne
tiendrait pas. Reciproquement ne lirait meme pas celui que la 'prudence
methodologique', les 'normes de l'objectivite' et les 'gardes-fous du savoir'
retiendraient d'y mettre du sien. Meme niaiserie, meme sterilite du 'pas
serieux' et du 'serieux'. Le supplement de lecture ou d'ecriture doit etre
rigoureusement prescrit mais par la necessite d'un jeu, signe auquel il faut
accorder le systeme de tous ses pouvoirs.32
31 N II, p. 470, 'Vermischte Bemerkungen', no. 125.
32 Derrida, La dissemination, p. 80.
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Alterity, Paradox, Aphorism and Desire
Turning now to questions of structure, I would like to outline the parameters of this
study and say a few words on the texts I have selected for close reading. It has been
particularly difficult to order the various themes ofmy comparison. This is mainly
because - as will become clear - each theme cannot be fully separated from the
others. One might even say that each chapter tries to do the same thing: namely,
outline the contours of a certain paradoxical relation with the Other. We will see this,
for instance, in the way that certain texts appear in more than one chapter. This is
partly because the works of both Novalis and Derrida form a kind of unfolding in
which earlier themes and problems are always there; always already caught up in the
process of reworking and rewriting. However, for the sake of clarity, it has been
necessary to identify several different aspects or perspectives through which this
paradoxical relation to alterity is articulated. The four terms which make up the title
of this study - namely 'the Other', 'paradox', 'aphorism' and 'desire' - are intended
to draw together some of the concerns which are pertinent to the thought of both
Novalis and Derrida. Each term names one of the themes on which their texts
correspond most closely.
I have chosen to begin with those texts ofNovalis and Derrida which deal
with the question of self-consciousness because they provide a relatively clear
illustration of the paradoxical and temporal relation to the Other in the thought of
both. This relation to the absolutely-other - which Derrida sometimes names
Tautre', T'absolument-autre' or Te tout-autre' - will guide us through the readings
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and writings of all the other chapters. While we cannot directly equate what Novalis
terms 'the absolute' with the Derridean Other, we can trace how both writers
conceive ofways of articulating something which cannot be made a direct object of
discourse. In Chapter 1, then, I compare texts by Novalis and Derrida which concern
themselves explicitly with the metaphysical concept of the absolute. Derrida's
reading ofEmmanuel Levinas, 'La violence et la metaphysique', is one such text. As
with all of Derrida's texts, 'La violence et la metaphysique' is itself a reading- an
interpretation and commentary on the texts of another writer or philosopher.
Alongside Derrida's reading of Levinas, we will briefly consider his essay on
Foucault, 'Cogito et histoire de la folie', also published in L 'ecriture et la difference.
Derrida's essays will be considered alongside Novalis's reading of the philosophy of
one of his contemporaries, Johann Gottlieb Fichte. The insights of the so-called
'Fichte-Studien' - a collection of unpublished notes and reflections on Fichte's
Wissenschaftslehre - inform all ofNovalis's work (including his thinking on the
subject-object relation which will concern us in the final chapter).
The second chapter considers literature and philosophy as specific forms of
discourse, and the distinctions and similarities between them, and asks among other
things whether they differ in their apprehension or articulation of the absolutely
other. This entails looking at Novalis's and Derrida's respective views on the
functioning of language itself and at their positions on issues such as representation,
'truth' and meaning. Derrida texts which are particularly concerned with these
questions include his readings of Rousseau (in De la grammatologie) and of Plato
33 See in this connection Geza von Molnar, Novalis' 'Fichte-StudiesThe Foundation ofHis
Aesthetics (The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 1970).
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('La pharmacie de Platon' in La dissemination). I also consider his engagement with
the speech act theory of J. L. Austin and John Searle in the texts collected in Limited
Inc. These texts are compared with Novalis's speculations on signs and language
from the 'Fichte-Studien', as well as with a detailed reading of his short text on the
functioning of language, 'Monolog'. 'Monolog' is a remarkable text for a number of
reasons, not least for its demonstration that paradox and undecidability are among the
most important features of Romantic literature. By the end of the second chapter, we
will have started to move away from more strictly 'philosophical' concerns, in order
to consider the emergence of'modern' literature and literary theory in the era of
German Romanticism as a response to philosophy's failure to deal with that which
cannot be made a direct object of discourse .
Chapter 3 takes up the discussion of literature and examines texts by Novalis
and Derrida which best illustrate a shared interest in 'nonclosure' and the self-
referentiality of literature. Building on the work of Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy and
Kuzniar, this chapter considers the Romantics' preference for fragmentary forms of
discourse alongside Derrida's texts on dissociation and never-ending undecidability.
The word 'aphorism' as it appears in the title of this thesis corresponds not only to
the Romantic predilection for the aphorism or 'finished fragment', but also to
Derrida's expansion of the term to include separation, dissociation and the ways in
which these structure both language and literature. Two of Derrida's shorter texts,
'L'aphorisme a contretemps' (a reading ofRomeo and Juliet) and 'Devant la loi',
which is a reading of the Kafka short-story of the same title, are considered in
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connection with Novalis's narrative strategies for evading closure in his unfinished
novel, Heinrich von Ofterdingen.
Finally, an examination of the concepts of love and desire in Chapter 4
reveals fascinating similarities between Novalis and Derrida when they write on
relationships with a friend or loved one. In the case ofNovalis, we will look at the
role ofMathilde, the female other in Heinrich von Ofterdingen, which points to
possible answers to some of the questions of feminist criticism. We will see too that,
for both Novalis and Derrida, it is death which sheds more light on the essential
separation which always already constitutes our relation to the other. The Derridean
texts which best elucidate the interweaving of death, language and literature are
Memoirespour Paul de Man and the essay 'Pysche: Invention de l'autre.' The
discussion of the subject-object relation reprises the question of respect for alterity
raised by Chapter l's consideration of the philosophy of consciousness and it is to
this that we now turn.
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Chapter 1
Self-Consciousness: The (De)construction of the Absolute
'Toute la valeur est d'abord constitute par un sujet theoretique. Rien ne
se gagne ou perd qu'en termes de clarte et de non-clarte, d'evidence, de
presence et d'absence pour une conscience, de prise ou de perte de
conscience. La diaphaneite est la valeur supreme; et l'univocite.'1
Derrida
L 'ecriture et la difference




The Philosophy of Consciousness
In an article entitled 'Novalis und der Postmodernismus' John Neubauer outlines
areas which, in his opinion, would be of significance for a comparison ofNovalis's
thought with postmodernism. One topic he identifies as being of particular
significance is 'Subjektidentitat'.4 Indeed, the question of the ego is perhaps the most
important area. It is certainly a good place to start. I want to look at self-
consciousness first because, apart from the fact that it has always been of interest to
poets and philosophers alike, it provides us with one of the clearest indications of
1 Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference (Paris: Seuil, 1967), p. 46.
2 N II, p.523-24, 'Logologische Fragmente', no. 9.
3
Neubauer, John, 'Novalis und der Postmodernismus', in Geschichtlichkeit undAktualitat: Studien
zur deutschen Literatur seit der Romantik, ed. by Klaus-Detlef Miiller et al. (Tubingen: Niemeyer,
1988), pp. 207-20.
4 Ibid., p. 213.
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similarities in Romantic and poststructuralist perspectives. The most significant
similarity between Novalis and Derrida is the importance they accord to paradox.
The texts of both writers are often meditations upon a certain relation with the so-
called absolute, and looking at their reflections on philosophy's desire for a secure
foundation or absolute origin leads us directly to consider the emphasis which both
place on aporia. Derrida does use the term 'the absolute' in certain texts but, to take a
slightly more general view, the notion of an absolute foundation (for this is what is at
stake in Novalis's engagement with Fichte's system) can be regarded as analogous
with the Derridean terms presence and the 'transcendental'. These are examined and
called into question by many ofDerrida's texts, in particular the earlier ones.
Looking at the concept of the absolute will reveal similarities in the texts ofNovalis
and Derrida which will elucidate all the other aspects ofmy thesis. It is important to
begin with the problem of the ego because the functioning of self-consciousness, as
conceived of by Novalis and Derrida, will start to reveal the configurations and
structures through which the other themes of this study - our experience of
otherness, the opposition between philosophical and literary discourse, aphorism,
self-referentiality and desire - can also be understood.
The reading ofNovalis's 'Fichte-Studien' (1795-96) will largely take place
alongside a discussion of Derrida's collection of essays published in 1967 as
L 'ecriture et la difference. One piece, in particular, which helps illuminate our
discussion of the absolute is the essay on the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, 'La
violence et la metaphysique'. In his excellent comparative study, The Ethics of
Deconstruction, Simon Critchley examines Derrida's relation to Levinas and points
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out that Derrida has explicitly identified Levinas's project with his own. Critchley
cites several ofDerrida's remarks, the most 'surprising' of which is his response to
Andre Jacob's question on Levinas in an interview published in Alterites. Jacob asks
Derrida to specify the distance he maintains with respect to Levinas. Derrida
responds:
Je ne sais pas.... Devant une pensee comme celle de Levinas, je n'ai jamais
d'objection. Je suis pret a souscrire a tout ce qu'il dit. £a ne veut pas dire que
je pense la meme chose de la meme fafon; mais la les differences sont tres
difficiles a determiner.5
While we cannot directly equate what Novalis terms 'the absolute' with Derrida's
and Levinas's 'tout-autre', we can trace how all three writers conceive ofways of
articulating something which cannot be made an object of discourse. Novalis's
reflections on relating to the absolute correspond closely to those pointed to by 'La
violence et la metaphysique'. Both the concept of the absolute and that of the totally-
other - 'le tout-autre' is Levinas's term for that which cannot be an object of
discourse - can be seen as ways ofpreserving some orientation towards truth and
ethical responsibility without which we would, in Andrew Bowie's words, be
'trapped by the paradoxes of relativism and the regresses of nihilism'.6 Indeed, we
shall see in Chapter 2 that a new kind of 'literature' can be regarded as emerging in
the Romantic era only in relation to this problematic - as a way of articulating and
re-articulating the truth by striving to relate to the absolute without seeking to
objectify it. As such, an understanding of our paradoxical relation to that which
5
Derrida, Alterites (Paris: Osiris, 1986), p. 74. Cited by Simon Critchley, The Ethics of
Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 9-10.
6Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy ofGerman Literary Theory
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 75.
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cannot be finally articulated assumes great importance, particularly with regard to
Derrida, who has often faced criticism for his perceived insistence on the empty play
of signifiers. And the image ofNovalis, as a Romantic poet yearning for the
unreachable absolute, simply does not stand up to a close examination of his
remarkable insights into the activity of the ego.
Grounding the Self
In the eighteenth century, in the wake of the teachings ofKant, philosophy begins to
devote itselfmore than ever to the question of the subject. Novalis contrasts the
philosophical activity of his contemporaries with that of the ancients: 'Die Alten
nannten [...] Naturlehre etc. auch Filosofie - wir haben sie auf Denken des Grundes
der Vorstellungen und Empfindungen, kurz der Veranderungen d[es] Subjects
eingeschrankt.'7 Literature, too, seems to turn inward, starting to explore its own
conditions ofpossibility as well as looking at the role of language and literature in
shaping the ego's perception of itself and of the world of living others in which it is
situated. In the next chapter, I will compare literature and philosophy as specific
forms of discourse and ask, among other things, whether Novalis and Derrida see any
differences in the ways in which these types ofwriting deal with questions of the self
and other forms of presence which are held to be of the order of an absolutely
anterior reality. For now, though, where I use the word 'philosophy', it will be
largely in the sense accorded to it by Plato when he speaks of 'living philosophy'. In
7N II, p. 272, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 567.
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this sense, philosophy can be seen as analogous with pure thought or the living logos
rather than as a specific type of discourse. I think it is fairly safe to say that, at least
at certain points in history, philosophy would like to believe that it is transparent,
closer to pure thought and truth, to presence and the absolute foundation, than other
forms of discourse. Indeed, Andrew Bowie makes a very interesting point about one
eighteenth-century German philosopher, F. H. Jacobi, who asserts that his own
position should be described as 'Unphilosophie' because he renounces the notion that
knowledge could be finally grounded in a system. This, as we will discuss in the
chapter on literature and philosophy, is one ofDerrida's main problems with
metaphysics - precisely its assumption that it is closer to the truth, the foundation or
the origin, than other types of writing. And in one of the 'Fichte-Studien' fragments
Novalis, speculating on the nature of philosophy, also observes that grounding a
system is both its ultimate goal and its necessary first step:
Filosofiren muB eine eigne Art von Denken seyn. Was thu' ich indem ich
filosofire? Ich denke iiber einen Grund nach. Dem Filosofiren liegt also ein
Streben nach dem Denken eines Grundes zum Grunde.9
Novalis draws together several important issues here. Firstly, the goal of philosophy
is qualified by the word 'Streben'; later we will look at this idea and note its
importance for the Romantic stance. For now we can note that he stresses that
8
Bowie, p. 42. According to Bowie, modern critics and philosophers have tended to overlook the
importance of Jacobi's position with regard to the philosophy of the ego. I agree with his argument
that Jacobi's work of 1798-99 is fascinating - 'startlingly prescient', as Bowie puts it - when
considered in relation to modern philosophy, but I would argue that Novalis was arriving at similar
insights on his own (as in the 'Kant-Studien' and the 'Fichte-Studien' of 1795-96). I will not consider
in detail Jacobi's relation to Novalis because, apart from the fact that it would be difficult without
further research into the intellectual climate in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, it would
not really help to illuminate our comparison ofNovalis and Derrida.
9N II, p. 269, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 566.
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philosophy is simply a kind of thinking, albeit a particular type. Furthermore, the
Novalis formulation, describing philosophy's ground as the thinking ofa ground,
both identifies the very goal of philosophy, especially in the eighteenth century, and
hints at the difficulties attendant upon such a goal.
So we need to examine the search for this absolute ground. Philosophical
systems of all kinds seek to provide a complete account of reality; to arrive at a final
articulation of the truth as it corresponds to the world 'in itself. However, for this to
be a truly complete account, there must be a grounding principle or 'basic axiom' -
in German, the 'Grundsatz'. The totality of the system depends on the positing of an
unconditioned first principle, which requires no qualification and thus anchors the
entire system. This grounding proposition, which Karl Leonhard Rheinhold tried to
establish in his Elementarphilosophie, realizing in the light ofDescartes and Kant
that it must be a 'proposition of consciousness', would be the absolute foundation of
philosophy and the proposition from which all others could be deduced. Novalis's
formulation is interesting when he says: 'Dem Filosofiren liegt also ein Streben nach
dem Denken eines Grundes zum Grunde [my emphasis].' It hints at the problem of
infinite regress which always sabotages attempts to locate a beginning (or an end) of
the chain of causality in which every cause is contingent upon a preceding one and so
on ad infinitum. A questioning of this absolute foundation both informs the
Derridean resistance to metaphysics and is central to the debate on the modernity of
Romanticism. Two terms in particular, paradox and temporality, will lead us to the
affinities between Novalis and Derrida. Manfred Frank, in several works, argues
persuasively that, along with Friedrich Holderlin, Novalis is the first thinker to reveal
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clearly the radical temporality of the self. According to Frank, herein lies early
Romanticism's unique contribution to modern philosophy. Fie says ofNovalis's
attempts to resolve the contradictions of the Fichtean system: 'Indem er nicht mit der
Diagnose eines fundamentalen Problems in der Erstfassung von Fichtes Prinzip sich
begniigt, sondern ein hochdifferenziertes Instrumentarium zu seiner Losung
erarbeitet, vermag er noch heutiger BewuBtseinstheorie gute Dienste zu leisten'.10
So, since Fichte is a catalyst in the development ofNovalis's thought, it is necessary
to look at his engagement with Fichte's Transcendental Idealism before turning to
Novalis's own account of the self and examining whether it can be said to bear
witness to the Derridean perspective.
Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre
For one ofNovalis's contemporaries, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the ultimate founding
principle of philosophy is the ego - the ego itself is the absolute. I said above that the
proliferation of attempts in eighteenth-century philosophy to account for self-
consciousness is inevitable in the light ofDescartes and Kant. To put it briefly, the
turn towards the subject can be seen in some ways as a response to the failure of
previous philosophical systems to ground themselves. Fichte's Idealism is one
attempt to address the perceived failings of Enlightenment philosophy - in essence,
Cartesianism - which 'holds the necessities of thought evident in mathematics and
10 Manfred Frank, Gerhard Kurz, 'Ordo Inversus: Zu einer Reflexionsfigur bei Novalis, Holderlin,
Kleist und Kafka', in Geist und Zeichen: Festschriftfur Arthur Henkel (Heidelberg: Winter, 1977),
pp. 75-97 (p. 76). The sections on Novalis and Holderlin are written by Frank. See also his book, Das
Problem 'Zeit' in der dentschen Romantik: Zeitbexvufitsein nnd Bewufltsein von Zeitlichkeit in der
friihromantischen Philosophie und in Tiecks Dichtung (Munich: Winkler, 1972).
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logic to be imbued in the very nature of things, so that the task of thinking is to
construct the whole pattern of reality on the basis of these indisputable a priori
foundations'.11 Kant, rejecting the philosophy ofDescartes and building on David
Hume's questioning of causality, asserts that these foundations are located only in
our way of seeing the world; they are necessities in thought, not in the world in itself.
The fact that Fichte calls his philosophy of the ego the Wissenschaftslehre - usually
translated as The Science ofKnowledge - indicates that for him the ego is the key to
all knowledge. And if Derrida recognizes that self-consciousness is the apparent
underpinning of all values, as in the quotation with which I prefaced this chapter,
Novalis puts it as follows: 'Wenn ich frage, was eine Sache ist, so frage ich nach
12ihrer Vorstellung und Anschauung - ich frage mich nur nach mir selbst.'
The failure of Rationalism is, therefore, to a large extent what motivates both
Kant and Fichte. In the empirical world of conditions, each cause depends on a prior
cause and so on. Fichte, like Kant, seeking to escape this infinite regress, realizes that
the thinking self cannot be of the same order as the world of conditions ofwhich it is
the cognitive condition of possibility. As Andrew Bowie puts it:
The fact is that it is contradictory to think that a complete account of the
world in terms of scientific laws is absolute, unless consciousness could
explain itself in a completely law-bound manner. The problem is that the
explanation must be of the same kind used to explain a phenomenon of nature
like any other, but the whole point of transcendental philosophy, which Fichte
saw more clearly than anyone, is that the condition of possibility of grasping








In other words, how are we to account for the subject whose cognition gives meaning
to the world 'in itself including the subject's place in this world? Novalis ponders
this in typically brief fashion: 'Kann ich ein Schema fur mich suchen, da ich das
Schematisierende bin?'14 Here we are coming to the crux of Fichte's main problem
with Kant's system. Indeed, it is very much Kant's own problem, namely the need to
resolve the apparent contradiction that the human subject is part of the world of
appearances and yet at the same time is to be regarded as the subject whose cognitive
activity gives this world meaning. Kant has trouble with this because, if the
foundation of the self s cognition is part of the world of appearances, moral freedom
- and hence moral responsibility - is curtailed as we submit to a deterministic world-
view. Kant, therefore, needs to take the step of describing the activity of the self as
'unconditioned'. This frees it from the law-bound world of conditions where every
action is caused by a condition which is in turn contingent upon a preceding one.
Fichte's solution, taking Kant's thought even further, is to posit 'das Absolute Ich'
('the Absolute Ego') as the agent under which existence and knowledge, objectivity
and subjectivity, matter and form, world and self, are synthesized. His 'Grundsatz',
or first basic axiom, is that the absolute and self-identical I, as self-generating and
spontaneous 'Thathandlung' ('deed-action'), is the absolute ground from which the
intelligibility of the world ensues and, as such, is free of the world of conditions and
needs no further ground. It is its own ground:
[...] das Ich ist, und es setzt sein Seyn vermoge seines bloBen Seyns. - Es ist
zugleich das Handelnde, und das Product der Handlung; das Thatige, und das,
was durch die Thatigkeit hervorgebracht wird; Handlung und That sind Eins
und ebendasselbe.15
14 N II, p. 252, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 469.
15 J. G. Fichte, Samtliche Werke, ed. by J. H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit, 1845), vol. 1, p. 96.
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Andrew Bowie notes that this conception appealed to the Romantics. But he also
points out that, as we shall see when we turn to Novalis's 'Fichte-Studien', they were
not without their reservations:
Despite their doubts about Fichte's conception, the Romantics were highly
attracted by the sense that what Fichte was striving to understand, the I, as
that which revealed nature, could not be understood in the objectifying terms
which had dominated Western philosophical thinking's relationship to the
natural world until this period. This soon led, in Schelling, Holderlin,
Schlegel and Novalis, to the notion that the I might best be understood by
aesthetic means.16
The 'Fichte-Studien'
Fichte's philosophy was to have an immediate impact on the young Novalis. As a
student at Jena in the early 1790s, Novalis attended the lectures in which the
philosopher expounded his Wissenschaftslehre. In studying the philosopher, Novalis
engaged fully with the complexities of the Fichtean system and produced, as we shall
see, the intricate outline of a solution to what he felt were its inadequacies. The tone
of the 'Fichte-Studien' is very tentative. The caution with which Novalis proceeds
reminds us that he is, at least initially, a disciple of Fichte's. However, he seems to
grow in confidence throughout the studies and we are reminded of Derrida's
admission of the difficulty of addressing or criticizing a teacher. As Derrida says of
his relationship with his own former teacher, Michel Foucault:
16 Bowie, p. 42.
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le disciple sait qu'il est seul a se trouver de ce fait deja conteste par la voix du
maitre qui en lui precede la sienne. II se sent indefmiment conteste, ou recuse,
ou accuse: comme disciple, il Test par le maitre qui parle en lui [...]; comme
maitre du dedans, il est done conteste par le disciple qu'il est aussi. Ce
malheur interminable du disciple tient peut-etre a ce qu'il ne sait pas ou se
cache encore que, comme la vraie vie, le maitre est peut-etre toujours absent.
II faut done briser la glace, ou plutot le miroir, la reflexion, la
speculation infinie du disciple sur le maitre. Et commencer a parler.17
Though he begins within Fichte's system, the engagement with his former
teacher develops rapidly into the outline ofNovalis's own version of self-
consciousness. In the Fichtean system, the spontaneous 'Thathandlung' must be
absolute and original. Fichte's Absolute Ego posits itself directly and is thus not
given but self-generating - the absolute ground from which the intelligibility of the
world ensues. 'Das Absolute Ich' is whole and self-identical, and even though Fichte
defines the world as the 'Nicht Ich', i.e. everything which the ego is not, the
Absolute Ego is not to be seen as dependent on its other but vice versa. Strictly
speaking, the 'Nicht Ich' does define the 'Ich', but the ego is given priority over the
world according to a hierarchical binary opposition familiar to us from the work of
Derrida. We will consider in later chapters the way in which any opposition is
motivated; one element is always held to be superior. But we will also see the
surprising disorder revealed by deconstruction and the logic of supplementarity. For
now though, we just need to recognize that for Fichte the world, in effect, is entirely
subjugated by the ego - in fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that it is assimilated
into the ego.
17 Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference, p. 52.
36
Fichte's model of a self-positing ego neatly overcomes at the same time the
problem of the necessarily already split ego of the traditional reflection-model - no
self-consciousness without the ego both as reflecting subject and reflected object.
The traditional reflection-model is unsatisfactory because it describes how the
subject of self-consciousness reflects upon itself as its own object without
sufficiently explaining the fact that, for this to be valid, the ego must already be
acquainted with itself in order to recognize itself as itself. Fichte sees that the
reflection cannot be regarded as the origin of self-consciousness because, as Novalis
also maintains, '[w]as die Reflexionfindet, scheint schon da zu seyrC [Novalis's
..18
italics]. Another consequence of the traditional model which Fichte seeks to avoid
is the idea of infinite regress. The regress is inevitable because a self which is
conscious of itself, which reflects on itself, would then also have to be conscious of
itselfplus the part which is conscious of itself, and so on. Fichte's solution is, in a
way, breathtakingly simple. Why not begin with a self-consciousness which emerges
along with the self? A conscious self which, because its Being is simultaneous and
identical with its self-positing ('es ist, und es setzt sich'), is absolute, whole and self-
identical. However, Novalis is troubled by precisely this aspect of the
Wissenschaftslehre because it fails to account adequately for the foundation or cause
of the self s knowledge of itself, or in other words, that the self and self-
consciousness exist at all. Fichte actually founders on the Kantian problem he seeks
to circumvent. As we saw above, the self, even without consciousness of itself,
simply cannot be explained in the same objectifying terms as the empirical world of
which it is the cognitive condition of possibility. As Manfred Frank puts it:
18 N II, p. 112, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 14.
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In der Tatigung des Ich bleibt der Wissensgrund vom Wissen fur die
Reflexion unterschieden. Ohne einen unaktuiert in der Tiefe schlummernden
Urgrund ware das Wissen als sein Produkt nicht einmal frei zu postulieren.
Dieser Urgrund kann nicht selber ins BewuBtsein fallen. [...] Das Ich kann
seine Unbedingtheit nicht rechtfertigen aus seinem selbst bedingten
Zustand.19
The following fragment ofNovalis reads almost like a re-formulation of this point
and reminds us of Bowie's point that consciousness cannot be explained in the same
terms as that of which it is conscious - the 'Lernende' cannot be of the same order as
the 'Gegenstand' which is learnt:
D[ie] Filosofie soil nicht mehr antworten, als sie gefragt wird.
Hervorbringen kann sie nichts. [...] Sie handelt von einem Gegenstande, der
nicht gelernt wird. Wir mussen aber alle Gegenstande lernen - Also von gar
keinem Gegenstande. Was gelernt wird muB doch verschieden sein vom
Lernenden. Was gelernt wird ist ein Gegenstand - also ist das Lernende kein
Gegenstand. Konnte die Filosofie vielleicht vom Lernenden handeln, also von
uns, wenn wir Gegenstande lernen? Die Filosofie ist aber selbst im
Lernenden. Nun da wird die Selbstbetrachtung seyn. Ey! Wie fangt es der
Lernende an sich selbst in dieser Operation zu belauschen. Er miiBte sich also
lernen - denn unter lernen verstehen wir tiberhaupt nichts, als den
Gegenstand anschauen und ihn mit seinen Merckmale[n] uns einpragen. Es
wiirde also wieder ein Gegenstand. Nein, Selbstbetrachtung kann sie nicht
seyn, denn sonst ware sie nicht das Verlangte. Es ist ein Selbstgefuhl
vielleicht.20
The above quotation sets out in a series of logical steps the problems facing
philosophy's attempt to make an object of the ground of self-consciousness. Novalis
uses the term Ternen' (literally 'to learn') in the sense of'to know objectively' or 'to
intuit' ('den Gegenstand anschauen'). The salient point, as we saw above, is that the
'Lernende' cannot be of the same order as that which is learnt. Novalis then wonders
19 Frank, 'Die Philosophie des sogenannten "magischen Idealismus'", Enphorion, 63 (1969), 88-116
(91-92).
20 N II, p. 113, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 15.
38
whether philosophy's task is to observe the human subject as it learns; to learn itself
as it learns itself('Er miiBte sich also lernen'). But of course this would render the
subject an object once more, and Novalis concludes that 'Selbstbetrachtung' cannot
be the answer. How, Novalis asks with a little exclamation of frustration, can the
subject listen to itself in the process of self-consciousness? 'Ey! Wie fangt es der
Lernende an sich selbst in dieser Operation zu belauschen.' Interestingly, his
terminology here is reminiscent ofDerrida's description of Hegelian philosophy as
'the absolute desire to hear oneself speaking.' Andrew Bowie credits Derrida with
21'one of the decisive moves in recent literary theory' for the way in which he
subverts this notion by demonstrating how the perfect reflection or self-mirroring
inherent in the idea of 'hearing oneself speaking' is arrested and prevented by the
means of signification one uses to do so. Bowie explains this in terms of the
differance inherent in the chain of signification - one signifier being dependent on
others with no ultimate access to a final positive meaning. He goes on to suggest that
'a related, though not identical, conception is central to thinking about literature in
Romantic philosophy, where it emerges as a result of the links between the Spinozist
ideas observed here and aspects ofKant's notion of the "free play" of the
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imagination in aesthetic experience.' While I largely agree with Bowie on this
point, and will return to the Romantics' idea of literature in the following chapter, I
do not think we have to go as far as the idea of 'literature' to see how something
similar to Derridean differance informs Novalis's reservations about the transparency
of the subject to itself. At a more fundamental level, we shall see how the workings
of representation and time prevent the neat and absolute reflection of hearing oneself
21
Bowie, p. 43.
22 Ibid., p. 44.
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speaking or, as Novalis puts it above, 'listening to oneself in the operation of self-
consciousness. So, before proceeding to Novalis's outline of self-consciousness, we
must first look at differance and draw together some of the things which it attempts
to name.
Difference and Differance
Differance is a 'neographism' of Derrida's - neographism because in French the
difference between 'difference' and 'differance' can only be marked in writing, can,
therefore, only be written or read, not spoken or heard. Derrida, insisting that it is
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neither a word nor a concept, nevertheless undertakes a 'semantic analysis' of
differance in the essay of the same name, published in Marges de la philosophie. In
French, the verb 'differer' (from the Latin differre) has two distinct, though related,
meanings. The first aspect of differance can be characterized as Ta temporisation' or
deferral, and Derrida says: 'Differer en ce sens, c'est temporiser, c'est recourir,
consciemment ou inconsciemment, a la mediation temporelle et temporisatrice d'un
detour suspendant l'accomplissement ou le remplissement du "desir" [...]'.24 The
second and more usual meaning has to do with difference, i.e., 'ne pas etre identique,
9 S
etre autre, discernable, etc.' There is no gerund, no noun-verb, for either sense in
French, and the noun 'difference' does not convey anything of the former sense, 'to
defer'. The 'a' of differance thus not only suspends the difference between 'differ'
and 'defer' but also the difference between active and passive:
2 >
Derrida, Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Minuit, 1972), pp. 5-7.
24 Ibid., p. 8.
25 Ibid.
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ce qui se laisse designer par 'differance' n'est ni simplement actif ni
simplement passif [...] disant une operation qui n'est pas une operation, qui
ne se laisse penser ni comme passion ni comme action d'un sujet sur un objet,
ni a partir d'un agent ni a partir d'un patient, ni a partir ni en vue d'aucun de
ces termes.26
Derrida first of all demonstrates how in the sense of deferral, differance is
already implicit in the philosophical concept of the sign. Conventionally, a sign is
already thought of in terms of deferral: it is proffered in the place of the no-longer-
present thing or referent. This sign, then, deferring presence, is conceived only on the
basis of the presence that it defers and is held to ensure movement towards the
deferred presence that it seems to reappropriate; the absence is thus a modified
presence. However, we shall soon see how both Derrida and Novalis complicate and
displace the primacy of this presence. Pausing to note here the provisional and
secondary character which this privileging of presence confers upon the sign in
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relation to the thing, I am going to move straight on to the other aspect of
differance. Derrida recalls Saussure's argument about the differences in the
language-system: in language there are only differences. And, more importantly,
while 'difference' generally implies positive terms between which the difference is
28
set up, in language there are only differences without positive terms. Derrida says
that what is written as 'differance':
ce sera done le mouvement de jeu qui 'produit', par ce qui n'est pas
simplement une activite, ces differences, ces effets de difference. Cela ne
veut pas dire que la differance qui produit les differences soit avant elles,
dans un present simple et en soi immodifie, in-different. La differance est
26 Derrida, Marges de laphilosophie, p. 9.
27 The secondariness of the sign will be important in Chapter 2, when we come to consider
philosophy's dislike for writing.
28 See Derrida, Marges de la philosophie, p. 11.
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F'origine' non-pleine, son-simple, l'origine structuree et differante des
• • • 29differences. Le nom d"origine' ne lui convient done plus.
Differance is what subverts attempts to objectify the absolute. Derrida and
Levinas, like Novalis, are very much aware that knowledge of (consciousness of)
something is not possible without objectification and representation. Derrida reminds
us that it has often been argued that 'une philosophic de la conscience etait toujours
philosophic de l'objet'.30 Consciousness requires an object, a 'Gegenstand'. (The
German word expresses well the idea of standing opposite; the accusative.) But once
again we are faced with this question: where does this take account of the subject
which reflects on or posits itself as object? Because he seeks to solve this problem
simply by positing an Absolute Ego which is generated simultaneously along with
the awareness of itself, Fichte's absolute and spontaneous 'Thathandlung' is a mere
tautology, an ultimately meaningless circle. This is essentially where Novalis begins
to depart from Fichte's system. To look at it another way, Novalis objects to the
inconsistency involved in describing the self-positing of the ego as an absolute
action. The absolute foundation of philosophy cannot be of the order of an action -
an action which, of course, takes place in time. Manfred Frank pinpoints the
problem:
Die Urhandlung, in der sich das seiner bewuBte Ich losreiBt aus seiner
unvordenklichen Einheit und in Differenz zu seinem Sein setzt, kann nicht
Prinzip der Philosophic sein. Die Philosophic, deren erster Schritt die
Fundierung des Endlichen als eines Endlichen ist, genugt dem eignen
Anspruch nicht, unbedingt zu beginnen.31
29
Derrida, Marges de laphilosophie, p. 12.
30 Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference, p. 126.
31
Frank, Das Problem 'Zeit', p. 22.
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And Novalis, even more succinctly, points out that any absolute foundation would
have to be eternal and immutable - he calls it the 'Augenblick, der das ewige
Universum umfaBt'.32 As we shall see more clearly later in the chapter, the absolute
cannot be subject to the essential difference - in the sense of differing from itself
which constitutes the movement of time. The philosophical implications ofNovalis's
insights are far-reaching and, indeed, have continued to be articulated in modern
philosophy and literary theory. For example, taking Andrew Bowie's description of
Hegel's system as 'the most emphatic and totalising form of "self-presence"', we
see how Novalis's acknowledgement of the temporality of self-consciousness leads
inevitably to the questioning of the concept of 'presence' in the same way that
Derridean differance undermines a Hegelian desire for One philosophy. It would
seem that the very idea of time is an unwelcome one for any philosopher who seeks
to fix a system, to give it a permanent and absolute foundation and an ultimate goal.
But, initially, Novalis's engagement with Fichte starts with an apparently small
phrase - the logical proposition referred to as the 'proposition of identity'.
Novalis begins, like Fichte, with the proposition of identity, but where Fichte
sees the self-identical, Novalis sees only difference. For Fichte 'a ist a' is the
expression of the ego's original and absolute unity ('Ich = Ich'). Here Fichte uses the
seemingly irrefutable logic of grammar to guarantee the self-identity of the ego. As
he describes it, the simultaneity of being and self-positing means that the absolute
ego is whole and self-identical in and for consciousness. And because of both its
accessibility to consciousness and the fact that it is what it is ('a ist a'), the Absolute




Ego can, according to Fichte, legitimately be the grounding proposition of
philosophy. But Novalis sees the problem with this proposition immediately:
In dem Satz a ist a liegt nichts als ein Setzen, Unterscheiden und verbinden.
Es ist ein philosophischer Parallelismus. Um a deutlicher zu machen wird A
getheilt. Ist wird als allgemeiner Gehalt, a als bestimmte Form aufgestellt.
Das Wesen der Identitat laBt sich nur in einen Scheinsatz aufstellen.34
Novalis rightly realizes that the very act of equating ('gleichsetzen') always already
implies difference and is thus the expression of a merely relative identity. The
original absolute and singular identity of 'a' cannot be expressed in the proposition 'a
ist a', which is only a pseudoproposition - Novalis calls it a 'Scheinsatz.' Expressed
in terms of self-consciousness, the philosophical proposition 'Ich = Ich' cannot
possibly convey the one-ness of the ego before consciousness. What we are dealing
with here, with the word 'ist', is precisely the kind of philosophical, propositional
language called into question by both Levinas and Derrida. As Simon Critchley puts
it, 'the primacy of the third person present indicative of the copula in predicative
propositions - S is P - is one of the principal targets of deconstruction.' Such
language rests on what Heidegger termed the ontological difference - the forgotten
question of Being. It is my contention that the importance ofNovalis for modern
literary-theoretical positions lies in his recognition that the concept of equating
consists in representation; and representation always already involves difference. In
this, I do not in any way contradict Manfred Frank's insistence that Novalis's work
on the radical temporality of the self constitutes his major contribution to modern




thought. As we shall see, the intervention of representation in self-consciousness
involves differance\ deferral as much as difference.
The Ordo Inversus
Frank has done perhaps more than any other critic to identify Novalis's unique
solution to the problem of self-consciousness. It hangs on the interplay between what
Novalis calls in the above quotation 'Selbstbetrachtung' (sometimes 'Reflexion') and
'Selbstgefuhl' (or simply 'Gefuhl') - an interplay which takes place in time and in
which, as we shall see, neither term can be given precedence. Frank has pointed out
that scholarship has been slow to appreciate the originality ofNovalis's solution due
to a certain confusion over terminology. Ordo inversus is the term which Frank lifts
from the 'Fichte-Studien' as best describing Hardenberg's model, but as he says,
Novalis was apparently very taken with this figure of inversion and throughout his
life continued to work it out with varying terminology, at times borrowing heavily
from Fichte, which only serves to obfuscate the nature of the actual departure from
Fichte.
Novalis's answer to the doubly irritating reflection model is a 'nicht
-7 r
thetisches BewuBtsein', a non-positing consciousness, which as such does not take
or posit itself as an object upon which it reflects but which does enjoy an absolute
identity, an original one-ness with itself. This state of one-ness is referred to by
36 Frank, 'Ordo Inversus', p. 76.
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Novalis as the 'Zustand' and the only relation the subject can have to this pre-
reflexive state is in the form of a feeling, a 'Selbstgefuhl'. As we have seen, the
'setzen, unterscheiden und verbinden' necessary for consciousness to know itself as
represented object means that this state of one-ness cannot possibly be a direct object
of consciousness. Consciousness cannot' learn itself because, as we have seen,
Novalis contends that learning is 'den Gegenstand anschauen' and, as a consequence,
'[es] wiirde wieder ein Gegenstand'. Here we see once more the importance of the
word 'Schein' for Novalis. (This term, which de Man, as we saw, translates as
'fiction', can mean shine, reflection or appearance. Unfortunately, it loses some of its
semantic plurality in English.) 'Das Wesen der Identitat laBt sich nur in einen
Scheinsatz aufstellen. Wir verlassen das Identische um es darzustellen' [Novalis's
T7 • i • •
italics]. We cannot know the pre-reflexive 'Zustand'. As Novalis puts it: 'Die
Grenzen des Gefuhls sind die Grenzen der Filosofie. Das Gefiihl kann sich nicht
selber fiihlen.'38
One might wonder at this point whether Novalis is according the
'
Selbstgefuhl' the status of an absolute, in effect replacing Fichte's Absolute Ego
with another absolute. However, and this is vitally important, the 'Selbstgefuhl',
unlike the Fichtean Absolute Ego, is not absolutely original, autonomous or
spontaneous. It is, rather, contingent, the 'Resultat [my italics]',39 of an absolute
cause which always already escapes it. (By 'absolute cause' I mean here absolutely
other, inaccessible to consciousness, thought and philosophical discourse.) As a pre-
reflexive state which does not posit or thematize itself (in other words, as non-
37 N II, p. 104, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 1.
38 Ibid., p. 114, no. 15.
39 Ibid., p. 107, no. 3.
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knowledge), this pure 'feeling' must remain inaccessible until it is reflected. But as
soon as this happens it becomes nothing more than the reflection (and thus the non-
being) of the pure-being-itself or one-ness of the 'Zustand'. The identity-with-itself-
only of the 'Zustand' is transformed by reflection into an identity which is only
relative in the same way that the mirror image is only ever relatively identical to the
original - it is an identity marked by difference. This necessary intervention of
representation utterly precludes knowledge of the absolute self-identity of the self
which it possesses in the pre-reflexive 'Zustand'. Now the connection with Levinas's
and Derrida's 'tout-autre' is becoming clearer. To reiterate the point I made above:
without directly equating the absolute with the totally-other, a comparison of how
Novalis and Derrida approach these is interesting and, for my purposes, necessary. It
helps illuminate the significance of the 'Fichte-Studien' for literary theory today.
Only what Derrida terms a 'violent' metaphysics would attempt to assimilate the
very alterity of this pre-reflexive 'Zustand'. In this sense, and without trying to put a
superficial Derridean spin on Novalis, I would say that Novalis's awareness of the
ungraspability of the 'Zustand' is precisely the same as that which informs Derrida's
insistence that there is a 'tout-autre' - an Other which cannot be made the object of
philosophy.
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'Ein Bild des Seyns im Seyn'
In the speculative tone characteristic of the 'Fichte-Studien', Novalis wonders:
Das BewuBtseyn ist ein Seyn auBer dem Seyn im Seyn.
Was ist aber das?
Das AuBer dem Seyn muB kein rechtes Seyn seyn.
Ein unrechtes Seyn auBer dem Seyn ist ein Bild - Also muB jenes auBer dem
Seyn ein Bild des Seyns im Seyn seyn.
D[as] BewuBtseyn ist folglich ein Bild des Seyns im Seyn.40
We need to keep in mind here that what Novalis refers to in the above quotation as
'Seyn' refers specifically (and only) to the being of the ego in andfor consciousness.
The term 'Seyn' is by no means to be confused with what Novalis calls 'Nur Seyn',
or sometimes 'Chaos'. This 'Nur Seyn' is the being-of-the-ego-for-itselfplus its
Being - the pre-reflexive 'Zustand'. The 'Zustand' is not directly accessible to
consciousness but it gives rise to consciousness; it is the always already lost origin of
self-consciousness. That which is accessible to thought, to discourse, to philosophy
(i.e., 'im Seyn') always already bears the trace of representation. Without the
objectification made possible by the substituting sign, nothing would seem to be
presented to consciousness. There would be, in effect, no self-consciousness. Novalis
says: 'Deutlich wird etwas nur durch Repraesentation'.41 Signs intervene. Or, rather,
we can say that signs and substitutions are what make up the functioning of the ego.
They open up the possibility of self-consciousness and, as we shall see when we
come to Derrida's reading of Plato in the following chapter, it is only from signs and
supplements that 'living' memory emerges.
40 Ibid., p. 106, no. 2.
41 N III, p. 246, 'Das Allgemeine Brouillon', no. 49.
48
Novalis goes on to point out the need for a closer examination of the role of
signs:
Nahere Erklarung des Bildes. /Zeichen/ Theorie des Zeichens. / Theorie der
Darstellung oder des Nichtseyns im Seyn, um das Seyn fur sich aufgewisse
Weise daseyn zu lassen/ Theorie des Raums und der Zeit beym Bilde.42
Later in the 'Fichte-Studien', he begins to relate this demand for a theory of the sign
specifically to language. Indeed, John Neubauer identifies the topic of 'Sprache' as
another fruitful area for a comparison ofNovalis and postmodernism. We will have
cause in the following chapter to look more closely at Novalis's reflections on
language as sign-system in the 'Fichte-Studien' and in other works, both theoretical
and more overtly 'literary'. We will also look at philosophy and poetry as different
types of writing and examine the ways Western philosophy has treated them in
relation to memory and self-consciousness. For now though we will consider
representation in a more general sense and examine the role it plays in Novalis's
version of self-consciousness. This will help set the scene for the history of truth
which Derrida sees as playing itself out between Plato and Mallarme. We will find
that the idea of representation cannot be separated from the history of truth.
Frank, in the article written with Kurz on the ordo inversus as it appears in
Novalis, Holderlin, Kafka and Kleist, has written a very clear summary of some of
the more complex aspects of the 'Fichte-Studien'. He sketches Novalis's solution to
the problem that Being cannot be directly represented - and yet is 'in a certain way'
accessible to the subject - as follows. It is thanks to a double reflection which
42 N II, p. 106, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 2.
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cancels out the non-Being of the reflected 'Zustand' and transforms it once more into
Being for and in consciousness. The subject reflects upon what is actually itself a
reflection:
Von der je schon geschehenen Uroffenbarung im Gefuhl (Resultat) auf sich
selbst als Thematisierung derselben zurtickbiegend, negiert die Reflexion jene
Verkehrung und stellt die Wahrheit negativ als ein Resultat her, das auf das
erste Resultat scheinbar paradox als auf eine tatsachliche Voraussetzung
aufbaut. Natiirlich verwandelt die Darstellung das Sein zunachst nur in sein
Nichtseyn, (...) [in] ein Nichtidentisches (104).43
So what the subject perceives as happening in consciousness is the reverse ofwhat
actually happens. Frank regards this double reflection as a variation on the Fichtean
law of reflection by which we can think something only by first thinking that which
it is not. But the Fichtean ego, although split into subject and object, grasps
cognitively and gives meaning to that which it is not ('Nicht Ich'). This primacy of
the 'Ich' - along with the subsequent subjugation of the 'Nicht Ich - is, in effect, the
return of the other to the same. The absolute and original identity of the ego remains
intact. But the Novalissian ego is always already marked by a radical alterity, a
difference with itself with no possibility of even momentary self-identity. Where
Fichte's Absolute Ego assimilates the 'Nicht-Ich', Novalis's 'Zustand' is necessarily
transformed into non-being, appearance, 'Schein', in order for it to be at all
accessible to the subject of consciousness. The double reflection only apparently
transforms it once more into Being - this is why what the subject finds 'scheint
schon da zu seyn ',44 So, and this is the consequence of this departure from Fichte, for
Novalis feeling and reflection only coincide on an abstract level - in thought or in
43
Frank, 'Ordo inversus', p. 77. References in brackets are to the critical edition ofNovalis (N II).
44 N II, p. 112, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 14.
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philosophy. Yet, at this point, we might still be wondering whether this internal
difference is not merely what Derrida and Levinas refer to as 'the play of the same'.
Derrida says: 'Le moi est le meme. L'alterite ou la negativite interieure au moi, la
difference interieure n'est qu'une apparence: une illusion, un "jeu du Meme" [ ].'45
Pausing to note that Derrida, too, recognizes the role of illusion (what Novalis calls
'Schein') in the functioning of self-consciousness, we now need to try to draw out
the aspect ofNovalis's outline which demonstrates his respect for the total otherness
of the absolute.
The Double Bind
In Fichte's version, the 'Nicht-Ich', while it is certainly other than the empirical
'Ich', loses its alterity by being assimilated into the transcendental Absolute Ego.
The Absolute Ego knows (grasps cognitively; understands) both ego and world. But
for Novalis, self-consciousness is a process, which he refers to as the 'Rollentausch'
- a to-ing and fro-ing or 'Wechselwirkung'46 - between subjective and objective
moments, between knowledge (non-Being) and non-knowledge (Being), between
'Reflexion' and 'Gefiihl', whose figure is that of the 'double bind'. The self-
conscious ego is also termed 'analytisches Ich' by Novalis, but due to the logic of
temporality, the analytical ego cannot be conscious of itself in the moment that it is
45
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46 Novalis uses the terms 'Wechselwirkung' and 'wechselseitig' frequently in the 'Fichte-Studien'. At
times, these refer to problems of communication and 'transmission' of meaning between human
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the ego. It can only be conscious of the represented ego, the reflection of ego.
'Synthetisches Ich' would be the identity of self and self-consciousness (the
'Zustand') but this is not available in and for the ego. Novalis puts it like this:
Analytisches Ich ist Ich mit BewuBtseyn - synthetisches Ich, ohne
BewuBtseyn. Im Synthetischen Ich schaut sich das analytische Ich an. [...]
Das analytische Ich wechselt wieder mit sich selbst - wie das Ich schlechthin
— in der Anschauung - Es wechselt Bild und Seyn. Das Bild ist immer das
verkehrte vom Seyn.47
True coincidence of the analytical ego and the synthetic ego is utterly impossible.
Impossible because, the double reflection notwithstanding, the 'always already' of
separation and representation means that the entire process by which the self attains
consciousness of itself is exactly that - a process, an ever-changing dynamic which
is part of the flow of time. The following description from Novalis re-formulates and
further elucidates the entire problematic:
Reflectirt das Subject aufs reine Ich - so hat es nichts - indem es was fur sich
hat - reflectirt es hingegen nicht darauf- so hat es fur sich nichts, indem es
was hat.48
This beautifully concise statement describes an aporia: it is a version ofwhat Derrida
calls a 'double bind' (the term always appears in English in his texts). The 'Zustand'
(the pre-reflexive state of one-ness) is only there when the subject refrains from
reflecting on itself, but in this moment ofpure identity the self is non-knowledge,
i.e., not graspable by either consciousness or philosophy. And when the subject
47 N II, p.142, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 63.
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knows itself, makes an object of itself, the content actually escapes it thanks to the
double-reflection of the ordo inversus - the subject's gaze believes it is meeting
something, but it is merely meeting a reflection. Non-Being reflected back into Being
may appear the same, the right way up and the right way round, but it is still Being
transformed by representation into appearance or 'Schein'. Thinking, which is of the
same order as philosophy, cannot do without representation. Novalis says: 'Alles
Denken ist also eine Kunst des Scheins.'49 Later on in the 'Fichte-Studien', he says:
'Denken der Ausdruck/die AuBerung/ des Nicht-Seyns.'50 In as much as it may be
said to be a ground (in philosophy's sense) the self s ground is its Being, but it
always already escapes the thinking, reflecting subject. 'Paradox' is Novalis's term
for the aporia of self-consciousness and its relation to the absolute. Derrida uses the
word paradox but more frequently speaks of'the aporia', 'the impossible possible',
or the 'double bind'. Time, as Manfred Frank puts it, is the 'Ursprungsdimension des
BewuBtseins'.51 And there is no paradox without time.
Indeed, time and paradox cannot be thought separately, as the following
quotation from Derrida suggests:
Cette formulation du paradoxe et de l'impossible en appelle done a une figure
qui ressemble a une structure de la temporalite, a une dissociation instantanee
du present, a une differance dans l'etre avec soi du present [...].52
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52 Derrida, Apories (Paris: Galilee, 1996), pp. 38-39.
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Despite the complexities ofNovalis's account of self-consciousness, we can pinpoint
the difference with Fichte fairly succinctly - because of the original differance from
which self-consciousness emerges, the self is never present to itself. To put it in the
simplest terms, the empirical subject is not that upon which it feels itself to be
dependent. Manfred Frank describes the original self-identity of the ego (Novalis's
'Synthetisches Ich' or 'Nur Seyn') as 'das Sein an sich' or 'die Identitat ihres
BewuBtseins und ihres Seins'. He says:
Diese Identitat, die der Grundsatz der Philosophic des deutschen Idealismus
gewesen ist, wird dem BewuBtsein zur 'regulativen Idee,' an deren
Unerreichbarkeit es verzweifelt und die, ewig vorschwebend, ewig verfehlt
wird.53
Due to the aporetic or temporal structure of consciousness, the subject can never
enjoy the absolute unity of self, but thanks to the thematization of the 'Selbstgefuhl'
(through which the one-ness of the 'Zustand' is experienced as past) the self never
ceases trying to supplement this lack of being and the sought-after absolute identity
remains ever future. Time, bearing as it does the trace of both past and future, is the
expression both of the lack inherent in the ego and of the possibility of its fulfilment.
This is why the idea of never-ending 'Streben' is so central to Romanticism. We
shall see in Chapter 3 how this eternal striving towards the absolute underlies the
Romantics' predilection for the fragmentary. And the final chapter deals with our
relationships with others, and examines ways in which Novalis and Derrida articulate
the paradoxical relationship between separation (or lack) and never-ending desire.
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Derrida, in many of his works, demonstrates how the present, like the self, is
condemned to this impossible-possible aporetic structure, the structure of a Catch-22
or of the double bind. Like the Novalissian self, the now is and is not what it is: 'Le
maintenant est mais il n'est pas ce qu'il est. Plus precisement, il n'est ce qu'il est que
"faiblement" (amudrds). En tant qu'il a ete, il n'est plus. Mais en tant qu'il sera,
comme l'avenir ou la mort [...], il n'est pas encore.'54 Fichte cannot allow for time in
his attempt to fix self-consciousness in a static opposition between subject and
object, self and non-self, in the Absolute Ego. Ironically, his attempt to fix the
absolute actually fails to respect its otherness. The paradoxes which structure self-
consciousness in Novalis's version reveal that, for him, the difference in the ego is
not merely the play of the same. If everything in Fichte's system is founded on the
absolute ego, then he has colluded in what Derrida terms a 'philosophy of light':
'Tout ce qui m'est donne dans la lumiere parait m'etre donne a moi-meme par moi-
meme.'55 But the one thing I cannot give myself is time. Levinas, Derrida and
Novalis all recognize that this philosophy of light and unity is a philosophy of a
world without time: 'philosophie d'un monde de la lumiere, d'un monde sans
temps'.56 Novalis says:
Die Zeit kann nie aufhoren - Wegdenken konnen wir die Zeit nicht - denn die
Zeit ist ja Bedingung des denkenden Wesens - die Zeit hort nur mit dem
Denken auf. Denken auBer der Zeit ist ein Unding'.57
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And, as Derrida puts it, '[...] la simple conscience interne ne saurait, sans 1'irruption
du tout-autre, se donner le temps et Talterite absolu des instants, de meme le moi ne
peut engendrer en soi l'alterite sans la rencontre d'autrui.'~ Derrida has often
reflected on the way in which the two common-sense meanings of 'present' - both
'present' as in 'not absent' and as in 'now' - are inextricably linked. Both are based
on the assumption that something 'is-here-in-this-moment.' So, in a way, qualifying
'the present' with 'in the temporal sense' is a tautology. However, it is useful to do
so in order to emphasize the way in which differance prevents self-presence. The self
for Novalis, then, like the present in the temporal sense, is never present to itself and
the absolute remains forever out of reach, but were this not the case there would be
neither empirical self nor philosophy. Indeed, Frank sees these as being of the same
order as temporality: 'wo immer Philosophieren ist, ist demnach empirisches Ich,
Geist und Zeitlichkeit.'59 As we will see more clearly in the chapter on the death of
the other, there would be no desire either. The absolute, the firm foundation of self-
consciousness cannot be thought. It is beyond the reach of philosophy and yet we
cannot do without it.
58 Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference, p. 140.
59 Frank, 'Die Philosophie des sogennanten "magischen Idealismus'", p. 93.
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The Absolute
All of this exemplifies what is perhaps the most important similarity between
Novalis and Derrida: their attitude towards questions of the absolute in general.
Novalis's outline of the temporal structure of self-consciousness has revealed the
problematic nature of the concept of any absolute. Indeed, the 'Fichte-Studien' are
interspersed with reflections on the concept of the absolute; in connection with its
relation to the subject, but also with implications reaching beyond the self towards
philosophy in its other domains and concerns.
In the most basic terms - and Novalis is fully aware of this - the very phrase
'any absolute' is highly problematic. By its very nature, the absolute must be One, a
totality, which renders all qualifying adjectives redundant. Novalis says: 'Nur das All
ist absolut,'60 Derrida, in 'La violence et la metaphysique', reflects on the inability of
language, even in the form ofmetaphor, to accommodate the absolute. Considering
Levinas's use of the (religious) expression 'le tres-haut'('the most high'), he says
that this expression:
dechire, par l'exces superlatif, la lettre spatiale de la metaphore. Si haute
qu'elle soit, la hauteur est toujours accessible; le tres-haut, lui, est plus haut
que la hauteur. Aucun accroissement de hauteur ne saurait le mesurer. II
n'appartient pas a l'espace, il n'est pas du monde.61
60 N II, p. 247, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 454.
61 Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference, p. 139.
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Novalis's friend and fellow literary theorist, Friedrich Schlegel, also uses the
example of superlatives to demonstrate the logical impossibility of rendering the
absolute into discursivity:
Ein hochstes HaBliches [ist] offenbar so wenig moglich wie ein hochstes
Schones. Ein unbedingtes Maximum der Negation, oder das absolute Nichts
kann so wenig wie ein unbedingtes Maximum der Position in irgendeiner
Vorstellung gegeben werden.62
In the 'Fichte-Studien', the empirical ego is of the same order as language. If
the 'most high' always exceeds the metaphor, Novalis shows how the Being of the
ego always already exceeds the consciousness of itself. We saw above that he names
the absolute ground of self-consciousness 'Nur Seyn' (i.e., the very Being of the ego
or the identity of self and self-consciousness). As I stressed above, this 'Nur Seyn' is
not the same as 'Seyn' which refers to being (with a small 'b') in and for the
empirical ego. The whole point about this 'Nur Seyn' - which Novalis also terms
'Chaos' or 'das bloBe Wesen' - is that it cannot be an object of consciousness. It has
always already escaped consciousness. Novalis is adamant that '[d]as blofie Wesen
ist nicht erkennbar'63 and, being inaccessible to discourse, it has no need of
qualification. He recognizes at the very start of the 'Fichte-Studien' that the question
of the absolute has philosophical implications beyond the problem of self-
consciousness:
An dem Nur Seyn haftet gar keine Modification, kein Begriff- man kann
ihm nichts entgegensetzen - als verbaliter das Nichtseyn. Dis ist aber ein
62 Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ansgabe, ed. by Ernst Behler (Munich: Schoningh,
1958-), vol. I, p. 313.
63 N 11, p. 240, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 440.
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copulirendes Hackchen, was bios pro Forma dran gehangt wird - Es scheint
nur so. Greift doch eine Handvoll Finsternis.[...] Hier bleibt die Filosofie
stehn und muB stehn bleiben - denn darin besteht gerade das Leben, das es
nicht begriffen werden kann. Nur aufs Seyn kann alle Filosofie gehn/'4
This quotation is very important. Not only does it articulate a recurring theme of the
'Fichte-Studien', namely that the absolute is inaccessible to discourse, but also there
are linguistic resonances with Derrida's reflections on the relation between
philosophy and the absolute. In the essay on Levinas, Derrida describes as violent
philosophy's need to know - to grasp - the absolute. The German verb 'begreifen'
has the same semantic plurality as the English 'to grasp': it means both 'to
understand' and 'to appropriate; to take (by force)'. But Derrida, although he does
not entirely identify himselfwith Levinas throughout the whole essay, is very close
to him on this point and quotes him: 'Si on pouvait posseder, saisir et connaitre
l'autre, il ne serait pas l'autre. Posseder, connaitre, saisir sont des synonymes de
pouvoir.'65 Novalis recognizes that this need to grasp is not only futile but also, he
implies, simply not the task of philosophy: 'Hier bleibt die Filosofie stehen und muB
stehen bleiben [...].' A philosophy of light cannot grasp 'a handful of darkness.'
Derrida, Foucault and the History of Madness
We saw above that knowledge of something always involves objectification. What
Derrida and Novalis demonstrate is that this concept of an object presented to the
theoretical gaze cannot accommodate our apprehension of the absolute - and I would
64 Ibid., pp. 106-07, no. 3.
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argue that this applies equally to the Levinasian 'tout-autre'. Another essay in
L 'ecriture et la difference, 'Cogito et histoire de la folie', condenses these problems
using a very specific example which provides us with a slightly different perspective.
Derrida examines the difficulties encountered by Michel Foucault in his attempt to
write a history of madness in terms of its exclusion by reason. I am not suggesting
that we can simply regard as identical the absolute, the 'tout-autre' or madness.
However, Derrida's reading of Foucault demonstrates in a different way the
difficulty of rendering into discourse something the very otherness ofwhich one
wishes (and needs) to respect and maintain. In 'Cogito', Derrida describes madness
as 'the other of a language'; specifically, of the language of reason. As he himself
puts it, Foucault's project is to write a history of madness in which madness speaks
(for) itself. He does not want to write on madness in the objectifying language of
reason and psychiatry. Foucault's attempt to write an archaeology ofmadness is a
good illustration of the way in which Derrida regards the concept of the other which
is not to be confused with the totally-other (the Other). We can say that the language
of reason would like to assimilate and tame its other with its discourse. Critchley
speaks of 'domesticating'66 the Other, and in a formulation reminiscent of the way
Novalis and Frank express it says: 'The activity of philosophy, the very task of
thinking, is the reduction of otherness. In seeking to think the other, its otherness is
reduced or appropriated to our understanding.'67 The whole point about the totally-
other is that it cannot be tamed. If this seems contradictory, our examination in
Chapter 2 of writing as the 'other' of philosophy will show how this binary





return of the other to the same. To put it another way, if the discourse of reason and
psychiatry were to fully explain madness, it could no longer be said to be other than
this discourse. But how, then, can the otherness of this other be respected? Entering
into a dialogue with his former teacher, Michel Foucault, with the attendant
difficulties of addressing a mentor which I mentioned above, Derrida goes on to
consider Foucault's undertaking and to explain what he means by its 'infeasibility'.
Foucault describes his project in terms of silence, the silence of a madness
denied a voice: 'Le langage de la psychiatrie, qui est monologue de la raison sur la
folie n'a pu s'etablir que sur un tel silence. Je n'ai voulu faire Fhistoire de ce
langage; plutot l'archeologie de ce silence.'68 However, Derrida's response to this is
to ask whether a history of silence is at all possible. Remarking that Foucault
describes the fate of madness using terms from 'la zone juridique de 1'interdiction',69
Derrida wonders whether such an archaeology of silence could be anything other
than the restoration of the very order which seeks to exclude madness. Would it not
merely be 'le recommencement le plus efficace, le plus subtil, la repetition, au sens
le plus irreduciblement ambigu de ce mot, de Facte perpetre contre la folie, et ce
7Q . . • ...dans le moment meme oil il est denonce?' He reminds us that this impossibility
sabotages every attempt to objectify a silence - and not just the silence which is
madness - in the language of which it is the other. This is worth quoting in full
because it elucidates not only the question of the cognitive appropriation of the
absolutely other but also the implications of the problem encountered by any
deconstructive reading; namely, how to locate the point of alterity from which to
68 Michel Foucault, Folie et deraison, pp. x-xi. Cited by Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference, p. 57.
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interrogate a tradition when the only means at one's disposal are the very terms and
concepts of that tradition:
Tout notre langage europeen, le langage de tout ce qui a participe, de pres ou
de loin, a l'aventure de la raison occidentale, est 1'immense delegation du
projet que Foucault definit sous l'espece de la capture ou l'objectivation de la
folie. Rien dans ce langage et personne parmi ceux qui le parlent ne peut
echapper a la culpabilite historique - s'il y en a une et si elle est historique en
un sens classique - dont Foucault semble vouloir faire le proces. Mais c'est
peut-etre un proces impossible car l'instruction et le verdict reiterent sans
cesse le crime par le simple fait de leur elocution. Si VOrdre dont nous
parlons est si puissant, si sa puissance est unique en son genre, c'est
precisement par son caractere sur-determinant et par l'universelle, la
structurale, l'universelle et infinie complicity en laquelle il compromet tous
ceux qui l'entendent en son langage, quand meme celui-ci leur procure
encore la forme de leur denonciation. L'ordre alors est denonce dans
l'ordre.71
Paradox: The Impossible Possible
The problems Foucault encounters in trying to write an archaeology of silence are
symptomatic of philosophy's relation to the absolute. If the absolute, which in terms
of the 'Fichte-Studien' is the Being of the ego, were accessible to philosophy, it
would not be the absolute. Novalis, as we saw, recognizes that this is where
philosophy stops and must remain. But this is not a simple admission of defeat.
While making it clear that the absolutely other is inaccessible to discourse, both
Novalis and Derrida see nevertheless the possibility of a certain relation with the
other. This quotation from Derrida brings together the entire problematic of
71 Ibid., p. 58.
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conceptualizing - i.e., rendering into philosophical discursivity - the absolutely-other
while revealing the necessity of this impossibility. But it is an impossibility which
begins to open up apossibility - the possibility of some kind of encounter with the
other:
Quelle est done cette rencontre de l'absolument-autre? Ni representation, ni
limitation, ni relation conceptuelle au meme. Le moi et l'autre ne se laissent
pas surplomber, ne se laissent pas totaliser par un concept de relation. Et
d'abord parce que le concept (matiere du langage), toujours donne a I 'autre,
ne peut se fermer sur l'autre, le comprendre. La dimension dative ou vocative
ouvrant la direction originaire du langage, elle ne saurait sans violence se
laisser comprendre et modifier dans la dimension accusative ou attributive de
l'objet. Le langage ne peut done totaliser sa propre possibility et comprendre
en soi sa propre origine ou sa propre fin.72
As we shall see, we are speaking here of the only possible relation: a non-violent
relation which respects the absolute alterity of the Other.
Let us return for a moment to 'Cogito et histoire de la folie.' for Foucault
does manage to write his impossible book. In order to do so, he has to practice a kind
of double writing, believing in the possibility ofwriting an archaeology of silence
while being aware, at the same time, of the impossibility of the undertaking. This can
be applied to all deconstructive readings and Derrida, in his more explicit statements
on deconstruction, has often described it as a double reading. This is where Manfred
Frank's description of the function and role of the absolute in Novalis's account of
self-consciousness emphasizes the negative a little too much at the expense of the
paradoxical double movement. Frank, describing Novalis's 'Nur Seyn' as 'das Sein
72 Ibid., pp. 140-41.
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an sich', says that it functions as a regulatory idea 'an deren Unerreichbarkeit es
73
verzweifelt und die, ewig vorschwebend, ewig verfehlt wird'. He is quite right to
emphasize the 'Unerreichbarkeit' of the state of absolute identity but the word
'verzweifelt' does not do justice to the paradoxical attitude to the absolute which is
explicit in Novalis. Possessing the absolute would totally destroy its absolute
otherness, assimilating it into the light of the same. Derrida and Levinas liken this
problem of philosophy's attempts to grasp the absolute to our relation to human
others, and we can begin to see how this demand for the respect of others has ethical
implications. For Derrida, that which escapes objectification and knowledge
manifests itself as a certain absence. We cannot speak ofthe, absolutely-other, only to
it. Vocative, then, not accusative:
Dans le visage, l'autre se livre en personne comme autre, c'est-a-dire comme
ce qui ne se revele pas, comme ce qui ne se laisse pas thematiser. Je ne
saurais parler d'autrui, en faire un theme, le dire comme objet, a l'accusatif.
Je puis seulement, je dois seulement parler a autrui, l'appeler au vocatif qui
n'est pas une categorie, un cas de la parole, mais le surgissement, l'elevation
meme de la parole. [...] [Pjour qu'autrui ne soit pas manque, il faut qu'il se
presente comme absence et apparaisse comme non-phenomenalite.74
Novalis's thought in the 'Fichte-Studien' is remarkably close to that of
Levinas and Derrida. In his comments on the idea of 'the pure', which must be an
absolute in the sense of its untouchable and essential singularity, he articulates this
paradoxical relation to the absolute in typically concise and explicit fashion. While
reiterating the idea that 'das Reine' cannot be a direct object of consciousness or
73 Manfred Frank, Das Problem 'Zeit', p. 17.
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philosophical discourse, Novalis broaches the possibility of nevertheless entering
into a relation with it:
Der Begriff rein ist also ein leerer Begriff- i.e. ein Begriff, dem keine
Anschauung entspricht - ein weder moglicher, noch wirklicher Begriff, noch
ein Nothwendiger - alles Reine ist also eine Tauschung der Einbild[ungs]
Kr[aft] - eine nothwendige Fiction. Wahrheit - Fiction oder Schein.73
But the fictionality of 'das Reine' is no cause for fear or despair. It is, as Novalis
says, necessary. I cannot stress this enough; not least because this relation to an
impossible yet necessary absolute is the very matrix of the similarities between
Novalis and Derrida. As I said above, Novalis sees the philosophical systems of his
contemporaries as emerging from a 'Streben nach dem Denken eines Grundes'. The
following quote from Friedrich Schlegel on 'absolute truth' is a good illustration of
the Romantic position with regard to the absolute. We notice the emphasis on
freedom; a freedom of spirit which would only be limited by philosophical attempts
to fix the absolute in a single determinate proposition:
Absolute Wahrheit kann nicht zugegeben werden; und dies ist die Urkunde
fur die Freyheit der Gedanken und des Geistes. Wenn die absolute Wahrheit
gefunden ware, so ware damit das Geschaft des Geistes vollendet, und er
miiBte aufhoren zu seyn, da er nur in der Thatigkeit existirt.76
And Novalis says of the absolute ground:
Alles Filosofieren muB also bey einem absoluten Grund endigen. Wenn
dieser nun nicht gegeben ware, wenn dieser Begriff eine Unmoglichkeit
75 N II, p. 179, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 234.
76 Friedrich Schlegel, vol. 12, p. 93.
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enthielte - so ware der Trieb zu Filosofieren eine unendliche Tatigkeit - und
darum ohne Ende, weil ein ewiges Bedurfnis nach einem absoluten Grunde
vorhanden ware, das doch nur relativ gestillt werden konnte - und darum nie
aufhoren wtirde. Durch das freywillige Entsagen des Absoluten ensteht die
unendliche freye Thatigkeit in uns - das Einzig mogliche Absolute, was uns
gegeben werden kann und was wir nur durch unsre Unvermogenheit ein
Absolutes zu erreichen und zu erkennen, finden. Dies uns gegebene Absolute
laBt sich nur negativ erkennen, indem wir handeln und finden, daB durch kein
Handel erreicht wird, was wir suchen. Das lieBe sich ein absolutes Postulat
nennen. Alles Suchen nach Einem Princip war also ein Versuch die
Quadratur des Zirkels zu finden.77
For Novalis, such a single grounding principle simply cannot be thought. The
self, thought and philosophy, emerging as they do from difference and substitutions
and subject to time, cannot encompass 'das Reine', an absolutely singular entity,
complete in and of itself; One. The absolute can neither be known nor thought since
we can only know objects. Novalis states clearly that 'das Absolute, das blofie Wesen
ist nicht erkennbar' and that the pure does not exist other than in the sense, as we
have seen, of a 'nothwendige Fiction'.78 Andrew Bowie says rightly of the above
quotation: 'Crucially, and contrary to so many interpretations of Romanticism, this
7Q
does not mean that one gives way to an indeterminate longing for the impossible.'
As the long Novalis quotation above demonstrates, the idea of the absolute must be
simultaneously believed in and renounced: 'Durch das freywillige Entsagen des
Absoluten entsteht die unendliche freye Thatigkeit in uns [...].' It is the failure to
appreciate this paradoxical situation which has given rise to the diametrically
opposed (mis)readings ofRomanticism which we considered in the introduction.
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For Novalis finding the ground is impossible - akin to 'squaring the circle'
but the paradox consists in the fact that we cannot cease to search for it. Such a
paradox is irreducible and non-dialectizable, an aporia or 'double bind'. This, as
Derrida tells us again and again, is the situation in which we have always found
ourselves and will always find ourselves. He suggests in Apories that perhaps we
have no alternative to a kind of non-passive 'endurance' of this situation, but even
this endurance and the 'experience' of the aporia cannot be seen in terms of an
'either/or' alternative:
Que serait-il une telle experience? Le mot signifie aussi passage, traversee,
endurance, epreuve du franchissement, mais peut-etre une traversee sans
ligne et sans frontiere indivisible. Peut-il jamais s'agir, justement, [...], de
depasser une aporie, de franchir une ligne oppositionnelle ou bien
d'apprehender, d'endurer, de mettre autrement a l'epreuve l'experience de
l'aporie? Et s'agit-il a cet egard d'un on bien ou bien? Peut-on parler et en
quel sens d'une experience de I 'aporie? De I'aporie comme telle? Ou
inversement: une experience est-il possible qui ne soit pas experience de
I'aporie?80
In Apories, Derrida follows the trace of the aporia throughout his own work
and draws attention to the fact that he has never ceased to engage with it. He
81describes his work as a kind of 'aporetographie' or 'aporetologie', and recalls a
moment in which he has perhaps come closest to defining deconstruction - in
'Invention de l'autre': 'L'interet de la deconstruction, de sa force et son desir si elle
en a, c'est une certaine experience de l'impossible: c'est-a-dire, [...], de 1'autre,
l'experience de l'autre comme invention de l'impossible, en d'autres termes comme
80 Derrida, Apories, p. 35.
81 Ibid.
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la seule invention impossible.'82 In Memoirespour Paul de Man, Derrida considers
the importance of the word for de Man and also for deconstruction:
Le mot d'aporie revient souvent dans les derniers textes de Paul de Man. Je
crois qu'on l'entendrait mal si on en arretait le sens au plus pres de sa
litteralite: absence de chemin, paralysie devant le non-passage,
immobilisation de la pensee, impossibility d'avancer, barrage devant l'avenir.
II me semble, au contraire, que 1'experience de l'aporie, telle que de Man la
dechiffre, donne ou promet la pensee du chemin, provoque a penser la
possibility meme de ce qui reste encore impensable ou impense, voire
0-3
impossible.
And Novalis, in remarkably similar terms to Derrida, emphasizes the positive and
productive nature of paradox, wondering:
Sollte das hochste Princip das hochste Paradoxon in seiner Aufgabe
enthalten? Ein Satz seyn, der schlechterdings keinen Frieden lieBe - der
immer anzoge, und abstieBe - immer von neuen unverstandlich wiirde, so oft
man ihn auch schon verstanden hatte? Der unsre Thatigkeit unaufhorlich rege
machte - ohne sie je zu ermtiden, ohne sie je gewohnt zu werden?84
Both Derrida and Novalis attach great importance to the way in which a paradox or
an aporia, refusing to leave us in peace, can 'provoke' further thought, even
'promise' the thinking of the impossible. The oscillation between two alternatives,
with neither the possibility of coincidence nor of the closing of the dialectical
movement, is the 'highest principle', the only chance of respecting the other which
cannot be thought or made an object. Novalis's praise for paradox contrasts sharply
with the perception of him as a 'Romantic' poet: one whose constant yearning for an
82 Derrida, Psyche (Paris: Galilee, 1987), p. 27.
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Derrida, Memoires pour Paul de Man, pp. 129-30.
84 N II, pp. 523-24, 'Logologische Fragmente', no. 9.
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irretrievable absolute is mingled with the anticipation of an ecstatic telos. But neither
is it a question of a straightforward negative theology. It is not a question of a belief
in 'pure absence'. To speak of an 'absent' absolute actually implies the presence of
an absolute which is merely located somewhere else. As Derrida says, there logic
could make its claim.83 Certainly, the original difference from which self-
consciousness and thought emerge bear the trace of both past and future but Novalis
and Derrida demonstrate that we can and must live with this paradoxical situation
and respect the radical alterity of the totally-other without seeking to master or
possess it once more.
Absolute reflection or lost origin?
In the introduction we looked at the various ways of reading which define criticism
on the affinities between early Romanticism and poststructuralism. I outlined two
different versions of an 'either/or' approach, one of which can be broadly defined in
terms of its insistence on 'yearning for metaphysical plenitude'. The inverse would
be the insistence on awareness of 'metaphysical void'. In the context of self-
consciousness, a brief look at the lack of critical consensus on the absolute
demonstrates that it is precisely the endurance of a paradox which the either/or
approach will always overlook. I do not, therefore, wish to show how each type of
criticism would fit into our consideration of the paradoxical relation to the absolute
85 See Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference, p. 135.
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but rather at one critic, Winfried Menninghaus, who takes issue with another -
Manfred Frank.
Menninghaus's problem is that Frank, eschewing an either/or approach, is
happy to leave paradoxes unresolved. In his book, Unendliche Verdoppelimg,
Menninghaus attacks Frank's insistence on the ground or origin which always
already escapes discourse and the objectifying consciousness. Where Frank
maintains the deficiency of reflection, and connects it with separation and
objectification, Menninghaus, following in the tradition which stretches from Hegel
to Walter Benjamin, argues that reflection itself is the absolute. In Frank's reading,
the 'Wechselwirkung' between 'Gefuhl' and 'Gedanke' never lets the pre-reflexive
absolute be captured or mastered by consciousness. However, for Frank this lack is
not a pure and simple absence but rather the always already escaped absolute which
opens up the possibility of the subject and, by extension, time, thought and
philosophy. Menninghaus insists, on the contrary, that the absolute is first created by
the play between the poles, as '"Medium" eines differentiellen Spiels ohne festen
86Grund'. However, ironically, it is Menninghaus not Frank who insists that this
'absolute reflection' is of the same order as Derridean differance. Menninghaus's
reading is radically unfaithful to the texts of both Novalis and Derrida. To pursue it
to its logical conclusion would involve the dissolution of the paradox upon the
irreducible nature ofwhich both Derrida and Novalis insist. As Geoffrey Bennington
puts it, in a formulation which could be applied verbatim to Novalis's outline of self-
consciousness:
86 Winfried Menninghaus, Unendliche Verdoppelung: Die Friihromantische Grundlegung der
Kunsttheorie im Begriffabsoluter Selbstreflexion (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1987), p. 57.
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Differance is never pure. One cannot make it into an absolute (on pain of
falling into Hegel's absolute difference and reverting to identity [...]): it is
always in-between or in-the-process-of, never itself, never present.87
Furthermore, as I have shown above, lack - the 'Mangel an Sein' and the un-
representability of the absolute - is central to Novalis's thinking. Menninghaus's
attempts to convert this into a positive game of differences do not seem appropriate,
especially since the lack is already for Novalis the prerequisite for the difference
from which self-consciousness emerges. As Derrida expresses it:
Seul, l'autre, le tout-autre, peut se manifester comme ce qu'il est, avant la
verite commune, dans une certaine non-manifestation et dans une certaine
absence. De lui seul on peut dire que son phenomene est une certaine non-
phenomenonalite, que sa presence (est) une certaine absence. Non pas
absence pure et simple, car la logique finirait par y retrouver son compte,
mais une certaine absence.88
Herbert Uerlings seems to find the difference between Menninghaus and Frank so
subtle as to be almost irrelevant:
Man kann durchaus die Kritik des Ursprungsdenkens in den Mittelpunkt von
Hardenbergs Philosophieren stellen und den von Derrida betonten
Doppelsinn von 'differance' (Aufschiebung, Verzeitlichung wwiNicht-
Identitat, Anderssein) hier vorgedacht finden. Ob man aber deshalb schon
behaupten kann (und muB), Hardenberg habe auch den Gedanken
dekonstruiert, daB diese Dualitat in einer ihr zugrunde- und voraufliegenden
und der philosophischen Reflexion nicht weiter zuganglichen Einheit
begrtindet sei - das bliebe als einzige Differenz zwischen Menninghaus und
Frank -, ist sehr fraglich.89
87
Bennington, 'Derridabase', in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida (Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 80.
88
Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference, p. 135.
89 Herbert Uerlings, Friedrich von Hardenberg genannt Novalis: Werk und Forschung (Stuttgart:
Metzler, 1991), p. 619.
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While I agree with Uerlings that this difference is very subtle, I simply cannot agree
that his verdict does justice to the questions with which we have dealt in this chapter.
Firstly, it fails to appreciate the complexity of the engagement with Romanticism and
poststructuralism of critics such as Frank. As such, it represents a certain levelling of
the differences between modern critical attitudes and schools of literary theory.
These differences are vital to literary debate and, regardless ofwhether or not one
agrees with the one or the other, one simply cannot ignore their importance not just
for the criticism ofRomanticism and poststructuralism but also for the wider field of
literary theory. But secondly, and even more importantly, it seems to me that the
'subtle difference' which Uerlings is so swift to dismiss is the most central similarity
between Novalis and Derrida - and by that I mean not only central to my thesis but
also vital to the thought of both writers. When Derrida says that deconstruction is not
an enclosure in language but an openness towards the other which manifests itself as
'a certain absence', we see the structure ofNovalis's relation to a necessary andyet
fictional absolute. Derrida says in De la grammatologie: 'On ne peut s'empecher de
vouloir maitriser l'absence et pourtant il nous faut toujours lacher prise.'90 The
eternal 'Reitz' of the absolute is desire itself; the call of the other without which there
would be no need to speak. As Simon Critchley says of deconstruction's relation to
the 'tradition', in a formulation which seems to me to trace the structure ofNovalis's
fictional absolute:
To say that the goal ofDerridian deconstruction is not simply the unthought
of the tradition but rather that-which-cannot-be thought, is to engage in
neither sophistical rhetoric nor negative theology. It is rather to point towards
that which philosophy is unable to say.91
90




So our next question has to be: is there another way of saying 'that which
philosophy is unable to say?' A way of preserving some orientation towards truth
without curtailing what Schlegel calls 'freedom of thought and of spirit'? In the next
chapter, I want to examine what we call 'literature' and 'literary theory' and ask
whether they can be regarded as an inevitable response to the questions raised by
Novalis and Derrida and their paradoxical relation to the absolute. But, as we shall
see, it is not simply a question of a straightforward alternative to philosophy. With




Philosophy, Literature and the Logic of Leakage
'Ohne Philosophic unvollkommener Dichter'1
Novalis, 'Logologische Fragmente'
'II n'y a pas une transgression si 1'on entend par la l'installation pure et
simple dans un au-dela de la metaphysique, en un point qui serait aussi,
ne l'oublions pas, et d'abord un point de language ou d'ecriture.'2
Derrida, Positions
Difficulties of Categorization
Having looked at their questioning of philosophy's desire to render into discourse the
absolutely other, we now need to look in a little more detail at ways in which Novalis
and Derrida explore the possibility of relating to the absolute while at the same time
respecting its otherness. The most immediately obvious way of doing so is to
consider how this attitude of respect manifests itself in the kind of texts they produce.
By this I mean not only what the texts say but also how they say it. But, having said
that, the distinction between 'doing' and 'saying' will turn out to be one of the
oppositions which their texts seek to complicate.
My initial motivation for embarking on a comparison of Derrida and Novalis
had a lot to do with certain similarities in the way both writers are perceived in
1 N II, p. 531, 'Logologische Fragmente', no. 29.
2
Derrida, 'Implications', interview with Henri Ronse, Positions (Paris: Minuit, 1972), p. 21.
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literary studies. There seems to be a lack of consensus as to what they actually do.
They are writers, certainly, but is it possible to say what kind ofwriter? Novalis is
sometimes described as a poet; sometimes as a philosopher. Are we to regard Derrida
as a philosopher, a literary critic or simply a 'theorist'? Indeed, there is a certain
irony about the place which Derrida occupies in relation to both philosophy and
literary studies: a writer who has claimed that 'il n'y a pas de philosophic de Jacques
Derrida', he is almost always to be found in the philosophy section of university
libraries and academic bookshops. It is almost as though both groups - literary critics
and philosophers - want to dissociate themselves from a writer whose work could be
seen to threaten the integrity of their respective disciplines.
Although it might be regarded as a superficial similarity, in that one notices it
without having studied their work in very great detail, this confusion of
categorisation and the fact that their texts resist easy definition reveal a more
fundamental similarity between Derrida and Novalis. As I pointed out in the
introduction, critics have for some time now been drawing parallels between German
Romanticism and poststructuralism and even, at times, explicitly between the work
ofNovalis and Derrida. We saw that Margaret Mahony Stoljar is one critic who
argues that Novalis's texts 'proceed by intuitive and imaginative reasoning, rather
than sustained systematic argument, in a manner that has become familiar in the
writings of Derrida and others of our time.'31 do not want to pursue this argument to
its logical conclusion, because setting up another opposition between 'systematic
argument' and 'imaginative reasoning' would ultimately be untenable and would do
3
Margaret Mahony Stoljar, 'Introduction', Novalis: Philosophical Writings (Albany: State University
ofNew York Press, 1997), p. 2.
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more to obscure than to clarify the issues with which we are dealing here. However,
engaging with part of Stoljar's opposition, I would like to explore whether the
eschewal of 'sustained systematic argument' that she sees in the writings ofNovalis
and Derrida is merely a manifestation of similarities in form and style or whether it
is, rather, evidence of similar views on philosophy and literature. If tradition has
generally seen literature as an aesthetic object and thus entirely separate from
philosophy as a quasi-scientific and universally valid system for describing reality or
- since Descartes — the conditions of human understanding, the texts of both Derrida
and Novalis suggest that philosophy and literature cannot be regarded as mutually
exclusive. Rather than treating literature and philosophy as strictly delineated areas
of culture, Novalis and Derrida invite us to consider ways in which philosophy and
literature have - or ought to have - more in common than tradition has tended to
allow. However, as we shall see, this is not to say that distinction between
philosophy and literature is entirely meaningless.
At the end ofChapter 1,1 asked whether a new type of 'literature' can be
regarded as emerging from some of the issues confronting eighteenth-century
philosophy. I would now like to consider this question, as well as to explore the
wider implications of writing which questions the rigidity of distinctions such as the
one between literature and philosophy. By 'wider' I do not mean that I will be
attempting to trace a broad historical path from Romanticism to modern literature
and literary theory. Apart from the fact that this subject has been covered extensively
by critics in recent years,4 it has never been my intention to treat Derrida and Novalis
4 See in particular Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy ofGerman
Literary Theory (New York and London: Routledge, 1997) and Manfred Frank, Das Problem 'Zeit' in
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in terms of their historical relation to one another. By 'wider' I mean rather that,
more than the other chapters, this one considers some of their more general
statements about philosophy and writing, in addition to selected texts that exemplify
the kind ofwriting which itself complicates the literature/philosophy opposition. In
the case ofNovalis, we will look at some of his collaborations with Friedrich
Schlegel, including the famous Athenaum fragments and aphorisms. We will look at
some ofDerrida's interviews - for instance, in Positions - and at earlier texts such as
De la grammatologie and La dissemination. These early texts can be regarded as
more programmatic than his later work, and it is here that Derrida expounds in the
greatest detail the idea of 'supplementarity', a structure which informs all of his
work. Furthermore, a discussion of the logic of supplementarity must be the next step
since it gives us the means not only to examine the relationship between philosophy
and its various others, but also to understand the themes which are discussed in the
following two chapters: the concept of nonclosure and the interrelation between self
and human other.
Theory
As I hinted above, when considering the difficulty of describing Novalis and Derrida
as writers, perhaps the best word for writing which shares features of literature and
philosophy and yet is neither the one nor the other is 'theory'. Indeed, both Derrida
and Novalis are often called 'theorists'. There is good reason to focus on theory as a
der deutschen Romantik: Zeitbewufitsein iind Bewufitsein von Zeitlichkeit in der friihromantischen
Philosophic imd in Tiecks Dichtung (Mtinchen: Winkler, 1972).
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framework for negotiating the complex relationship between philosophy and poetry.
It goes without saying that the critical theory of literature has occupied writers since
Aristotle. However, what we call 'theory' today is rather different. It is a word which
enjoys great notoriety in literary studies and which is often used negatively, perhaps
by those who might come under my earlier (admittedly somewhat simplistic)
category of critics whose faith in the 'transcendental signified' remains unshakeable
in the face of the questioning attitude of theorists. It is certainly a word familiar to
today's student of literature and, rather than being the theory ofsomething in
particular, it is simply known as 'theory' or sometimes 'literary theory', which is
something of a misnomer since theory casts its gaze far wider than the borders of
what we think of as literature. This is, of course, no accident. Indeed, Jonathan
Culler, pointing to one possible definition, suggests that 'theory' is a nickname or
'convenient designation' to describe 'works that succeed in challenging and
reorienting thinking in fields other than those to which they apparently belong.'5
One reason to consider Novalis and Derrida as producers of the particular
type of writing known as 'theory' is the fact that, as we have seen, some critics -
Culler among them - have started to locate the origins ofmodern theory in the era of
German Romanticism as much as in the twentieth century's reception of Saussure's
linguistics. Andrew Bowie, for instance, in his study of the path from German
Romantic philosophy to modern critical theory, argues that the German philosophical
tradition he explores is 'the historical and theoretical "condition of possibility" of the
new wave of theory which developed from the 1960s onwards in the works of
5 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), p. 3.
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Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man and others'.6 And,
as Culler's definition suggests, theory is very much about questioning boundaries
and mixing disciplines. The philosopher Richard Rorty, who also locates its origins
in the era ofGerman Romanticism, gives his own attempt at a definition:
Beginning in the days of Goethe and Macaulay and Carlyle and Emerson, a
new kind ofwriting has developed which is neither the evaluation of the
relative merits of literary productions, nor intellectual history, nor moral
philosophy, nor social prophecy but all of these mingled together.7
Bowie, too, is keenly aware that this mixing and mingling of disciplines is perhaps
the most easily discernible similarity between German Romanticism and what we
today call theory. This observation, in which he directly equates 'literary theory' and
'Romantic philosophy', is worth quoting in full:
Literary theory is itself a hybrid rather than a unified discipline, combining
resources from philosophy, linguistics, psychoanalysis, feminism, social
theory and other areas of the humanities, in order to question basic
assumptions about the understanding of texts and other bearers of truth and
meaning in both the human and the natural sciences. Like Romantic
philosophy, literary theory can be understood as part of a growing reaction
against the separation of the everyday 'life world' from the systematically
determined spheres of science, technology and modern bureaucracy. By
crossing the boundaries between subjects it attempts to reveal the repressions
involved in the specialisation of knowledge into discrete cultures of experts.
The fact that objections of the kind made to Romantic thinking have
resurfaced in recent objections to literary theory can further suggest ways in
which they are closely related. The fundamental attribute which Romantic
philosophy shares with literary theory is, then, a questioning of the borders
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Ifwe look at the range of topics covered by Novalis and Derrida, we can see
how accurately the above pertains to our two writers. Novalis, a polymath who was a
salt-mine inspector as well as a poet and philosopher, writes on themes which extend
from language and politics to religion and geology. The title of one of his collections
of notes and aphorisms, Das Allgemeine Brouillon, composed with an encyclopaedic
project in mind, indicates his fascination with establishing connections and
correspondences between different fields and spheres of knowledge. Headings such
as 'Musikalische Physik' and 'Medizinische Politzey'10 demonstrate the
juxtaposition of apparently diverse subjects. Derrida has written of love and
friendship, death and apartheid, as well as literature and philosophy. In many ways,
though, the broad range of subjects covered by both writers is less important than the
way in which they both seek to demonstrate how the most apparently clear
distinctions are far from fixed. This kind of thinking has inevitable implications for
the academic disciplines of literary criticism, philosophy, history and the human
sciences. Derrida is fascinated by theory's potential for shaking up the academic
institution, and we might wonder whether the early Romantics' dream of a universal
'Symphilosophie' has been realized in what we know today as 'cultural studies'.
However, I am less interested in looking at theory as a branch of the
humanities than in examining more fundamental reasons why the texts of Derrida
and Novalis seek to demonstrate the permeability of perceived and staunchly
defended boundaries such as the one between philosophy and literature. Therefore,
we will focus on the ways in which these two writers deal with questions of the
9 N III, p. 311, 'Das Allgemeine Brouillon', no. 387.
10
Ibid., p. 313, no. 395.
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philosophical and the literary. This does not mean that we are going to ignore
'theory'. In fact, the opposite is the case. I referred above to a certain questioning
attitude which characterizes theory and theorists. There is no doubt that the mixing of
disciplines and genres is the most noticeable characteristic of theory. However, the
questioning attitude, though it is less easy to define, is actually more significant.
Indeed, it is only thanks to this questioning that the divisions separating fields of
knowledge and forms of discourse have come to be re-examined. It has to do with a
constant .ve//-questioning. Theory - poststructuralist theory, in particular - is
constantly in the process of examining its own conditions of possibility. This is why
it is so difficult to define theory. And it is precisely this kind of self-questioning
which characterizes the new kind of literature which emerged in the Romantic era.
'This Strange Institution Called Literature'
Derrida often points out - without specifically locating its origins in the Romantic
era - that the phenomenon we call 'literature' is 'a very recent invention'.11 In an
interview with Derek Attridge on 'this strange institution called literature', Derrida
speaks of the conventions and laws of authorial property which go some way towards
creating a distinction between literature 'in modernity' and Graeco-Latin poetry or
i
belles-lettres. 'What is literature?' is a question which comes up again and again in
11
Derrida, 'This Strange Institution Called Literature', interview with Derek Attridge, in Acts of
Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-75 (p. 40). This is the translated and
edited transcript of an interview, unpublished in French, that took place in Laguna Beach in April
1989. (Translation by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby).
12 Ibid.
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Derrick's work, and it is immediately clear that this is an extremely difficult question
- an impossible question. As Derrida puts it:
even if a phenomenon called 'literature' appeared historically in Europe, at
such and such a date, this does not mean that one can identify the literary
object in a rigorous way. It doesn't mean that there is an essence of literature.
i -i
It even means the opposite.
Novalis, too, is aware that it is impossible to define the essence of literature.
The following quotation is a very astute recognition that it is the singularity - what
Derrida calls the signature or the idiom - of a literary text which precludes its being
fully conceptualized by the discourse of criticism: 'Kritik der Poesie ist ein Unding.
Schwer schon ist es zu entscheiden, doch einzig mogliche Entscheidung, ob etwas
Poesie sey, oder nicht. [...] Der Dichter ordnet, vereinigt, erfindet - und es ist ihm
selbst unbegreiflich warum gerade so und nicht anders.'14 However, we can take our
cue from Novalis's paradoxical assertion of the simultaneous difficulty and necessity
of deciding whether something is or is not literature. It is not possible to define a
fixed essence of literature. Even in terms of identifying 'style' - what Derrida calls
the idiom or signature of the author who wants to write like no other - it is
impossible to say that such-and-such a text has certain inherent qualities which mark
it as literature. However, it is possible to say that literary texts all do something.
These texts, which we might call 'modern' in accordance with Derrida's above
distinction, operate in the mode of questioning activity which also characterizes
'theory'. The new type of literature which emerges in the Romantic era is no longer
governed by mimesis and no longer regarded as an aesthetic discourse entirely
13 Ibid., p. 41
14 N III, p. 685-86, 'Fragmente und Studien 1799/1800', no. 671.
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separate from philosophy; a self-conscious literature which, in Schlegel's famous
definition of Romantic literature, is 'zugleich Poesie und die Poesie der Poesie'.15 In
their preface to L 'absolu litteraire, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy
make an interesting point about this new kind of literature. They cite Madame de
Stael's observation that what is new about German literature at the end of the
eighteenth century is notso much 'literature' but rather 'criticism' or, as she also
puts it, 'theorie litteraire'.16 But, according to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, she fails
to recognize that Te romantisme n'est ni "de la litterature" (ils en inventent le
concept) ni meme, simplement, une "theorie de la litterature" (ancienne et moderne),
mais la theorie elle-meme comme litterature ou, cela revient au meme, la litterature
se produisant en produisant sa propre theorie.'17 It is this critical or theoretical aspect
which Derrida pinpoints when he characterizes the (mostly twentieth-century)
literary texts which interest him. In fact, he might almost have been speaking of early
Romantic literature when he says of these texts:
[They] all have in common that they are inscribed in a critical experience of
literature. They bear within themselves, or we could also say in their literary
act they put to work, a question, the same one, but each time singular and put
to work otherwise: 'What is literature?' or 'Where does literature come
from?' 'What should we do with literature?'18
This consideration of literature as the theory of itself, or as the 'putting to work' of
the question of its own conditions of possibility, emerges from a certain confusion of
15 Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. by Ernst Behler (Munich: Schoningh,
1958-), vol. II, p. 204, 'Athenaums-Fragmente', no. 238.
15 Madame de Stael, De I'allemagne (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1968), p. 162. Cited by Philippe
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, L 'absolu litteraire (Paris: Seuil, 1978), p. 22.
17 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, p. 22.
18
Derrida, 'This Strange Institution Called Literature', Acts ofLiterature, p. 41.
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distinctions not only between philosophy and literature but also between other pairs
of opposites such as philosophy/writing, speech/writing, and language/truth. This
chapter will deal with these oppositions, looking at how they emerge, only to
discover that they are always already in deconstruction. The whole chapter will be
marked by the entwining of two broadly discernible movements: one traces ways in
which philosophy has always had trouble keeping language or literature safely
'outside', and the other suggests ways in which literature welcomes philosophical
concepts and even provides a viable alternative means of articulating philosophical
concerns.
In a sense, we are now moving on to look at texts which are ostensibly less
'philosophical' than those we read in Chapter 1. By this I mean that they do not
explicitly refer to 'the absolute' or 'the absolutely-other'. However, the metaphysical
notion of the absolute is what underpins concepts such as truth, meaning and reality
and their accessibility to discourse - philosophical or otherwise. Here the Derridean
concept of 'presence' is very useful because truth, meaning and reality are all
founded upon an assumption of absolute presence. In the previous chapter, we saw
that for Fichte the absolute ground of a philosophical system is the ego's presence to
itself and that this self-presence is then accessible to thought and to philosophy (or,
rather, to philosophy as thought: what Derrida will call after Plato 'living
philosophy'). In this chapter, we will look more specifically at language, and whether
language can refer directly to these anterior forms of presence: 'truth', 'meaning' and
'reality'. It is the particular forms of language known as writing and literature which
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reveal the complicated folds which interest both Novalis and Derrida, and highlight
remarkable affinities between them.
Before we go on, I would like to say a few words about the title of this
chapter. It is important to stress at this early stage that, although 'theory' and the
emergence of a new kind of literature provide useful ways to focus on the
oppositions and boundaries in question, it is not a matter of transgressing boundaries
as such. This word suggests the simple and direct breaching of a boundary or the
crossing of the line between two entirely separate realms. I have, therefore, borrowed
from Nicholas Royle the expression 'the logic of leakage'. He characterizes
deconstruction as revealing, through the logic of the supplement, 'an unsettling of
borders, a troubling of inside/outside distinctions, a logic of leakage, of underflow
and overflow'.19 I hope that the other formulations I have used - like Derrida's own
- suggest a certain confusion or permeability of boundaries. This is no superficial
question of emphasis. As we will see later in this chapter, philosophers have often
seen philosophy's relation to its various others - nonphilosophy, writing, literature -
in terms of the distinction between the inside and the outside. But as Derrida says,
there is no sure opposition between outside and inside: 'Au terme d'un certain
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travail, le concept meme d'exces ou de transgression pourra devenir suspect.' On
the other hand - and this is just as important - as I said above, it would be wrong to
say that a distinction between philosophy and the various forms of nonphilosophy is
meaningless. As Bennington says of'philosophical language' and 'ordinary
language': while there is no question of a rigorously definable distinction between
19 Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 61.
20 Derrida, 'Implications', Positions, p. 21.
85
the two, this 'does not imply total confusion, as might be feared, but passage and
entwinings to be negotiated.'21 Derrida himself suggests that the word 'complication'
might be less vulnerable to misinterpretation than 'confusion' because his critics,
Searle in particular, have read his questioning of boundaries as implying a desire to
abolish all distinctions. In Limited Inc, he says that 'the deconstruction of binary and
hierarchical oppositions does not open the way to confusion, to "indistinction", or to
the empiricism that Searle seems to want to make his own, even if it is only in order
to object to those benighted "literary theorists" who think, rightly, that a distinction
22without rigor and without precision is not one at all.'
Philosophical Beginnings
Before we come to the conception of literature as its own theory, we must build on
the conclusions of Chapter 1, remaining for a little longer within philosophy in the
tradition with which Novalis and Derrida engage. To put it very simply, they both
have certain difficulties with this philosophical tradition and with philosophy's own
perception of its status, goals and objectives. Much of their work stems from a direct
engagement with what have usually been regarded as strictly philosophical concerns.
In Chapter 1, for instance, we dealt in detail with Novalis's very specific engagement
with Fichte's philosophy and with Derrida's reading of Levinas. We could say that
21
Geoffrey Bennington, 'Derridabase', in Bennington and Derrida, Jacques Derrida (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 92.
22 Limited Inc, trans, by Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 127. As 1
explained in Note 28 in the introduction, with the exception of'Signature Evenement Contexte', 1 cite
Weber's translations of the texts in Limited Inc because it is to these that Searle's article and Derrida's
responses refer.
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both Derrida and Novalis begin within philosophy. But ifwe attempt to begin at the
beginning or to begin with their beginnings, we discover that it is never as simple as
that. When considering beginnings, Novalis states that the first moment is actually,
like Derrida's 'toujours-deja,' already secondary, in the sense that the chain of
causality can be said to extend infinitely in both directions: 'Aller wircklicher
Anfang ist ein 2ter Moment.'' And, in his excellent account of Derrida and
deconstruction, Bennington, having already admitted to the necessity of having to
start 'somewhere' (which is not just 'anywhere'), characterizes Derrida's own
beginnings as follows, and hints at how the very idea of beginnings is inextricably
linked to the permeability of the literary/philosophical divide:
Derrida, for his part, did not begin at the beginning, [...]. Set off on a study of
"The Ideality of the Literary Object," [...] which is an entirely marginal
object for philosophy in the main lines of its tradition, he tarries over
problems to do with the sign and meaning and finds that philosophy never
gets out of these problems. Starting with the sign is starting with
secondariness itself, already the detour.24
Novalis questions philosophy's ability to locate a 'Grundsatz', a founding
principle and absolute origin of a philosophical system. But there is more to consider
here than a failed attempt to locate an origin or absolute starting point. We are also
called upon to consider philosophy's need to do this. There are certain telling
comments scattered throughout the aphoristic outline of a solution to the problems of
the Wissenschaftlehre. Far from being incidental, these comments actually inform
Novalis's version of self-consciousness, and demonstrate his dissatisfaction with
philosophy's attempts to fix permanently, to ground its propositions. It is made more
23 N II, p. 591, 'Vorarbeiten 1798: Anekdoten', no. 284.
24
Bennington, 'Derridabase', p. 23-24.
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or less explicit that this is a particularly philosophical desire. We saw that, in the
'Fichte-Studien', Novalis distinguishes between 'Seyn' (which is being for the ego
and philosophy) and 'Nur Seyn' (which is the always already lost absolute origin and
inaccessible to the ego and philosophy). He comes back again and again to the idea
that philosophy is misguided in its desire to grasp this Being: 'Hier bleibt die
Filosofie stehn und muB stehn bleiben — denn darinn besteht gerade das Leben, das es
9S
nicht begriffen werden kann.' He questions the very possibility of philosophy
9 ft
('Inwieweit ist Filosofie moglich.' ) and later relates this more specifically to
philosophy's pretensions to general and absolute truth: 'Inwiefern kann eine
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Filosofie allgemeingeltend und wircksam werden.' And, in a vivid and visual
image, he describes the relativity which prevents the location of an absolute ground
as follows: 'Nur das Ganze ist real - Nur das Ding ware absolut real, das nicht
wieder Bestandtheil ware. Das Ganze ruht ohngefahr - wie die spielenden Personen,
die sich ohne Stuhl, bios Eine auf der andern Knie kreisformig hinsetzen.' 8 It is, for
example, no accident that his more overtly literary texts also reject definitive
beginnings and endings. His (unfinished) Heinrich von Ofterdingen 'begins' medias
in res - and, as we shall see in our consideration of nonclosure in Chapter 3, what
sets the novel's narrative in motion is already itself narrative. Any attempt to claim
this preceding narrative as the true beginning is thwarted by the fact that we know
nothing of its origin - there are merely the shadowy tales of a mysterious stranger.
We will have reason, too, to investigate the notion of accident. Much ofDerrida's
work challenges the notion that properties of language such as problematic
25 N II, p. 106, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 3.
26 Ibid., p. 223, no. 320.
27
Ibid., p. 233, no. 390.
28 Ibid., p. 242, no. 445.
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beginnings or difficulties in establishing meaning are merely accidental. He seeks to
show that these 'problems' are actually endemic. They are integral - or as he says
proper - to both literature and philosophy. So it is precisely their dissatisfaction with
the very concept of beginning which starts to reveal similarities in Derrida's and
Novalis's views on philosophy.
It could certainly be argued - and this is very much Derrida's contention in
the first part ofLa dissemination - that it is at philosophy's own beginnings that the
problem of boundaries is first articulated. He maintains here, as he does elsewhere,
29that Platonism 'installe toute la metaphysique occidentale dans sa conceptualite',
and he sets out in La dissemination to examine Plato's attitude to writing. We are not
yet dealing with 'literature'; either as the kind of writing Derrida discusses with
regard to Ponge, Kafka and Mallarme (among others) or as the early Romantic idea
of literature as the theory of itself. That will come later. In Platonism it is writing
itselfwhich is seen to be somehow 'outside' true philosophy and living knowledge.
The distinction between philosophy and writing in Plato becomes apparent in terms
of this spatial difference between the inside and the outside. And, as Derrida's
deconstruction of other binary opposites invariably reveals, we are not faced with the
stable opposition of two different but equal parts, but rather with a motivated
opposition, a hierarchical ordering. In 'La pharmacie de Platon', Derrida shows that
writing is regarded as the subordinate of true philosophy and living knowledge, and
lays bare a persistent and determined attempt to relegate writing to the outside. He
discusses Plato's Phaedrus, and demonstrates that in this dialogue the idea of writing
29 Derrida, La dissemination (Paris: Seuil, 1972), p. 95.
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is equated with thepharmakon. Pharmakon can mean 'drug', both in the sense of
'remedy' and of 'poison', and this ambiguity gives Derrida the means, what he calls
the 'supplementary thread'('fil supplementaire'30), to negotiate the complexities of
the origin, history and value ofwriting.
The Logic of Supplementarity
Socrates compares the written texts which Phaedrus has brought with him to a
pharmakon. The pharmakon would be something which comes from outside the
body; something alien to the natural state ofman, whether it be for good or ill; an
inessential supplement to what is alive and natural. This brings us to the Derridean
'logic of supplementarity', first introduced in another of the earlier texts, De la
grammatologie. Derrida makes the point several times in 'La pharmacie de Platon'
that we are dealing here with the same logic which operates in the texts of Rousseau
and Saussure. His reading of these two writers makes up the main body ofDe la
grammatologie, perhaps his most famous work. The example of Rousseau's attitude
to writing is the clearest - and certainly the best-known - illustration of the logic of
supplementarity. Derrida discusses both Rousseau's essay on the origin of languages
and his autobiographical Confessions and his tendency to talk - in fact, Rousseau
does not talk but writes and this is part of the problem - ofwriting as a supplement to
speech in almost the same terms as those in which, in the Confessions, he discusses
masturbation as being a supplement to 'natural' sexuality. But the ambiguity of the
30 Ibid., p. 83.
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word 'supplement' itself aids Derrida in exposing the inevitable difficulties in the
attempt to oppose speech to writing. I have chosen to say 'aids Derrida' rather than
something like 'Derrida exploits the word supplement'. This latter formulation would
be misleading since it would obscure the way in which Derrida takes a word —
'supplement' in the case ofRousseau, and for Mallarme, 'hymen' - from the text in
order to uncover the paradoxes that already structure the text. Derrida's own phrase,
'the supplementary thread', conveys this very well, with its connotations of
unravelling from within rather than taking the 'scissors' of deconstruction to the
perfect integrity of the text. As Geoffrey Bennington expresses it, paradoxes such as
the one marking the speech/writing opposition 'are not imported into metaphysics by
Derrida; on the contrary, they constitute metaphysics and in some sense speak its
truth'.31
In both French and English, 'supplement' or 'supplement' means 'that which
is added'. But it can mean either superadded to something complete in itself or added
to something in order to make up for a certain incompletion. Rousseau would like to
regard writing as a supplement in the former sense: writing can be added to speech
but is not a necessity since speech is complete in and of itself. Because it rests on the
notion of the presence of the subject's thought to itself, living speech is to be
preferred to writing which is held to be merely a secondary, derivative transcription
of this thought. Writing is at times referred to by Rousseau as an inessential extra and
even a 'disease of speech'. Writing can easily lead to misunderstandings, firstly
because, in the most basic terms, as Derrida says in 'Signature Evenement Contexte':
31
Bennington, 'Derridabase', p. 41-42.
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32 • •'Un signe ecrit s'avance en 1'absence du destinataire.' But this absence is more
than a modified presence. It is not merely a delay or a matter of distance, but a
radical absence: 'Une ecriture qui ne serait pas structurellement lisible - iterable -
par-dela la mort du destinataire ne serait pas une ecriture.' More importantly, this
absence can also extend to the sender, the writer. For writing to function as writing,
the thinking, speaking subject is not required to be present. This is not only
accidental but, rather, an essential structural possibility. For writing to be writing, it
must be possible for the written to be totally divorced (both temporally and spatially)
from what the writing subject might have 'intended' to say. Again, Derrida's analysis
ofwriting in 'Signature Evenement Contexte' is helpful here:
Pour qu'un ecrit soit un ecrit, il faut qu'il continue a 'agir' et etre lisible
meme si ce qu'on appelle l'auteur de l'ecrit ne repond plus de ce qu'il a ecrit,
de ce qu'il semble avoir signe, qu'il soit provisoirement absent, qu'il soit
mort ou qu'en general il n'ait pas soutenu de son intention ou attention
absolument actuelle et presente, de la plenitude de son vouloir-dire, cela
meme qui semble s'etre ecrit 'en son nom'.34
Rousseau's supplement is dangerous in that it displaces the 'properness' or
plenitude which seems to constitute the moment of enunciation. But it is not as
simple as that because, as Derrida demonstrates, even as Rousseau condemns
writing, he actually treats it as something which makes good or completes the
imperfections of speech. And this is more than a simple 'performative
contradiction',35 which term could be used to describe the paradoxical act ofwriting
,2 Derrida, Marges de laphilosophie, p. 374.
33
Ibid., p. 375.
34 Ibid., p. 376.
35 This term 'performative contradiction' has often been used by writers who seek to provide an
account of the development of literary theory, in particular the importance accorded to aporia or
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a condemnation ofwriting. Bennington recognizes that this is, indeed, one way of
looking at the problem. However, pointing out that many people have (erroneously)
taken this idea of a performative contradiction as Derrida's own conclusion,
Bennington argues that it is actually the 'most obvious and least interesting
conclusion'. He does concede that this way of looking at it is 'not nothing' and we
shall see later in the chapter how Novalis uses the idea of the performative
contradiction to good effect. Bennington is trying to suggest here that what we are
dealing with is more profound and complex than a performative contradiction.
Rousseau recognizes that spoken language can also be misleading. Derrida
cites Jean Starobinski's analysis of Rousseau's decision 'to hide himself and write':
'Jean-Jacques choisit d'etre absent et d'ecrire. Paradoxalement, il se cachera
pour mieux se montrer, et il se confiera a la parole ecrite: "J'aimerais la
societe comme un autre, si je n'etais sur de me montrer non seulement a mon
desavantage, mais tout autre que je ne suis. Le parti que j'ai pris d'ecrire et
de me cacher est precisement celui qui me convenait. Moi present, on
n'aurait jamais su ce que je valais.'"37
TO
Rousseau recognizes, as Derrida says, with incomparable acumen, that speech,
even though it appears not to leave the speaker, is marked as much as writing by the
undecidability in certain types of theory, notably postmodernism and poststructuralism. One
performative contradiction cited by Bennett and Royle is the celebrated example of the Cretan liar
paradox: 'If someone says 'I am a liar', how can we tell if that person is lying or not?'Andrew Bennett
and Nicholas Royle, An Introduction to Literature,Criticism and Theory (London, New York,
Toronto: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995), p. 179. See also Peggy Kamuf s introduction to
the Derrida reader Between the Blinds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
36
Bennington, 'Derridabase', p. 47.
37 Jean Starobinski, La transparence et/'obstacle, p. 154. Cited by Derrida, De la grammatologie
(Paris: Minuit, 1967), p. 205.
38 'En fait, Rousseau avait eprouve le derobement dans la parole meme, dans le mirage de son
immediatete. II l'avait reconnu et analyse avec une incomparable acuite.' Derrida, De la
grammatologie, p. 203.
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necessity that, in order for the spoken words to be understood, it must be possible to
repeat them in the absence of the speaker and, indeed, in the case of the ultimate
absence which is death.
Through the logic of supplementarity, speech (as that which needs a
supplement) is shown to have precisely the same qualities as the supposedly inferior
supplement (writing). If writing as sign-system arises in the absence both of the
signified and the human interlocutor, we see clearly that writing, a more generalized
concept of writing, is actually the mode in which spoken language also operates. In
'Signature Evenement Contexte', Derrida notes that it is the 'iterability in alterity' of
the phonic signifier which allows it to be understood across empirical variations of
tone, voice or accent:
Cette possibility structurelle d'etre sevree du referent ou du signifie (done de
la communication et de son contexte) me parait faire de toute marque, fut-elle
orale, un grapheme en general, c'est-a-dire, comme nous l'avons vu, la
restance non-presente d'une marque differentielle coupee de sa pretendue
'production' ou origine.39
What we are beginning to articulate here is the Derridean idea of 'archi-ecriture' as
that which opens up the very possibility of the speaking subject even as it prevents
self-presence and 'dislocates' the subject. In speech, presence is both promised and
refused. There is thus: 'une puissance de mort au coeur de la parole vive'.40 In the
same way that Novalis requires us to believe in and at the same time to renounce the
absolute, Derrida emphasizes the 'strange unity' of this 'supplementary logic':
'9
Derrida, Marges de laphilosophie, p. 378.
40 Derrida, De la grammatologie, p. 204.
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Ayant d'une certaine maniere, disions-nous, reconnu cette puissance qui,
inaugurant la parole, disloque le sujet qu'elle construit, l'empeche d'etre
present a ses signes, travaille son langage de toute une ecriture, Rousseau est
neanmoins plus presse de la conjurer que d'en assumer la necessite. C'est
pourquoi, tendu vers la reconstitution de la presence, il valorise et disqualifie
a la fois l'ecriture. A la fois: c'est-a-dire dans un mouvement divise mais
coherent. II faudra tenter de ne pas en manquer Tetrange unite. Rousseau
condamne l'ecriture comme destruction de la presence et comme maladie de
la parole. II la rehabilite dans la mesure oil elle promet la reappropriation de
ce dont la parole s'etait laissee deposseder. Mais par quoi, sinon deja par une
ecriture plus vieille qu'elle et deja installee dans la place?41
The (Non)truth of Writing
To return to 'La pharmacie de Platon': we learn that Phaedrus has brought along his
texts in order to help him to remember what he wants to say and gradually a
configuration emerges, linking writing, memory, and the pharmakon. It becomes
clear that Socrates' association ofwriting with the pharmakon is neither artificial nor
purely coincidental. Derrida says:
[...] une seule et meme suspicion enveloppe, dans le meme geste, le livre et
la drogue, l'ecriture et l'efficace occulte, ambigue, livree a l'empirisme et au
hasard, operant selon les voies du magique et non selon les lois de la
necessite. Le livre, le savoir mort et rigide enferme dans les biblia, les
histoires accumulees, les nomenclatures, les recettes et les formules apprises
par coeur, tout cela est aussi etranger au savoir vivant et a la dialectique que
le pharmakon est etranger a la science medicale. Et que le mythe au savoir.42
Pausing to note again the association of writing with death and written knowledge
(Te savoir mort et rigide'), which Derrida develops elsewhere in the notion of the
41 Ibid.
42 Derrida, La dissemination, p. 90.
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monumentality ofwriting, or ofwriting as remains, we see that he closes in on this
configuration wherein writing or myth is opposed to true knowledge. What we are
seeing here is the very movement of deconstruction. Derrida's work on binary
oppositions is perhaps his most radical and enduring contribution to theory. Many of
his works have sought to show how seemingly fundamental oppositions are never
stable and equal and can always be deconstructed, as in the case of Rousseau and the
speech/writing opposition. The case ofwriting in Plato is, as we are beginning to see,
another very clear example of this logic and of deconstruction at work. Derrida not
only contests the validity of Plato's attempt to relegate writing to the subordinate
position but he also, by examining Plato's own attitude towards writing, is able to
find a loose thread (another 'fil supplementaire') with which to start to unravel the
philosophy/writing opposition.
The problem revolves around the idea of proximity to that which is supposed
to be beyond - strictly speaking, before - language. This is of the order of presence
and takes many guises, both in the various themes of this thesis, and more
importantly - as the works of Derrida demonstrate again and again - throughout
Western metaphysics. This presence can be the absolute foundation of a
philosophical system, as we saw in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. In the case of Fichte,
we can discern what might be regarded as a twofold assumption of presence. In his
system it is the presence of the ego to itself in the Absolute Ego, which then
guarantees another form of presence: the self-presence of the ego is directly
accessible to philosophy. Here, with Plato, we are confronted with the idea of the
living logos - with all this implies of presence and intention - as that which
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guarantees meaning. Writing, by its very nature, is held to be at a further remove
from the logos than speech (even though, as we saw above with regard to Rousseau,
speech turns out to be always already characterized as much as writing by distance
and differance.) In the Phaedrus, too, writing and myth are described as inessential
extras. Like the pharmakon they have the potential - without being intrinsically good
or evil - to be detrimental to that which is natural and true, in the same way as
writing or masturbation for Rousseau. Derrida explains philosophy's attitude towards
writing both in terms of truth and exteriority, and also in terms of distance from the
origin:
Le verite de l'ecriture, c'est-a-dire, nous allons le voir, la non-verite, nous ne
pouvons la decouvrir en nous-memes par nous-memes. Et elle n'est pas
l'objet d'une science, seulement d'une histoire recitee, d'une fable repetee.
Le lien de l'ecriture au mythe se precise, comme son opposition au savoir et
notamment au savoir qu'on puise en soi-meme, par soi-meme. Et du meme
coup, par l'ecriture ou par le mythe, se signifient la rupture genealogique et
l'eloignement de l'origine.43
But it is at one of the moments in Plato when memory is opposed to writing
that the deconstructive reading begins to reveal a certain confusion of boundaries. I
mentioned above that Phaedrus has brought his texts with him as an aid to memory.
But Plato's opinion of the written text is that it leads one astray from true memory;
having the words written down, on the 'outside' so to speak, one comes to rely on
them and the work of living memory is neglected - it atrophies. Again Derrida points
to the identification of the written (partly through its equation with the artificial and
potentially lethal pharmakon) with a certain 'cadaverous rigidity'. He who relies on




physiques, spatiales et superficielles qu'on met a plat sur une tablette 4 Being
the ultimate absence, death always already marks - or, more precisely, re-marks -
the essential possibility of absence which constitutes the written text, because he who
trusts his thought to these marks knows that:
lis le representeront meme s'il les oublie, ils porteront sa parole meme s'il
n'est plus la pour les animer. Meme s'il est mort, et seul unpharmakon peut
detenir un tel pouvoir, sur la mort sans doute mais aussi en collusion avec
elle. Le pharmakon et Tecriture, c'est done bien toujours une question de vie
ou de mort.45
Precisely here, where living memory is opposed to the written text, the boundary
begins to seem less defined and a problematic familiar to us from Rousseau and
Novalis is revealed: 'Le dehors est deja dans le travail de la memoire. Le mal
s'insinue dans le rapport a soi de la memoire, dans l'organisation generale de
l'activite mnesique.'46 This is because the work ofmemory, 'mnesic activity', always
already needs signs and substitutions to recall the nonpresent with which it is
necessarily in relation. Plato has to acknowledge that memory is finite. A memory
which could do without the supplement or the sign would no longer be memory but
infinite self-presence (T'infinite d'une presence a soi').47 And so this opening of the
supplementary outside means that the pharmakon always already penetrates or
infects that which had wanted to do without it:
45 Ibid., p. 130.
46 Ibid., p. 135.
47 Ibid., p. 135.
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Des que le dehors d'un supplement s'est ouvert, sa structure implique qu'il
puisse lui-meme se faire 'typer', remplacer par son double, et qu'un
supplement de supplement soit possible et necessaire. Necessaire parce que
ce mouvement n'est pas un accident sensible et 'empirique', il est lie a
Tidealite de Yeidos, comme possibility de la repetition du meme. Et l'ecriture
apparait a Platon (et apres lui a toute la philosophie que se constitue comme
tel dans ce geste) comme cet entrainement fatal du redoublement: supplement
de supplement, signifiant d'un signifiant, representant d'un representant.48
As we saw with Novalis's outline of self-consciousness, the intervention of
these signs and substitutions necessary for the work ofmemory is also constitutive of
the temporality which always already divides the subject in its aporetic relation to
itself. The Platonic eidos is already marked by this necessary iterability, in the same
way in which the Fichtean proposition 'a ist a' expresses not absolute identity but
only a relative identity - 'a ist a' is, in Novalis's words, a 'Scheinsatz'. The
implications for Platonism (and, as Derrida sees it, for all ofWestern metaphysics) of
the opening of the supplementary outside are felt in the way in which Plato must
simultaneously maintain T'exteriorite de Tecriture et son pouvoir de penetration
malefique, capable d'affecter ou d'infecter le plus profond.'49 Derrida continues,
linking thepharmakon explicitly with Rousseau's 'dangerous supplement': 'Le
pharmakon est ce supplement dangereux qui entre par effraction dans cela meme qui
voudrait avoir pu s'en passer et qui se laisse a la fois frayer, violenter, combler et
remplacer, completer par la trace meme dont le present s'augmente en y
disparaissant.'5
48 Ibid., p. 136.
49 Ibid., p. 137.
50 Ibid., p. 137.
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Writing, Myth and Sophistics
But so much for the opposition memory/writing. What of philosophy? Derrida goes
on with his deconstructive reading of the Phaedrns and discovers that, according to
Plato, there is - or ought to be - a 'true' philosophy, lined up on the side of living
memory, dialectics and true knowledge. Opposing these are writing, myth and
'sophistics'. What characterizes these latter is that, even though the necessary
intervention of representation in living memory or true knowledge must be conceded,
writing and sophistics are at an even further remove from the logos. This brings us
towards a clearer understanding of what Derrida might mean by the 'remarque'. This
useful term - almost a kind of short-hand - will also be important in Chapter 4, when
we come to look at the death of a loved one. In writing the necessary iterability of the
eidos is carried away by a repetition of that which repeats. Both sophistics and living
dialectics presuppose the possibility of repetition, but in the case of sophistics (and
writing): 'Ce qui se repete, c'est le repetant, Timitant, le signifiant, le representant, a
Toccasion en Tabsence de la chose meme qu'ils paraissent reediter, et sans
Tanimation physique ou mnesique, sans la tension vivante de la dialectique.'51 The
idea of the re-mark provides us with a relatively concise way to express the reason
for Plato's distaste ofwriting. If, as we saw above with regard to Rousseau, speech is
always already marked by the necessity of repetition in alterity, and thus the
possibility of death, writing, by seeming to be at an even further remove from living
memory, marks again, and more clearly, this necessity. Writing is the signifier's




and without the truth being anywhere present. Pursuing this, he concludes that the
only thing separating sophistics and writing from philosophy and dialectics is
52
Tepaisseur invisible, presque nulle, de telle feuille entre le signifiant et le signifie'.
As we shall see later on when we consider Mallarme's use of the word 'hymen' in
'Mimique', this 'leaf or sheet unites even as it separates. And it is the unity of the
leaf that points to the ultimate inseparability ofwriting (or sophistics) and philosophy
(or dialectics):
La difference entre signifie et signifiant est sans doute le schema directeur a
partir duquel le platonisme s'institue et determine son opposition a la
sophistique. S'inaugurant ainsi, la philosophic et la dialectique se determinent
en determinant leur autre.53
'Verwechselung des Symbols mit dem Symbolisirten'
Novalis, too, is aware that it is the distinction between signifier and signified which
governs the philosophical attempts of his contemporaries to locate the absolute
ground of philosophy. Obviously he does not use Saussurean terminology, but says
in a formulation which is almost uncanny in the way that it anticipates the concerns
of literary theory and philosophy in the twentieth century:
AufVerwechselung des Symbols mit dem Symbolisirten - auf ihre
Identisirung - auf den Glauben an wahrhafte, vollst[andige] Repraesentation
- und Relation des Bildes und des Originals - der Erscheinung und der
Substanz - auf der Folgerung von auBerer Aehnlichkeit - auf durchgangige
innre Ubereinstimmung und Zusammenhang - kurz aufVerwechselungen
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 139.
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von Subject] und Ofbject] beruht der ganze Aberglaube und Irrthum aller
Zeiten, und Volker und Individuenf4
It is precisely this 'Glauben an wahrhafte, vollstandige Repraesentation' which
Derrida examines in the second part ofLa dissemination, as we shall see when we
come to his reading ofMallarme in Chapter 3. One way of understanding the distaste
for writing which characterizes the Western philosophical tradition is to say that
metaphysics is only interested in the signified (in Novalis's terms 'the symbolized')
and abhors the fact that meaning must hide behind the signifier. This can be
described in terms of the so-called 'surface-depth model', which is explained by
Bennett and Royle: 'Reading has conventionally been thought of on the basis of a
surface-depth model, with the words of the text as the surface and the meaning
lurking somewhere inside or underneath.'55 Considering language as sign-system,
this philosophical desire recognized by Novalis can be described as the desire to
efface the signifier, or at least to render the symbol as transparent as possible, in
order to access more easily the depths or the inside. So the fate of writing in the face
of the philosophical wish to do without signs or, at the very least, to render them
transparent, also has an effect on the concept of art. We see the inauguration of an
aesthetics the value of which is also determined by proximity to or correspondence to
'truth' and the emergence of a mimetic conception of art, governed by this
distinction between the symbol and symbolized. In the second part of La
dissemination, Derrida begins to show how the status ofwriting in Platonism also
produces the dominant conception of art. Stressing all the while that 'writing' is not
exactly the same as 'literary writing', Derrida demonstrates that in Plato literary
54 N III, p. 397, 'Das Allgemeine Brouillon', no. 685.
55 Bennett and Royle, p. 174.
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writing, too, is governed by the relation of correspondence to that which is prior to it.
Poets, for example, are condemned in the Republic as being mere 'imitators', this
disdain underlining once more the preference for what is imitated: 'La place
specifique du poete peut etre jugee comme telle suivant qu'il fait ou non appel, de
telle ou telle fa?on, a la forme mimetique.'56
Considering the metaphors of writing and painting, Derrida maintains that
these share the same structure to the extent that both are 'mesures a la verite dont ils
sont capables [...]. Dans le mouvement du mimeisthai, le rapport du mime au mime,
du reproducteur au reproduit, est toujours rapport a un present passe. L'imite est
avant l'imitant. D'oii le probleme de temps qui ne manque pas de se poser en effet.'57
We have inevitably come back to the question of time, which played such an
important role in the discussion of self-consciousness in Chapter 1. For traditional
metaphysics and its conceptualizing ofmimetic art, the temporal structure - the
before and after - ofmimesis means that the signified (Novalis's 'symbolized') must
come first. Language, writing and art are then held to be secondary, supervening
upon a prior presence or, rather, something which has once been present. This
intimates the very nature of the representational model: to re-present is literally to
'render present once more'.
Novalis rightly recognizes the tendency of metaphysics to confuse the symbol
with the symbolized, but we must also be clear that the desire to do so rests on an
assumption of their clear distinction. Looking at it from a slightly different




perspective, the notion of the gap which metaphysics would like to close only
emerges thanks to this opposition. Derrida, too, highlights the traditional assumption
of difference between word (or concept) and sign, and argues that in Platonism (and
this includes the anti-Platonisms that regularly feed into it58) both art and philosophy
are governed by their relation to the on (or 'being-present') and its clear distinction
from the image or the appearance. Writing must appear before the tribunal of
ontology: 'Le recours a la verite de ce qui est, des choses meme, permet toujours de
decider, si oui ou non, l'ecriture est vraie, si elle est conforme ou "contra/re" au
vrai.'59 Derrida insists on two different, though related conceptions of truth. One is
truth as the unveiling of that which lies concealed (aletheia) and the second is the
idea of agreement (homoiosis or adequatio) which is the very value of imitation:
'rapport de ressemblance ou d'egalite entre une re-presentation et une chose (present
devoile)'.60 He stresses that thus 'selon la "logique" meme, [...] l'imite est plus reel,
plus essentiel, plus vrai, etc., que l'imitant. II lui est anterieur et superieur.'61 Derrida
argues, while conceding that in twenty centuries of criticism and poetics a subversion
has, at times, occurred whereby art is held to provide a richer and more pleasant,
more 'real' reality, that this is nonetheless an 'extra-value' or 'extra-being' of reality
and it comes back to the same root. Art is still judged in relation to what is and
Derrida says: '[...] jamais la discernabilite absolue entre l'imite et l'imitant, ni
l'anteriorite de celui-la sur celui-ci, n'auront ete deplacees par un systeme
metaphysique.' Plato's distaste for writing is a manifestation of this philosophical
desire but, as we saw above in relation to the work ofmemory, signs and
58 See La dissemination, p. 235.
59
Derrida, La dissemination, pp. 227-28.
60
Ibid., p. 237.




supplements already penetrate - indeed, in a sense, constitute - the inside. Signifiers
and symbols cannot be so readily effaced.
Novalis's 'Monolog'
Derrida says above that no metaphysical system has ever succeeded in displacing the
absolute superiority and anteriority of the imitated. But we have to ask whether or
not literature can succeed, if not in displacing this order, then in complicating and
questioning it. Novalis's famous short text, 'Monolog', as Andrew Bowie rightly
says, is significant not only for the insights it offers into transformations of the
understanding of language and truth in the Romantic era but also because the text
itself 'offers an enactment of what Romanticism might mean by 'literature'
("Poesie").'63 I would go further than Bowie and suggest that 'Monolog' as a text
exemplifies many of the similarities between Novalis and Derrida. It not only
complicates the relation between language and reality, and the boundary between
literature and philosophy, but it does this with a certain ironic undecidability and a
virtuosity which is characteristic ofmany of Derrida's own texts, as well as those
(literary) texts in which he is most interested. If it seems that I have moved too
quickly from the status of'writing' in metaphysics to a new concept of'literature', I
would say only that 'Monolog' starts to demonstrate the way in which Romantic
literature emerges from precisely these 'philosophical' questions of truth, language
and iterability. Here is the full text of 'Monolog':
63 Bowie, p. 65.
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Es ist eigentlich um das Sprechen und Schreiben eine narrische Sache;
das rechte Gesprach ist ein bloBes Wortspiel. Der lacherliche Irrthum ist nur
zu bewundern, daB die Leute meinen - sie sprachen um der Dinge Willen.
Gerade das Eigenthtimliche der Sprache, daB sie sich bios um sich selbst
bekummert, weiB keiner. Darum ist sie ein so wunderbares und fruchtbares
GeheimniB, - daB wenn einer bios spricht, um zu sprechen, er gerade die
herrlichsten, originellsten Wahrheiten ausspricht. Will er aber von etwas
Bestimmten sprechen, so laBt ihn die launige Sprache das lacherlichste und
verkehrteste Zeug sagen. Daraus entsteht der HaB, den so manche ernsthafte
Leute gen die Sprache haben. Sie merken ihren Muthwillen, merken aber
nicht, daB das verachtliche Schwatzen die unendlich ernsthafte Seite der
Sprache ist. Wenn man den Leuten nur begreiflich machen konnte, daB es mit
der Sprache wie mit den mathematischen Formeln sei - Sie machen eine Welt
fur sich aus - Sie spielen nur mit sich selbst, driicken nichts als ihre
wunderbare Natur aus, und eben darum sind sie so ausdrucksvoll - eben
darum spiegelt sich in ihnen das seltsame VerhaltniBspiel der Dinge. Nur
durch ihre Freiheit sind sie Glieder der Natur und nur in ihren freien
Bewegungen auBert sich die Weltseele und macht sie zu einem zarten
MaaBstab und GrundriB der Dinge. So ist es auch mit der Sprache - wer ein
feines Gefiihl ihrer Applicatur, ihres Takts, ihres musikalischen Geistes hat,
wer in sich das zarte Wirken ihrer innern Natur vernimmt, und danach seine
Zunge oder seine Fland bewegt, der wird ein Prophet sein, dagegen wer es
wohl weiB, aber nicht Ohr und Sinn genug fiir sie hat, Wahrheiten wie diese
schreiben, aber von der Sprache selbst zum Besten gehalten und von den
Menschen, wie Cassandra von den Trojanern, verspottet werden wird. Wenn
ich damit das Wesen und Amt der Poesie auf das deutlichste angegeben zu
haben glaube, so weiB ich doch, daB es kein Mensch verstehen kann, und ich
ganz was albernes gesagt habe, weil ich es habe sagen wollen, und so keine
Poesie zu Stande kommt. Wie, wenn ich aber reden mtiBte? und dieser
Sprachtrieb zu sprechen das Kennzeichen der Eingebung der Sprache, der
Wirksamkeit der Sprache in mir ware? und mein Wille nur auch alles wollte,
was ich miiBte, so konnte dies ja am Ende ohne mein Wissen und Glauben
Poesie sein und ein GeheimniB der Sprache verstandlich machen? und so
war' ich ein berufener Schriftsteller, denn ein Schriftsteller wohl ein
Sprachbegeisterter?64
The most immediately striking feature of 'Monolog' is its questioning of
language as a means of representing truths or 'things.' Novalis's comparison of
language with mathematical formulae highlights the way in which language can be
said to refer only to itself. The Saussurean pre-echoes here are unmissable. However,
64 N II, pp. 672-73.
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Novalis does not reject entirely the possibility that language might also refer to
something other than itself. Derrida's reading ofMallarme will further elucidate the
complexity of this (self-)referentiality, but I would argue that in 'Monolog' Novalis
has already complicated the question in superbly economical fashion. It all revolves
around the difference between the language of determinate propositions - which
Novalis calls 'sprechen um der Dinge willen' or 'von etwas Bestimmten sprechen' -
and another way of thinking about language. Novalis calls this other way of
conceiving of language 'speaking in order to speak' ('wenn einer bios spricht, um zu
sprechen'). In his book, The Violence ofLanguage, Jean-Jacques Lecercle also
rejects - in very similar terms to Novalis - the conception of language as an
instrument for saying something determinate, saying that language 'always reminds
us that it, and no one else, is speaking, that whenever we believe we rule over words,
we are in the grip of an unavoidable but nevertheless delusive illusion.'65 Novalis,
too, recognizes that our illusory assumption that we control language is inevitable
and, like Lecercle, makes language the grammatical subject, creating a subtle and
uncanny sense that language is animate and autonomous.
Darum ist sie ein so wunderbares und fruchtbares GeheimniB, — daB
wenn einer bios spricht, um zu sprechen, er gerade die herrlichsten,
originellsten Wahrheiten ausspricht. Will er aber von etwas Bestimmten
sprechen, so laBt ihn die launige Sprache das lacherlichste und verkehrteste
Zeug sagen.
Derrida, in Memoirespour Paul de Man, is also fascinated by the 'fatal drift'
suggested by the German prefix 'ver-', as in Novalis's 'verkehrteste Zeug'. Derrida
cites de Man's subtle alteration to Heidegger's dictum that 'die Sprache spricht'. De
65
Jean-Jacques Lecercle, The Violence ofLanguage (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 265.
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Man modifies this to: 'Die Sprache verspricht (sich).'66 As well as noting the idea of
'promising', implicit in every 'act' ofwriting or speaking, Derrida admires de Man's
playful manipulation of the 'ver-':
Paul de Man joue encore -[...] il insinue qu'a s'affecter d'un 'ver- le
Sprechen de la parole ne devient pas seulement prometteur, il se detraque, se
perturbe, se corrompt, se pervertit, s'affecte d'une sorte de derive fatale. Vous
savez que le prefixe 'ver-' a tres souvent cette signification en allemand.67
To be serious...
It is helpful to digress a little at this point, letting ourselves be carried by another
kind of drift and to look at Derrida's reflections on serious and non-serious uses of
language in his extended debate with John Searle over J. L. Austin's Speech Act
AR . ... .
Theory. (Of course, the very notion of digression is one concept which is called
into question by Derrida, and we find that the detour will bring us to where we want
to go - ifwe let it.) In a long and complex debate - often about reading accurately
and faithfully - it is possible to identify one particular issue at stake for both Searle
and Derrida. This is Austin's contention, developed further by Searle, that it is
possible and necessary to distinguish between 'serious' and 'non-serious' uses of
language. The distinction is absolutely vital if a central tenet of speech act theory is
66 Paul de Man, Allegories ofReading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 277. Cited by Derrida, Memoires pour Paul de Man,
pp. 101-02.
67 Derrida, Memoires pour Paid de Man, p. 102.
68 This debate plays out in the articles collected in Limited Inc, ed. by Gerald Graff (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1988).
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to be credible. Austin argues that, as well as describing a state of affairs (constative
utterances), language can be used to produce a state of affairs, to effect 'real-life'
changes (performative utterances). A very clear and simple example of this is what is
uttered by bride and groom during a wedding ceremony. The vows spoken are
performative; they change the marital status of the couple, binding them together in
the eyes of the law or of the church. However, the distinction between the 'serious'
and 'non-serious' use of language is required ifwe are to explain how an actor or
actress, onstage in a play, use the same words in declaring the marriage vows and
exchange rings without being married.69
It is not that Derrida wishes to attack Austin or condemn speech act theory.
On the contrary, he very much admires Austin, recognizing the idea of the
performative as an extremely productive way of thinking about language and
literature. Indeed, Derrida's own texts as well as those he reads are often
performative; they not only describe but also transform other texts. However, ifwe
return to our above example of marriage vows, we see that for Derrida there are a
number of problems with speech act theory. He first takes issue with Austin's
recourse to non-linguistic conditions in order for the performative to be what he,
Austin, calls 'successful' or 'felicitous'70 - i.e., that both parties are single, the
presence ofwitnesses and a minister or official with the power to marry, and so on.
Derrida has certain reservations about the fact that Austin must ultimately invoke the
intentions of the bride and groom or anyone making a performative utterance, and we
will come to the question of intentionality in a moment. However, more specifically,
69 Culler also uses the example of wedding vows in his explication of performative language. See
Literary Theory, pp. 95-96.
70 J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 22.
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his objection has to do with Austin's insistence that serious uses of language can be
rigorously defined and opposed to non-serious utterances. In How To Do Things With
Words, Austin says:
Surely the words must be spoken 'seriously' and so as to be taken
'seriously'? This is, though vague, true enough in general - it is an important
commonplace in discussing the purport of any utterance whatsoever. I must
not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem.71
Austin asserts that a marriage simulated in the course of a play would be an instance
of the non-serious use of language. Once again a hierarchy is established wherein the
serious use of language is to be preferred to the non-serious use, which is regarded as
inessential, a secondary effect or a grafting of non-serious uses onto the primary
serious use. The non-serious uses are described by Austin as 'parasitic', and he
employs other metaphors of illness and infection which remind us of the pharmakon:
as utterances our performances are also heir to certain other kinds of ill,
which infect all utterances. [...] a performative utterance will, for example,
be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if
introduced in a poem, or if spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar
manner to any and every utterance - a sea-change in special circumstances.
Language in such circumstances is in special ways - intelligibly - used not
seriously [Derrida's emphasis], but in many ways parasitic upon its normal
use - ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All
this we are excluding from consideration. Our performative utterances,
felicitous or not, are to be regarded as issued in ordinary circumstances.72
71 Ibid., p. 9.
72 Ibid., pp. 21-22. See Marges de laphilosophie, pp. 386-87.
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Derrida points out that: 'C'est aussi comme un "parasite" que Tecriture a toujours ete
73traitee par la tradition philosophique, et l'approchement n'a rien ici d'hasardeux.'
In a move familiar to us from the above discussion of Plato and Rousseau, he shows
how the logic of supplementarity is also at work here. In the same way as writing, the
so-called secondary, derivative form of language, turns out to open up the very
possibility of living speech, so too do the non-serious uses of language make serious
utterances possible. This is due to what Derrida refers to as the 'general iterability' of
language. If it were not possible to repeat linguistic utterances in other contexts - and
this applies to both 'serious' and 'non-serious' repetitions - they would no longer
function as language but rather as what Culler describes as marks 'inextricably tied
to a physical situation'.74 'Serious' and 'non-serious' utterances are merely different
versions of the functioning of language. So when Novalis says that the 'serious
people' who have a hatred for language, 'merken ihren Muthwillen, merken aber
nicht, daB das verachtliche Schwatzen die unendlich ernsthafte Seite der Sprache ist',
we are reminded of Derrida's insistence that, as with a generalized writing, jokes and
quotations are not parasites or inessential supplements to 'serious' language. On the
contrary, the possibility of using words in non-serious contexts actually constitutes
the very possibility of serious utterances.
73
Derrida, Marges de laphilosophie, p. 387.
74
Culler, Literary Theory, p. 99.
Ill
Intention
In more general terms, it is the assumption that language can be used to refer simply
and directly which both Derrida and Novalis question. This brings us back to
intention, and 'Monolog' helps to shed more light on this question. We have not
really asked so far whether Novalis seems to be talking about what people say or
what they write. Now it might easily be argued that the text concerns the functioning
of language in general. In the same way I said just now that 'Novalis seems to be
"talking" about what people say' even though 'Monolog' is a written text, describing
writers as 'talking' and 'saying' is very common and, indeed, common sense. This is
further complicated by the fact that this written text is entitled 'Monolog' - a
monologue is usually a spoken discourse. I am not trying to split hairs here but,
rather, to make a serious point about intentionality. Keeping in mind Derrida's
deconstruction of the speech/writing opposition, we see that Novalis is concerned
with the intentions of those people who want to speak of something determinate. As
well as recognizing that this 'something determinate' is by its very nature anterior to
language, we also see that the intention itself is held to be pre-linguistic, the
manifestation of an impulse, idea or thought which is the logos itself or, at least,
closer to the logos than even living speech, and much closer than writing for the
reasons we outlined above. Ifwe look again at 'Monolog', even though Novalis does
not explicitly identify 'die launige Sprache' with writing, this temperamental or
capricious language leads intentions astray in precisely the same way as 'archi-
ecriture', the generalized writing which Derrida reveals as dislocating the speaking,
and intending, subject even as it constitutes this subject. Temperamental language
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makes fun of the intention to use it just as the subject is 'tormented' by its signs.
However, this does not mean that intention should be discounted entirely. There
would be very little point in writing or speaking at all if this were the case.
'Monolog', in that it sets up an alternative between two ways of using language,
clearly indicates that, for Novalis, language can be used. We have no choice but to
use language. Instead, what is called into question by 'Monolog' is the assumption
that this intention can be fully realized; that language can be used determinately in
order to give direct access to forms of plenitude such as truth, reality or the
unmediated experience of 'things'.
As for Derrida, it has often been claimed that he has no interest in what the
writer of a text might have 'meant' at the time of writing. However, this is a
somewhat misleading assumption based perhaps on an over-hasty identification of
Derrida with Roland Barthes and his famous statement on the 'death of the author'.
Nicholas Royle takes issue with this misconception, pointing out that:
at least as early as 1976 we can hear Derrida speaking out against the
Barthesian phrase. In Signeponge, for instance, Derrida refers to 'that death
or omission of the author ofwhich, as is certainly the case, too much of a
case has been made'.75
In 'Toward an Ethic ofDiscussion', Derrida takes issue with Searle's
contention that the deconstruction of the serious/non-serious opposition is
75
Royle, Jacques Derrida, p. 7. Royle cites Derrida, Signeponge/Signsponge, p. 22. Signeponge was
first given as a lecture at a colloquium on Ponge held at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1975 and was first
published in its full form in the bilingual edition I use here: Derrida, Signeponge/Signsponge, trans,
by Richard Rand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
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tantamount to accusing those who speak of intentionality as being in the grip of a
'longing for metaphysical plenitude':
It is not accurate, [...] to suggest that anyone who uses the word
'intentionality' 'invests intention with the longing for metaphysical
plenitude'. Nor did I ever say so. Nevertheless, if one wishes to speak
rigorously of an intentional structure one should take into account, with or
without 'longing', the telos of plenitude that constitutes it. [...] This plenitude
(this 'fulfillment'), for reasons I have already stated (iterability, structure of
the trace and of the mark in general), is already inaccessible in perception or
in intuition in general as the experience of a present content.76
But even without statements as explicit as these, Derrida's reading ofRousseau
makes clear that the intention of the writer is not to be discounted. Even though
Rousseau recognizes the power of death at the heart of speech, which dislocates the
subject, Derrida shows that he is 'neanmoins plus presse de la conjurer que d'en
assumer la necessite'. The strange double movement of elevating and disqualifying
writing at the same time demonstrates that blindness to the supplement is inevitable.
The author is - in the most essential way - blind to some aspects ofwhat the text
seems to say. If the 'dangerous supplement' demonstrates anything, it is that the text
has the ability to say something other than what the writer meant or, as Novalis puts
it, language can make him or her say 'das lacherlichste und verkehrteste Zeug'. But
rather than say that every attempt to speak determinately is doomed to failure,
77
'Monolog' demonstrates - as Derrida would say, with 'a certain laughter' - a way
of speaking or writing which allows for the articulation of something meaningful
while nonetheless recognizing that the endless differance of the trace prevents the
(re)constitution of a single, stable meaning as both origin and telos of language.
76 Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 121.
77 See Derrida, Marges de la philosophie, p. 29.
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So how, according to Novalis, does one avoid 'speaking determinately' and
'speak in order to speak'? Here he seems to be talking about 'Poesie' and contrasting
it to determinate - we could also say 'philosophical' - language. By 'contrasting', I
do not mean to imply that Novalis wishes to set up a clear and watertight distinction
between determinate and 'poetic' language. These are placed in a certain relation to
each another but, as we shall see in a moment, it is not a question of a stable or
hierarchical opposition. Likening language to mathematical formulae, he says:
Nur durch ihre Freiheit sind sie Glieder der Natur und nur in ihren freien
Bewegungen auBert sich die Weltseele und macht sie zu einem zarten
MaaBstab und GrundriB der Dinge. So ist es auch mit der Sprache - wer ein
feines Gefuhl ihrer Applicatur, ihres Takts, ihres musikalischen Geistes hat,
wer in sich das zarte Wirken ihrer innern Natur vernimmt, und danach seine
Zunge oder seine Hand bewegt, der wird ein Prophet sein, dagegen wer es
wohl weiB, aber nicht Ohr und Sinn genug fur sie hat, Wahrheiten wie diese
schreiben, aber von der Sprache selbst zum Besten gehalten und von den
Menschen, wie Cassandra von den Trojanern, verspottet werden wird.
This would seem to suggest that philosophy's insistence that language can be used,
in order to locate the truth, to pinpoint or 'grasp' the absolute by force, is precisely
that which blocks access to insights which might be achieved in other ways: any
apparent truths that emerge will only be 'mocked' by language. Novalis actually says
78
elsewhere: 'Offenbarungen lassen sich nicht mit Gewalt erzwingen.' Trying to
bend language, to make an instrument of it, reveals only the incompatibility of
discourse and the absolute, as we saw clearly in our discussion of Levinas and a
'violent metaphysics'. Allowing language freedom to move the speaker, letting
language express its own wonderful musical nature, might make a 'prophet' of the
78 N III, p. 601, 'Fragmente und Studien 1799/1800: Physicalische Bemerkungen, no. 291.
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speaker. But, of course, by trying to say this in determinate fashion Novalis's text
takes on the form of an aporia, setting up an undecidable oscillation between the two
alternatives. This is the most interesting aspect of the text in terms both of its status
as an excellent example of Romantic literature and of its interest for
poststructuralism. Novalis draws attention to the fact that 'Monolog' itself can be
read as an instance of 'speaking for the sake of things':
Wenn ich damit das Wesen und Amt der Poesie auf das deutlichste
angegeben zu haben glaube, so weiB ich doch, da!3 es kein Mensch verstehen
kann, und ich ganz was albernes gesagt habe, weil ich es habe sagen wollen,
und so keine Poesie zu Stande kommt.
So we find ourselves left with a certain paradoxical undecidability, through which, as
Novalis says, he may well have produced literature 'ohne [s]ein Wissen und
Glauben'.
Signeponge: Signing (Im)properly
We will return to the question of never-ending undecidability in the following
chapter on nonclosure and self-referentiality. But now I want to turn briefly to
Signeponge, Derrida's reading of Francis Ponge, because it offers further insight into
the problems of reference and respect for language which have been opened by our
reading of 'Monolog'. If 'Monolog' seems to say that the only chance of producing
literature is born of the attempt to avoid 'speaking for the sake of things', Signeponge
turns the logic of the 'thing' upside down by inviting us to look at the text as a thing.
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This idea of the text as 'thing' is not to be confused with the objectifying moves of
philosophy which we discussed in Chapter 1, especially with regard to Levinas. The
whole point about the 'thing' is that it cannot be objectified or fully rendered into
philosophical or critical discourse. Derrida says:
La chose serait done Tautre, Tautre-chose qui me donne un ordre ou
m'addresse une demande impossible, intransigeante, insatiable, sans echange
et sans transaction, sans contrat impossible. Sans un mot, sans me parler, elle
s'addresse a moi, a moi seul dans mon irremplagable singularity, dans ma
solitude aussi. A la chose je dois un respect absolu que me mediatise aucune
loi generate: la loi de la chose, c'est aussi la singularity. A elle me lie une
dette infinie, un devoir sans fond. Je ne m'en acquitterai jamais. La chose
79n'est done pas un objet, elle ne peut le devenir.
Novalis's statement, cited at the beginning of this chapter, that 'Kritik der Poesie ist
ein Unding' can be seen in terms of this infinite respect for the 'thing-ness' or
otherness of the text - 'une dette infinie, un devoir sans fond'. The text resists
explication, assimilation into the general discourse of criticism. The infinite debt to
the singularity of the literary text makes it particularly difficult for Derrida to discuss
the work of Ponge, and we are back again with the problem of (mis)reading. I do not
want to read Derrida reading Ponge (who is, of course, also reading himself). Instead,
I am going to look briefly at the slightly more general discussion in Signeponge of
the text as signature, because the analysis of the text's singularity gives us a different
perspective on the literature/philosophy opposition.
Both Ponge and Derrida play on the double meaning of the word 'propre' in
French. It can mean both 'clean', and also 'proper', in the sense of belonging to,
79
Derrida, Signeponge, p. 15.
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owned by - in this second sense, we also have to keep an eye on that which is
distinctive or singular, as well as that which is appropriate. Derrida says of Ponge:
'il aura specule comme personne sur le propre, le proprement ecrire et le proprement
signer. Ne separant plus, dans le propre, les deux tiges de laproprete et la
OA
propriete.' The ambiguity of the word 'propre' gives Ponge the means - through
.81
T'affinite [...] entre texte et tissu' - to create an entire network of images relating
to 'proper' and 'improper' ways of writing or signing.
Bringing us back to the literature/philosophy opposition, Derrida cites Ponge,
from Pages bis: '"Si je prefere La Fontaine - la moindre fable - a Schopenhauer ou
Hegel, je sais bien pourquoi. £a me parait bien: 1. moins fatigant, plus plaisant; 2.
89
plus propre, moins degoutant [.Derrida asks why philosophers would - apart
from all their other 'insuffisances' — be unclean or 'disgusting', and suggests that:
une des raisons pour lesquelles peut-etre les philosophes en tant que
philosophes sont un peu degoutants, c'est que pas un, en tant que philosophe,
car 9a fait partie de la philosophie, n'aura su trancher, s'arreter (d'ou le
caractere 'volumenplusieurstomineux' de leur oeuvre [...]), couper pour faire
court et signer. Pour signer il faut arreter son texte et aucun philosophe n'aura
signe son texte, resolument, singulierement, parle en son nom avec tous les
risques que cela comporte. Chaque philosophe denie l'idiome de son nom, de
sa langue, de sa circonstance, parle par concepts et generalites necessairement
impropres.
Seeking to speak in concepts and generalities would be analogous to what Novalis
describes as 'von etwas Bestimmten sprechen'. Trying to speak of something
80
Derrida, Signeponge, p. 29.
81 See Signeponge, p. 37.
82
Ponge, Pages bis from Proems. Cited by Derrida, Signeponge, p. 33.
83
Derrida, Signeponge, p. 33.
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determinate or something generally and universally valid, is in other words, to
attempt to render the surface as transparent as possible - one tries to deny the
differance of language which permanently defers the closing of the gap between
signifier and signified. Differance helps us to think about this alterity of the text
which is also - but not only - the alterity of language itself. Derrida often uses the
idea of'the trace' to express the functioning of differance. In Chapter 1, we
discussed Saussure's description of language as a 'system of differences without
positive terms.' Put simply, every element in language is marked by the trace of the
elements which are not present. But because of the differance of language, these
elements are not simply absent; they are not elsewhere, have never been in
84
themselves present. As Bennington puts it: 'Every trace is the trace of a trace.'
As Ponge sees it, the manipulation of language involved in bending it towards
concepts and generalities, soils the words, makes them unclean by denying their
absolute otherness and their 'properness'. Novalis, in the 'Logologische Fragmente',
contrasts the philosopher's love of generalities with the poet's respect for language:
'Wenn der Philosoph nur alles ordnet, alles stellt, so loBte der Dichter alle Bande auf.
Seine Worte sind nicht allgemeine Zeichen - Tone sind es - Zauberworte, die schone
Gruppe um sich her bewegen.'85 The philosopher's language is necessarily improper
because he denies the idiom and textuality of his text. And, according to Derrida, he
does this precisely by refusing to sign. In the introduction, we discussed the question
of readings and misreadings, and the idea that the possibility of the text is only
opened by the reading of the other. Derrida often describes this possibility in terms of
84
Bennington, 'Derridabase', p. 75.
85 N II, p. 533, 'Logologische Fragmente', no. 32.
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the signature. In the same way, as the signature on a travellers' cheque is only
validated by the countersignature, the text as signature always already awaits the
countersignature of the reader. We must now begin to consider ways in which
Novalis and Derrida admire - indeed, try to produce - the kind ofwriting which tries
to account for the singularity of the other who signs, for the alterity of language, and
examine whether, as Bennington puts it, more than philosophy 'literature can give an
idea of a probity or frankness in the negotiation of this singularity and the letting-be
of the other thing in its alterity.' In the next chapter, we will turn to ways in which
literature signs, remarks itself as literature, through a number of operations and
strategies which admit to the radical alterity of language, acknowledging the drift of
its differance.
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'Der SchluB des Buchs schien zu fehlen.'1
Novalis, Heinrich von Ofterdingen
'Differance jusqu'a la mort, pour la mort, sans fin parce que finie.'2
Derrida, 'Prejuges: Devant la loi'
Nonclosure
In Chapter 1, we considered the early Romantics' insights into the impossibility of
conceptualizing the absolute and of grounding a general and absolute system. This
philosophical pretension to universality and generality is one of the main targets of
deconstruction, and, as we saw in the second chapter, Derrida and Novalis
demonstrate that it is the differance of language - more clearly re-marked by the case
ofwriting - which prevents the realizing of philosophy's aim. Novalis's 'Monolog'
has helped us begin to explore ways in which the (literary) text can thematize, in
what Derrida calls 'undecidable strokes', the impossibility of using language to refer
in a direct and simple manner or fully represent anterior realities. However, we are
not done with philosophy and we are certainly not finished with representation.
Saying this, I do not mean simply to point to the structure ofmy thesis, but to make a
more fundamental point, namely that the questioning of the possibility of
representation does not end - but neither does representation itself. Having broached
1 N I, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, p. 265.
2
Derrida, 'Prejuges: Devant la loi', in Derrida, V. Descombes et al., La facidte de juger (Paris:
Minuit, 1985), p. 122. Hereafter 'Devant la loi'.
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the question of whether literature might have more chance than philosophy of
respecting the alterity of the absolutely other, and of acknowledging the differance
which prevents the transparency of signifier to signified, we must try to identify
deliberate strategies through which the literary text takes account of differance by
signing, by remarking itself as language, and by challenging what Novalis describes
as the belief in 'wahrhafte, vollstandige Repraesentation.'
Nonclosure, one of the words which entitles or frames this third chapter, is
not strictly Derrida's own term. Geoffrey Bennington argues that Derrida's use of the
word 'la cloture' has often been too hastily assimilated with 'la fin'. I would suggest
that this confusion has led to the term 'nonclosure', which is used by critics such as
Kuzniar to describe the constitutive open-endedness of a text, or the way in which
the arrival at an ultimate meaning is deferred. When Derrida speaks of the 'closure'
ofmetaphysics, he always stresses that it is necessary to distinguish between 'the
closure' and 'the end'. 'Closure' does not mean simply 'end'. In the interview with
Henri Ronse, Derrida points out that in De la grammatologie, 'une distinction se
proposait entre la cloture et la fin. Ce qui est pris dans la cloture de-limitee peut
continuer indefiniment.'4 The above quotation alerts us to the fact that the word
'closure' can also designate a certain ordering of space, as in 'enclosure', that which
separates a space from its outside. Derrida's 'closure', however, is not the clear
demarcation between inside and outside - there is nothing outside, nothing beyond
the closure. We see that, as with questions of philosophy and representation, the
question of boundaries has not been left behind in Chapter 2. In Derrida's essay on
3 N III, p. 397, 'Das Allgemeine Brouillon', no. 685.
4
Derrida, interview with Henri Ronse, in Positions (Paris: Minuit, 1972), p. 23.
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Artaud,5 the word 'cloture' also figures in the sense of enclosure, as a kind of circular
limit of the endless repetition of differences which constitutes representation:
Parce qu'elle a toujours deja commence, la representation n'a done pas de fin.
Mais on peut penser la cloture de ce qui n'a pas de fin. La cloture est la limite
circulaire a l'interieur de laquelle la repetition de la difference se repete
indefiniment. C'est-a-dire son espace de jeu 6
The fact that difference and representation have always already begun mean that, in a
sense, 'closure' is 'nonclosure'.
However, there is good reason for employing the word 'nonclosure', even
though Derrida does not do so himself. It is one theme which has hitherto attracted a
good deal of attention from critics. Kuzniar's study of nonclosure in Novalis and
Holderlin, Delayed Endings, is one example of this type of criticism. Two other
critics who are interested in nonclosure, without employing the word itself, are
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy. In their poststructuralist study of
y 7 i •German Romantic theory, L 'absolu litteraire, they accord great importance to
fragmentariness and incompletion as ways of articulating the dynamics of early
Romantic theory and literature. In this chapter I would like to present and examine
some of the findings of Kuzniar, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy because their analyses
of nonclosure and the fragment will help to identify some of the various strategies for
deferring closure. I said in the introduction that any comparison of the writings of
Novalis and Derrida - or indeed any criticism which seeks to bring together
5
Derrida, L 'ecriture et la difference, pp. 341 -68.
6 Ibid. p. 367.
7
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, L 'absolu litteraire: Theorie de la litterature du
romantisme allemand (Paris: Seuil, 1978).
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Romanticism and poststructuralist thought - must be constantly vigilant against the
tendency to 'apply' the theories of one to the other. While this, of course, is also the
case in the other chapters ofmy thesis, it is particularly important to bear it in mind
in connection with nonclosure, precisely because of the intense critical interest in that
theme. There is always a risk in employing (poststructuralist) terms like nonclosure
and radical temporality because, as we have seen, these structures and strategies
already characterize many German Romantic texts. Nonclosure is, however, a very
useful term for describing the ways in which even texts which are overtly self-
referential permanently defer a closure which would result in an ultimate, neat and
absolute self-mirroring. Derrida uses the phrase: '£a boite et 9a ferme mal.'
I want to say a few words now on the connection between nonclosure and
differance. As we have seen, differance is more than just a way of describing
Saussure's 'differences' between signifiers; it also tries to name the 'differentiality'
of difference; the being-different-from-itself of language; that which makes
differences possible. At the same time, differance describes the deferral through
which meaning is always to come or is re-established after the event: each and every
element is marked by the trace of a past and future which themselves will never have
been present. Nonclosure shares many of the features of differance, but where
differance is necessary and constitutive of all language, nonclosure is an active
strategy for thematizing it - for re-marking it. As we saw in our consideration of
Rousseau, the re-mark describes an aspect of a text whereby an essential or
constitutive feature is revealed more clearly; marked again, so to speak. Looking
8
Derrida, La carte postale: De Socrate a Freud et au-dela (Paris: Aubier-FIammarion, 1980), p. 418.
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ahead to the following chapter, the idea of death, for instance, comes to re-mark our
relation with the living other by shedding 'more light' on the essential separation
which always already constitutes this relationship with the other. With Rousseau the
general iterability of language is re-marked in the written; writing underlines the
essential differance which always already constitutes living speech as much as
writing. Here in Chapter 3, it is a matter of identifying active strategies for deferring
closure - or, more accurately - for thematizing or playing with the differance which
is a constitutive feature of all texts. Nonclosure and the re-mark are remarkably
productive and economical terms for conceptualizing these strategies which, by their
very nature, are elusive. They are themselves caught up in the very differance which
they seek to thematize.
Nonclosure creates certain practical difficulties. In the introduction we
discussed readings and misreadings and the inherent possibility that any text may
give rise to different readings. All texts, as Derrida says, are open to deconstructive
or 'non-transcendent' readings.9 But I also suggested that the texts ofNovalis and
Derrida are more susceptible than other texts to giving rise to different, even
conflicting, readings. This is directly related to nonclosure. On the most basic level,
the fact that both Novalis and Derrida are practitioners of nonclosure means that the
fragmentariness of their texts invites extrapolation and explication, and the open-
endedness leaves room for critics to impose their own forms of ideological closure.
That the texts open further avenues of thought is, of course, not a bad thing.
9 See Derrida, 'This Strange Institution Called Literature' in Acts ofLiterature: A Derrida Reader, ed.
by Derek Attridge (in particular, pp. 44-48, where the idea of'literature' is analysed with regard to the
question ofwhether some texts might be privileged by Derrida as being more interesting than others).
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Novalis's statement, 'Der wahre Leser muB der erweiterte Autor sein',10 is integral to
all of his work - indeed, it is one of the most important characteristics of Romantic
'Poesie' - and this sort of reader involvement is welcomed by him, and also by
Friedrich Schlegel and the other early Romantics. Novalis insists in the 'Teplitzer
Fragmente' that: 'Es giebt kein allgemeingeltendes Lesen, im gewohnlichen Sinn.
Lesen ist eine freye Operation.'11 As we have seen in relation to Ponge and
(mis)readings, this does not mean that a reader can simply say anything about a text
- Derrida reminds us that we are in a certain debt to the text - but it certainly
suggests that reading is (or ought to be) receptive to all the ways of reading a text,
even if these are apparently contradictory. Critics who adhere strongly to a
preconceived framework simply cannot uncover the paradoxes and apparent
contradictions through which widely differing readings may emerge. In many of
Derrida's texts we find the same fragmentariness and elliptical formulations that are
to be found in the works ofNovalis. Some critics do not do justice to the dense
richness ofDerrida's prose, in which several, at times opposing, meanings
reverberate throughout. Some commentators like to dismiss the wordplays and
multiple meanings as inessential ornamentation - even as a form of showing off-
and they seem to see the playfulness as interfering with the content or 'message' of
the texts. Richard Rorty writes: 'The most shocking thing about Derrida's work is his
use ofmultilingual puns, joke etymologies, allusions from anywhere to anywhere,
and phonic and typographical gimmicks.'12 And Geoffrey Bennington recognizes
that a certain 'demand for play and dance' in the works of Derrida is perceived by
10 N II, p. 470, 'Vermischte Bemerkungen', no. 125.
" N II, p. 609, no. 398 ('Teplitzer-Fragment no. 79).
12 Richard Rorty, 'Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida', New Literary History, 10
(1978), 141-60(146-47).
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some as 'a virtuoso and sophistical manipulation of paradoxes and puns, which takes
1 *5
pleasure in mocking a whole metaphysical tradition The puns and multiple
meanings are regarded as irritating detours which interrupt the process the goal of
which is resolution and a synthesis which would be entirely transparent and
accessible to discursivity. Even though Novalis's writing is less semantically dense
than Derrida's, some critics refuse to acknowledge the subtle irony which permeates
many of his texts and the way in which certain narrative operations defer the arrival
at a final and unequivocal meaning. But, of course, the contradictory moments in the
Novalissian text mean that the desire for resolution is not only understandable but, to
an extent, inevitable. As I said in the introduction, I am as guilty as any critic of
reading in my way. In attempting to show ways in which the writing ofNovalis
defers closure, I hope that it will be sufficiently clear that reading Novalis in this way
is only part of the story. The large body ofNovalis criticism testifies to this in the
conflicting readings it has produced.
The Finished Fragment
In L 'absolu litteraire, first published in 1978, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-
Luc Nancy are concerned with outlining the continuing relevance ofGerman
Romantic literature and philosophy in relation to both poststructuralist theory and
German Idealism. This broadly philosophical slant means that they tend to focus
more on the Romantics' collaborative efforts, such as the Athenaum Fragments and
13
Bennington, 'Derridabase', in Bennington and Derrida, Jacques Derrida (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 41.
127
the anonymous text, 'Das alteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus', and
on the fragments of Friedrich Schlegel, whom they regard as the Romantic theorist
par excellence. However, although they do not spend much time analysing the
writings ofNovalis, some of their remarks on the 'finished fragment' are useful and
illuminating for our discussion of nonclosure in Novalis and Derrida.
While it is true that the Jena Romantics did not invent the fragment as such, it
is nevertheless 'le genre dans lequel sont ecrits les textes sans doute les plus celebres
des Romantiques d'lena, le genre auquel leur nom est a peu pres inevitablement
associe'.14 And Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy go even further:
Plus meme que le 'genre' du romantisme theorique, le fragment est considere
comme son incarnation, la marque la plus distinctive de son originalite et le
signe de sa radicale modernite.15
They point out that critics have, at times, cited extracts of the Romantics'
posthumous writings and referred to these as 'fragments' without making clear
whether 'il s'agit d'ebauches interrompues ou de fragments destines a la publication
comme tels'.16 They continue:
On entretient ainsi - et parfois on exploite - une indistinction entre, disons, le
morceau frappe par inachevement et celui qui vise a la fragmentation pour
elle-meme. On laisse ainsi dans une penombre propice l'essentiel de ce que
ce genre implique: le fragment comme propos determine et delibere,
assumant ou transfigurant Taccidentel et l'involuntaire de la fragmentation.17
14 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, pp. 57-58.
15
Ibid., p. 58.




This reminds us of the long-standing critical debate as to whether Novalis intended to
complete his novel, Heinrich von Ofterdingen. Such speculation becomes less
relevant once one considers the ways in which the novel contains the seeds of its own
incompletion. While it is certainly not in the form of fragments intended, as Lacoue-
10
Labarthe and Nancy put it above, for publication as such, Ofterdingen is not only
'struck' by fragmentation but reveals an intrinsic fragmentariness. Using terms which
will be familiar from the discussion of speech act theory, we might say that the
fragmentariness of Ofterdingen is essential rather than accidental. One of
Derrida's texts from Psyche: Inventions de Vautre, 'L'aphorisme a contretemps', also
complicates the distinction between the accidental and the essential. In this reading
ofRomeo and Juliet, Derrida asks whether it is merely an unfortunate accident that
messages can and do go astray, as with the Friar's ill-fated letter, 'L'aphorisme a
contretemps', a text which is clearly self-referential in that it is itself a series of
aphorisms, will play a role later in the chapter, as well as in Chapter 4, and I have
provided the complete text in the appendix.
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, too, remind us that the Romantic fragment
possesses a necessary, rather than an accidental, incompletion achieved paradoxically
by its (premature) completion. Unlike the fragmentary texts which are the remainders
of antiquity, Romantic fragments are not textual ruins recalling what is lost or
18 In an essay entitled 'The Early Romantic Fragment and Incompleteness', Haynes Home finds
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's distinction between fragments published in the author's lifetime and
posthumously published fragments less relevant when one considers the conventions and restraints of
publishing itself: 'The contingence of publication, the same in today's literary market as in the
Athenaum's market - a successful veto by another group member, the lack of space, time, and money,
or pressures by powerful literary figures to abandon the mode altogether should be scarcely allowed to
determine a fragment's status as a 'romantic fragment'. Home, 'The Early Romantic Fragment and
Incompleteness', in Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology ofEarly German Romantic Writings,
ed. by Jochen Schulte-Sasse et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 289-313
(p. 299).
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sketching Tunite vivante d'une grande individuality, oeuvre ou auteur'.19 The
finished fragment, by virtue of its constitutive incompletion - interruption which is
also continuation - is a particularly appropriate articulation of the Romantic project,
the perfect form for a poetry the essence of which is that, as in 'Athendums-
Fragment' 116, it should forever be becoming and never be perfected: 'Die
Romantische Dichtart ist noch im Werden; das ist ja ihr eigentliches Wesen, daB sie
• • 90
ewig nur werden, nie vollendet sein kann.' In this context, Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy examine the way in which fragment relates to totality. Fragmentary totality is
neither located at any particular point nor can the fragment, as we have already said,
be regarded as a detached piece of a totality, but rather totality is simultaneously in
21the whole and in each part. They continue:
Chaque fragment vaut pour lui-meme et pour ce dont il se detache. La
totalite, c'est le fragment lui-meme dans son individuality achevee. C'est
done identiquement la totalite plurielle des fragments, qui ne compose pas un
tout [...], mais qui replique le tout, le fragmentaire lui-meme, en chaque
fragment. [...] Les fragments sont au fragment ses definitions, et c'est ce qui
installe sa totality comme plurality, et son achevement comme inachevement
de son infinite.22
This final sentence summarizes neatly the role of the finished fragment in subverting
the idea of the system. A system is not a system unless it is complete. And it cannot
be complete without determining the 'Grundsatz', absolute origin and an absolutely
achievable end-point. At the end of the previous chapter, I cited Derrida's allusion to
the 'volumenplusieurstomineux' character of the philosopher's text; the philosopher
19 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, p. 62.
20 Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. by Ernst Behler (Munich: Schoningh,
1958-), vol. 11, p. 183, 'Athendums-Fragmente', no. 116.
21 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, p. 64.
22 Ibid.
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who does not know when to stop or cut short his text ('couper pour faire court et
signer'), who refuses to sign 'properly' and acknowledge its very textuality: 'Pour
signer il faut arreter son texte et aucun philosophe n'aura signe son texte, resolument,
singulierement, parle en son nom avec tous les risques que cela comporte.' Writing
in fragments and aphorisms can be regarded as a way of signing 'properly', of
admitting to the textuality of the text. The fragment and the fragmentary series are in
a sense, by virtues of their form, themselves definitions of the fragment; they thus re¬
mark the impossibility of totality. Paradoxically, their premature completion is
continuation itself. The idea of continuation by means of interruption will be vital to
our reading ofNovalis's longer texts. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy are keen to point
out that the aphorism or finished fragment is not the only form which is fragmentary.
Although they are here referring in general to Romantic theoretical texts in
continuous prose, we shall see later how this applies to Heinrich von Ofterdingen,
which is also the theory of itself, and, in spite of its continuous prose, exemplifies the
fragmentary. We must bear in mind, then, that the finished fragment is not the only
means of achieving nonclosure in a text. Nonclosure can also be a feature of
narrative. A text which appears to consist of continuous prose can, in a number of
ways, actively defer a final interpretation and thematize the inevitable failure to
identify an ultimate meaning. But, before coming to nonclosure in longer texts, I
want to turn once more to Novalis's theoretical fragments - his aphoristic and
speculative reflections on a wide range of topics - because these provide valuable
insight into his strategies for evading closure in a longer narrative text such as
Heinrich von Ofterdingen.




Kuzniar identifies several main aspects ofNovalis's theoretical fragments which
foreshadow his methods of circumventing closure in the novel. The first of these is to
be found in his musings on the nature of the fragment itself. This sort ofmeta-
commentary is analogous to Romantic or modern literature's putting to work of the
question of its own conditions of possibility. The early Romantics insist that the
fragmentary statement, while it does call for further thought on the part of the reader,
cannot be fully completed by the reader. The title ofNovalis's collection of
fragments published in Friedrich Schlegel's Athenaum journal bears the title
'Bltithenstaub' ('Grains of Pollen'). This title, which makes us think of Derridean
'dissemination', testifies to the fragment's capacity to excite further thought and
reflection. However, the Romantics also insist that the fragment is entirely self-
contained and separate from its surroundings. Schlegel's famous comparison of the
fragment to a hedgehog is an excellent illustration of this paradox: 'Ein Fragment
muB gleich einem kleinen Kunstwerk von der umgebenden Welt ganz abgesondert
und in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Igel.'24 While, the hedgehog is, indeed,
separate from its surroundings, its spines reach out in different directions, just as the
fragment points toward the various avenues of thought which it opens. The fragment,
therefore, must not be regarded as a mere section or 'Bruchstiick' of a temporal
continuum which can be reconstructed in its entirety. As Kuzniar puts it: 'The
fragment signifies present deficiency or incompletion that categorically rejects future
24
Schlegel, vol. II, p. 197,'Athenaums-Fragmente', no. 206.
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closure.'25 The fragment is thus 'mystisch',26 according to Friedrich Schlegel, in that
it openly admits the incompatibility of language with the absolute. It can allude to a
possible future state while resisting ultimate interpretation.
The status of the absolute or the ideal forms the second strand through which
Novalis articulates the impossibility and undesirability of closure. As we saw in the
two previous chapters, any ideal - such as the perfect self-identity of the ego, the
attainment of truth, or an ultimate transcendental meaning (all ofwhich can be
subsumed under the Derridean category ofpresence) - is totally inaccessible to
language, thought and philosophy. The self, for example, can only be defined
through activity, and Novalis argues that it is through this activity ('Handeln') that
we discover that that which we are seeking is unattainable andyet necessary. Later
we will consider the important difference between temporalization and temporality,
between the virtual ideal in Novalis and the approximative ideals of Enlightenment
philosophy, which, while it admits to the impossibility of achieving the ideal, still
conceives of it as a kind of regulatory idea, one which points in the right direction, so
to speak, and ensures a continuous forward movement towards it. In the texts of
Novalis, though he sometimes refers to the concept of a regulatory idea, it is made
clear that the ideal is fictional. As Kuzniar points out, when he does use imagery
which seems to invoke a perfect state, we discover that the ciphers on which he
depends - the golden age or the millennium - do not reveal anything concrete about
the imagined state. Furthermore, I think that Kuzniar is right to maintain that Novalis
does not use these terms vaguely or carelessly. They are 'absolute metaphors that
25 Alice A. Kuzniar, Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and Holderlin (Athens, GA and
London: University of Georgia Press, 1987), p. 78.
26
Schlegel, vol. Ill, p. 99.
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escape exact definition and temporal specification. Their referentiality is opaque.'
Instead of the absolute, we find explicitly fictional constructs and, while this does
excite desire and promote change, the constructs do not function as regulatory ideals
in the Kantian sense. Kuzniar puts it as follows:
In place of an absolute ending, then, Novalis substitutes an absence or
extended lacuna. This postulated void at the end of time serves to incite
change and to prolong stimulation and incentive (Wircksamkeit or Reitz).
Hardenberg writes of an eternal Reitz which would cease to be if stilled.28
Novalis uses words such as 'unendlich', 'ewig' and 'immer' to modify, as Kuzniar
puts it, 'values which could rarely be construed as transcendent - concepts such as
9Q
incitant, lack, history and time.' Thus, the terms are not, as in the philosophy of the
Enlightenment, directed towards perfection. Here we can detect the same double bind
as in the other chapters ofmy thesis. Any absolute, be it perfection, self-identity or
perfect communion with the totally-other, would (even if these were possible) mean
the end of language, philosophy, time and desire. In the 'Fichte-Studien', Novalis
insists that attainment of the absolute would mean the end of time: '[es ist] an und fur
sich ein Widerspruch, daB in der Zeit etwas geschehn solle, was alle Zeit aufhebt'.
TO
[...] Die Zeit kann nie aufhoren [...]. Denken auBer der Zeit ist ein Unding . In the
very next fragment he refers explicitly to the golden age: 'Es konnen goldne Zeiten
erscheinen - aber sie bringen nicht das Ende der Dinge - das Ziel des Menschen ist
T 1
nicht die goldne Zeit.' And, as Derrida puts it neatly in Limited Inc, in a phrase





30 N II, p. 269, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 564.
31 Ibid., no. 565.
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which captures the aporia or double bind in which we find ourselves: 'Plenitude is
99
the end (the goal), but were it attained, it would be the end (death).'
This brings us to the third aspect identified by Kuzniar through which
Novalis's writing resists closure - interruption and continuation. As I said above,
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have pointed out that the fragment's incompletion lies
in its seemingly premature completion, its interruption. No incompleteness without
completion, no continuation without interruption. Novalis puts it as follows: 'Im
Unterbrechen liegt der Begriff des Fortsetzens, der Thatigkeit.' This recalls
Derrida's assertion in 'L'aphorisme a contretemps': 'Malgre les apparences, un
aphorisme n'arrive jamais seul, il ne vient pas tout seul. II appartient a une logique
serielle.'34 Once more, we need to bear in mind that continuation does not imply an
unending linear progression towards an absolute or a transcendental signified but
rather a multi-directional, unending referral and deferral. Further on in the 'Fichte-
Studien', Novalis takes up again the idea of continuation through interruption: 'Denn
9S
jede Reflexion setzt die andre voraus - Es ist Eine Handlung des Brechens.' '
Kuzniar argues that:
Novalis warns against interrupting, once and for all, the unending chain of
affiliations between ideas. To prevent both the realization of perfection and
referential closure, he instigates a series of interruptions and displacements.36
32
Derrida, 'Afterword: Toward an Ethic ofDiscussion', Limited Inc, trans, by Samuel Weber
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Many of Derrida's texts could be characterized as being full of 'interruptions and
displacements'. 'L'aphorisme a contretemps' is one obvious example. In other texts,
where the interruptions are less clearly related to structure, Derrida's argument is
often circuitous, full of diversions, constantly changing direction and exploring the
avenues of thought opened up by semantic or etymological multivalence. Of course,
Derrida would probably disapprove of the word 'diversion' because it implies a
detour which is not strictly necessary, which is somehow extraneous, diverting us
from the 'proper' meaning of the text. For Derrida, the accidental always turns out to
be the proper. In 'L'aphorisme a contretemps', a text which is truly remarkable for
its combination of clarity and complexity, the displacements and interruptions of
Derrida's other texts are more clearly re-marked by a self-referentiality which takes
the form of an aphoristic series on aphorism itself. The clearly delimited breaks or
interruptions, far from being merely stylistic or decorative, incite movement as one
aphorism calls out to or recalls another - irrespective of numerical progression -
across the white spaces in the text. As he says in the fourth aphorism of this
beautifully self-referential text:
4. Un aphorisme expose a contretemps. II expose le discours - le livre a
contretemps. Litteralement - parce qu'il abandonne une parole a sa
lettre. (Ceci pourrait deja se lire comme une serie d'aphorismes, l'alea d'une
premiere anachronie. Au commencement, il y eut le contretemps. Au
commencement, il y a la vitesse. La parole et Facte sont pris de vitesse.
L'aphorisme gagne de vitesse.)37
Here, Derrida is beginning to expand the meaning of the word 'aphorism'. In
'L'aphorisme a contretemps', more than simply describing a fragmentary statement,
37
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genre or form, the word 'aphorisme' draws together the ideas of dissociation and
separation, as well as that of a temporal difference which is also conveyed by
'contretemps' - out of step, out of time. In this extended sense, 'aphorism' is always
and already the very structure of language. Exposing language, it admits to the
incompatibility of language and ultimate, transcendental meaning. This admission is
the Romantic (and poststructuralist) prerequisite of all literature, in the specifically
Romantic sense of the word. As I said in Chapter 2, many critics (including Derrida)
have identified a particularly modern conception of literature as emerging in the
Romantic era. But, as Romantics and poststructuralists alike point out, earlier writers
such as Sterne and Shakespeare create self-referential literature, literary writing
which plays with its status as literature and (particularly noticeable in the case of
Sterne) conveys the constitutive open-endedness of all narrative.
To return to Romeo and Juliet and 'L'aphorisme a contretemps', Derrida
reminds us that Shakespeare's Friar Lawrence learns the danger of entrusting the
'secret to letters'. But Derrida equally demonstrates the inevitability of this; or
rather Shakespeare's play already shows that what brings about the lovers' tragic end
is by no means a peripheral plot twist. The fact that the Friar's letters fail to reach
their destination is no accident, but rather re-marks the essential possibility that, once
entrusted to writing, meaning and intention can be lost, can arrive too soon or too
OQ
late: 'Le contretemps accidentel vient remarquer le contretemps essentiel.' But, as
38 Ibid.'Abandonner la parole, confier le secret a des lettres, c'est le stratageme du tiers, le mediateur,
le Frere, le marieur qui, sans autre desir que le desir des autres, organise le contretemps. 11 compte sur




we have seen above, there would be no language and no desire without this essential
contretemps:
Le desir de Romeo et Juliette n'a pas rencontre par hasard le poison, le
contretemps ou le detour de la lettre. Pour que cette rencontre ait lieu, il
fallait dejci instituer un systeme de marques [...] pour contrecarrer, si on peut
dire, la dispersion des durees interieures et heterogenes, pour cadrer,
organiser, mettre de l'ordre, rendre possible un rendez-vous: autrement dit
pour denier, en en prenant acte, la non-coi'ncidence, la separation des
monades, la distance infinie, la deconnexion des experiences, la multiplicity
des mondes, tout ce qui rend possible un contretemps ou le detour
irremediable d'une lettre. Mais le desir de Romeo et Juliette est ne au coeur
de cette possibility. II n'y aurait pas eu d'amour, le serment n'aurait pas eu
lieu, ni le temps, ni son theatre sans la discordance.40
Derrida demonstrates here the more general effects of aphorism and dissociation,
their implications for 'real life'. The system of 'marks' through which we try to
institute order in the multiplicity of the world and manage the chaos of time and
space is what makes possible both the rendez-vous and the fact that Romeo and
Juliet can and do fail to meet - they miss each other, arrive too soon or too late. Yet
without the essential contretemps and aphoristic separation they would not desire
coincidence or seek to share the living present of the other.
In 'aphorism' - both as a fragmentary statement and in the wider sense
grafted onto the word by Derrida - we can glimpse the 'toujours-deja' and recognize
that an essential structural fragmentation is analogous to the aporetic, or radically
temporal, structure of self-consciousness as described by Novalis. The fragment does




total absence of the absolute. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy characterize the Romantic
era as the age of chaos: 'Le chaos est en fait la situation de la "naivete" toujours-deja
perdue et de l'art absolu jamais encore advenu, et en ce sens le chaos definit aussi
bien la condition de l'homme And, discussing nonclosure in Novalis and
Holderlin, Alice Kuzniar says:
A desire to compensate for the initial lack, to attempt recuperation or to
anticipate it, is what drives narrative forward. Differance, however, suspends
accomplishment, prolongs desire, and thus generates nonclosure.42
There is no sense, as we have seen in the two previous chapters, in which either
Derrida or Novalis could be said to articulate a straightforward negative theology or
a belief in pure absence. Through the various strategies of nonclosure, they focus on
the interim, the in-between, not upon that which remains hidden or absent. As
Friedrich Schlegel puts it in the fragment to which I referred in Chapter 1:
Ein hochstes HaBliches [ist] offenbar so wenig moglich wie ein hochstes
Schones. Ein unbedingtes Maximum der Negation, oder das absolute Nichts
kann so wenig wie ein unbedingtes Maximum der Position in irgendeiner
Vorstellung gegeben werden 43
It is impossible to overstress this point. It lies at the heart of both Romanticism and
poststructuralism and, as such, is vital to our comparison ofNovalis and Derrida.
Indeed, the close readings of texts in the earlier chapters have revealed the ever-
present tension between desire for the absolute and the simultaneous awareness of its
41 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, p. 72.
42 Kuzniar, Delayed Endings, p. 6.
43
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flctionality (whence the literary absolute of Lacoue-Labarthe's and Nancy's title).
This tension, which the Romantics refer to as 'Schweben' or 'Wechselwirkung', is
the essential structure of reading, of our interrelation with the other, and of the
double bind of self-consciousness. Now, having begun with the not-so-humble
fragment, we must turn to ways in which seemingly continuous prose can also
embody fragmentariness and nonclosure.
Secularization
Broadly speaking, the writings of both Novalis and Derrida testify to the constant
oscillation between the drive towards closure and the undermining or questioning of
the concept itself. The tension between these poles has had a clear impact on
criticism and, as we have seen, produced widely differing interpretations through
'either/or' approaches to reading. Kuzniar, explaining how some critics have seen
Novalis's work in terms of secularization, says:
Novalis makes his critics want to see in him a desire for closure, whether it be
in the form of a teleology, in the images of organicism, or in the secular
application of a sacred symbol but he equally challenges their findings.44
Kuzniar questions the concept of secularization in order to suggest a different way of
reading which is governed by its recognition of a (temporal) relation to the ideal or
the absolute. By secularization, she means a tendency ofmany eighteenth-century
texts to endow (now empty) sacred or Christian symbols with the aims and goals of
44
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the Enlightenment's Vernunftsreligion, such as the end of history, the possibility of
perfection and the 'steadily progressive development ofmankind'.45 We need to keep
this notion of linear progression in mind since it has implications not only for a
concept of the history ofmankind but also for a certain way of describing the
functioning of any text. Kuzniar's reading implies that linear progression, movement
from an origin to a telos, is perhaps an insufficient concept when applied to writers
such as Novalis whose texts, much like those of Derrida, are the very embodiment of
discontinuity and open-endedness.
Temporalization versus Temporality
Kuzniar makes use of two terms in her exploration of the critical response to Novalis
- 'temporalization' and 'temporality'. The former describes the structure of the
Enlightenment notion of eternal progress. An ideal is conceived of or posited and this
idea then assumes a regulatory function and can only be achieved by approximation.
But, as she says of the ideal as progressive goal: 'Since such a structure of future
time is still progressive, [...] it is yet far removed from the open-ended (because
radically discontinuous) narrative advocated by Schlegel, Schelling, and Novalis.'46
Given that early Romanticism has sometimes been regarded as a continuation of
Enlightenment thinking, we can see how the use of sacred symbols in the work of
Novalis might indeed be interpreted in the context of secularization. Ele can be read
as using these figures to denote a telos, albeit a non-Christian one. However, to read
45
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the sacred symbols as representing Enlightenment ideals still implies linear
progression towards a goal. This obscures the way in which 'sheer discontinuity'47 is
vital to the idea of temporality to be found in the texts of Romantic writers. The
concept of radical discontinuity is central to Paul de Man's famous essay, 'The
Rhetoric of Temporality', which examines the ways in which the symbol is linked to
temporalization while allegory is the figure of temporality:
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or an
identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its origin,
and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its
language in the void of this temporal distance.48
De Man has had a significant impact on our understanding of (mainly English)
Romanticism and, by providing a new way of conceptualizing the Romantic text, his
work has helped to uncover the radical temporality which is already its hallmark. So
we need to look again at aspects ofNovalis's work that seems to invite readings
governed by secularization and temporalization - in other words, in terms of
forward, linear movement towards the ideal state - and examine the validity of
Kuzniar's and de Man's very different interpretation.
Firstly, one cannot deny that we find in his work scattered references to the
golden age, the millennium and the image of the poet as messiah. Elowever, for those
who see in Novalis 'a substitute for or a translation of Christian salvation history [...]
his secular transformations of sacred themes are decoded back into their original
47 Ibid., p. 27.
48 Paul De Man, 'The Rhetoric of Temporality,' in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of
Contemporary Criticism (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 207.
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language'.49 Kuzniar's assertion that these critics are invariably advocates of
secularization is strongly supported by her examination of older Novalis criticism,
which in many cases focuses on the 'utopic elements' in his work.50 While Novalis
does use ciphers such as the 'golden age' to convey the idea of a perfect state, he
demonstrates at the same time that this state is neither possible nor desirable. This
corresponds to his reflections on the status of the necessary but fictional absolute.
According to Kuzniar, the ambiguity and the contradictory moments in
Novalis's work merely give certain critics licence to impose transcendent values onto
what are clearly Active constructs.51 She identifies two main ways in which critics
have read Novalis's transformation of Christian salvation history. The first group
maintains that 'poetry realizes or objectifies the messianic kingdom'. The poet is
the priest, and poetry is glorified, elevated to the status of a spiritual absolute and the
final stage in the progression of humanity. The second group argues that Novalis
53
merely 'anticipates the culmination of salvation history', his poetry portraying and
thereby ensuring movement towards the 'absolute present'.54 Johannes Mahr
maintains: 'Dichtung beschreibt eine erwartete Wirklichkeit und sucht sie, [...], durch
49
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die Beschreibung naherzubringen.'55 While I do not want to insist too much on
Kuzniar's assertion that these critics are wrong to seek closure, her identification of
these two ways of conceptualizing the transcendental reminds us that there is always
more than one way of reading a text, and also of the importance of appreciating the
paradoxical moments and apparent contradictions in early Romantic texts. The
grafting of transcendental values onto fictive constructs provides an important clue to
the critical desire for closure. While the theory of how the concept of secularization
has influenced some readings ofNovalis certainly goes a long way towards
explaining this, there is another, more general attitude governing criticism which
seeks closure in the texts ofNovalis, or, indeed, in the texts of any writer. In the case
of sacred symbols and ciphers such as the golden age, critics such as Mahl would
like to regard these as standing unequivocally for an extra-textual idea, whether it be
the notion of never-ending perfectibility or the ideal or absolute itself. Kuzniar
herself recognizes this and refers to it simply as our 'desire for referentiality'.56
However, the phrase 'desire for referentiality' is slightly misleading. Kuzniar
sidesteps the point that there is always referentiality and representation - these
cannot be suppressed, even in the most abstract poetry or nonsense verse. It is, rather,
the notion that language refers directly and simply to anterior forms of presence
which Novalis and Derrida seek to complicate.
55 Johannes Mahr, Ubergangznm Endlichen: Der Weg des Dichters in Novalis' "Heinrich von
Ofterdingen" (Munich: Fink, 1970), p. 249. Cited by Kuzniar in the notes to Chapter 2, Delayed
Endings, p. 213.
56 Kuzniar, Delayed Endings, p.73.
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Mallarme's 'Mimique'
In Chapter 2 we looked at Novalis's famous short text on the functioning of
language, 'Monolog'. This fascinating piece calls into question the assumption that
we control language and can simply use it as a tool to refer in a simple manner to
'things'. 'Monolog' embodies Romantic undecidability to the extent that the text is
itself a paradox. This undecidability is itself a manifestation of nonclosure. (Later,
taking Novalis's unfinished novel, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, as a case in point, we
will see how his longer texts also resist attempts to impose critical or ideological
closure precisely by subverting the notion that language refers directly to reality. We
will thus begin to examine more closely the way in which nonclosure is related to the
self-referentiality of literature.) 'Monolog', as well as being a perfect example of
(Romantic) 'literature', or literature as the theory of itself, also subverts this belief in
representation. Language cannot provide access to the true meaning or give us the
experience or intuition of plenitude. However, in its very undecidability, 'Monolog'
does not reject reference entirely.
In the second part ofLa dissemination, 'La double seance', Derrida is also
concerned with showing how a text can undermine the idea of representation while,
paradoxically, preserving its structure. We saw in the last chapter that, in 'La
pharmacie de Platon', Derrida argues that philosophy's desire to efface the signifier
has governed the inauguration of art as mimesis: art ought to try to reproduce, or re¬
present, reality. In 'La double seance', he goes on to consider the work of Stephane
Mallarme, a poet whose writing seems to Derrida to be at one end of the spectrum of
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conceptions of the relation between truth and language throughout Western art and
metaphysics. He suggests that a kind ofhistory of truth can be seen as playing itself
out between Plato and Mallarme. And what is really at stake in this play is the
relationship between literature and truth. Referring to the texts with which he has
prefaced 'La double seance' (an extract from the Philebus juxtaposed with
Mallarme's prose poem 'Mimique'), he says that we can identify a series ofmotifs
'in a few rough strokes'. He continues:
Ces traits formeraient une sorte de cadre, la cloture, les bordures d'une histoire
qui serait precisement celle d'un certain jeu entre litterature et verite. L'histoire
de ce rapport serait organisee [...] par une certaine interpretation de la
mimesis. Une telle interpretation n'a pas ete l'acte ou la decision speculative
d'un auteur a un moment donne mais, [...], le tout d'une histoire. Entre Platon
et Mallarme, [...] une histoire a eu lieu.
Here is the complete text of'Mimique':
Le silence, seul luxe apres les rimes, un orchestre ne faisant avec son
or, ses frolements de pensee et de soir, qu'en detailler la signification a Legal
d'une ode tue et que c'est au poete, suscite par un defi, de traduire! le silence
aux apres-midi de musique; je le trouve, avec contentement, aussi, devant la
reapparition toujours inedite de Pierrot ou du poignant ou elegant mime Paul
Margueritte.
Ainsi ce PIERROT ASSASSIN DE SA FEMME compose et redige
par lui-meme, soliloque muet que, tout du long a son ame tient et du visage et
des gestes le fantome blanc comme une page pas encore ecrite. Un tourbillon
de raisons nai'ves ou neuves emane, qu'il plairait de saisir avec surete:
l'esthetique du genre situe plus pres de principes qu'aucun! rien en cette
region du caprice ne contrariant l'instinct simplificateur direct... Voici - "
La scene n'illustre que l'idee, pas une action effective, dans un hymen (d'ou
procede le Reve), vicieux mais sacre, entre le desir et l'accomplissement, la
perpetration et son souvenir: ici devanqant, la rememorant, au futur, au passe,
sous une apparence fausse de present. Tel opere le Mime, dont le jeu se
borne a une allusion perpetuelle sans briser la glace: il installe, ainsi, un
37
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milieu, pur, de fiction." Moins qu'un millier de lignes, le role, qui le lit, tout
de suite comprend les regies comme place devant un treteau, leur depositaire
humble. Surprise, accompagnant l'artifice d'une notation de sentiments par
phrases point proferees - que, dans le seul case, peut-etre, avec authenticity,
entre les feuillets et le regard regne au silence encore, condition et delice de la
lecture.58
The poem's genesis is particularly complicated, being a sort of reader-
response to a short booklet by Mallarme's friend Paul Margueritte, which is in turn
the description of the performance of a mimodrama in the style of the Comedia
dell'arte. Derrida spends some time discussing the complicated nature of the poem's
beginnings but, as he himself says, this is less important than the complexity of the
text itself. Like Novalis's 'Monolog', what 'Mimique' does is as relevant as what it
seems to say. However, we do need to consider to a certain extent what Margueritte's
booklet is about. 'Mimique' itself actually directs us to the 'booklet-object' to which
the prose poem is a response. The pamphlet describes 'after the event' the
performance of Pierrot miming how he murders his wife by tickling her to death.
That Margueritte wrote the booklet after the performance is significant for Derrida.
No writing can be said to have preceded the mimodrama. 'Mimique' proclaims that
the mime writes himself in a mute soliloquy, upon the white page that he is: 'Ainsi ce
PIERROT ASSASSIN DE SA FEMME compose et redige par lui-meme, soliloque
muet que, tout du long a son ame tient et du visage et des gestes le fantome blanc
, . ,59
comme une page pas encore ecnte.
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What is also interesting about the mimodrama is, firstly, that it portrays a
murder without weapon. A certain kind of (non-)event is mimed, but it is a murder in
which the distinction between perpetrator and victim is blurred by the way in which
Pierrot switches between miming himself killing his wife and miming her death by
laughter. The boundary between perpetration and desire is blurred. As such the
drama itself enacts a temporal confusion which Mallarme in turn thematizes in
'Mimique'. Derrida says:
Le crime a deja eu lieu au moment ou Pierrot le mime. Et il mime - 'au
present' -,'sous une apparence fausse de present', le crime accompli. Mais
mimant au present le passe, il reconstitue, dans ledit 'present', la deliberation
qui a prepare le meurtre, lorsque s'interrogeant sur les moyens a employer, il
avait encore affaire a un crime a venir, a une mort a donner.60
Yet what is represented is something which has never been anywhere present.
Mallarme begins the poem with the claim that Pierrot writes himself on the white
page that he is. Nothing is prescribed to him, and certainly no prior writing or
discourse. Derrida then draws our attention to another sentence, in quotation marks,
in 'Mimique' which also thematizes this. (I cannot say 'illustrates' because
'illustrates' is precisely what the verb 'illustre' does not do.) ' "La scene n 'illustre
que I'idee, pas une action effective ... "' Derrida points out that this is actually no
quotation - for what is being cited? - but rather the simulacrum of a quotation.
Derrida's fascination with Mallarme often comes from the way in which his poetry
complicates the distinction between doing and saying. In the case of the simulated
quotation something is ostensibly quoted which has never been said in an 'original'
60
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in the same way as the mime imitates on the stage nothing that has ever been present:
'II n'y a pas d'imitation. Le Mime n'imite rien. Et d'abord il n'imite pas. II n'y a rien
avant l'ecriture de ses gestes. Rien ne lui est prescrit. Aucun present n'aura precede
ni surveille le tracement de son ecriture.'61 And if anything could be said to precede
or follow 'Mimique', it would be Margueritte's booklet and the reflection or referral
would be between two texts, setting up an abyssal structure ofmirroring. This would
seem to be borne out by 'Mimique': 'Tel opere le Mime, dont le jeu se borne a une
allusion perpetuelle sans briser la glace: il installe, ainsi, un milieu, pur, de fiction.'
In this pure medium of fiction there is the reference of allusion but we cannot locate
or describe the referent.
However, we should not be hasty in assuming that mimesis is thus neatly
overturned or displaced by Margueritte and Mallarme, or even by the play of
reflections between their texts. Derrida warns that we are not dealing with a simple,
straightforward rejection or reversal of mimesis. He points out that the poem could
be seen as a kind of 'neo-idealism' in which the Idea is presented, an intuition of the
eidos itself. He concedes that this is one possible reading, but goes on to suggest that
such a reading would miss the way 'Mimique' pays attention to the writing itself, to
writing's self-referentiality, both in the configuration of texts which surround it and
in the actual text. Just as Novalis's 'Monolog' allows for the possibility of a certain
commerce between the world (or the truth) and language, so, too, does Derrida
remind us that a simple 'reversal of mimetologism', an attempt to jump out of it




A vouloir renverser le mimetologisme ou a pretendre lui echapper d'un coup,
en sautant simplement a pieds joints, on retombe surement et immediatement
dans son systeme: on supprime le double ou on dialectise et on retrouve la
perception de la chose meme, la production de sa presence, sa verite, comme
idee, forme ou matiere.62
What Derrida finds important in the referentiality of the mimodrama, and by
extension Mallarme's critique of it, is that there is reference beyond a neat self-
mirroring. Firstly, because even writing which seems only to refer to itself always
already refers to some other writing. This is an essential necessity ofwriting, not
least because each and every word is marked by, or bears the trace of, all the words it
is not in the web of differential relations. But even more interesting is the way in
which Pierrot assassin de sa femme and 'Mimique' preserve the structure of
reference, but of a reference without referent. Thus we can re-read the sentence 'sans
briser la glace' as thematizing the double that has no simple, reference without
referent, the re-presentation of nothing that has ever been present. Looking at the first
part of the simulated quotation, Derrida draws attention to the word 'hymen'. This
word operates for Derrida in a way which is related to supplementarity, but it is its
relation to undecidability which is more important here. And we must allow for a
certain awareness in 'Mimique' which is lacking in Rousseau, to the extent that the
dangerous supplement seems to interrupt or disturb his text contrary to his intention.
Unlike Rousseau, Mallarme delights in the signature, marking and re-marking the
textuality or literariness of the text. The hymen means both the marriage or joining of
differents, and is also the membrane which stands between the desire to penetrate
and its fulfilment. In 'Mimique' and 'Pierrot' the hymen is the murder without crime
62 Ibid., p. 255.
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and the mirror of a reference without referent, but this reference at the same time - in
the vibratory undecidability of the hymen - alludes but without breaking the mirror;
reflecting itself but not only itself.
'Zufall': Aphorism and the Accidental
The thematics of the glass will occupy us for the rest of this chapter and we will
return to mirrors in the next chapter on the death of the other. 'La glace' will help to
conceptualize further nonclosure and self-referentiality in the texts of Derrida and
Novalis. The mirror, for example, is not transparent. Heinrich von Ofterdingen, to
which we will return later in the chapter, and the fairy tales embedded in the work,
are perfect illustrations ofNovalis's theory that a good Marchen is not an exercise in
the transparent conveying of a meaning or message. One of his aphorisms says:
Erzahlungen, ohne Zusammenhang, jedoch mit Association, wie Traume ...
aber auch ohne alle Sinn und Zusammenhang - hochstens einzelne Strofen
verstandlich - sie miissen, wie lauter Bruchstiicke aus den
63
verschiedenartigsten Dingen [seyn].
The mention of the 'Unverstandlichkeit' of all but a few verses is reminiscent of
Derrida's repeated assertions that no context is ever fully saturated; no statement is
ever transparent to itself.64 Klingsohr's tale at the end of the first part of the novel, in
particular, exemplifies the association of ideas 'ohne alle Sinn und Zusammenhang'.
63 N III, p. 572, 'Fragmente und Studien 1799/1800', no. 113.
64 In Memoires, for instance, Derrida says: 'tout depend de contextes toujours ouverts, non saturables,
qu'un mot seul (par exemple dans un titre) commence a avoir le sens de toutes les phrases potentielles
dans lesquelles on l'inscrira [...].' Memoires pour Paul de Man, p. 116.
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Mixing elements from Greek and Nordic mythology, as well as reprising various
themes from the preceding narrative, it has invited reams of speculative criticism, but
the tale, throughout which meanings continually circulate and dissipate, ultimately
resists definitive explication. Furthermore, the open-ended referrals and echoes are
not governed by a particular order - if they are governed by anything we might
describe this as 'Zufall' or 'chance'. Novalis recognizes the arbitrary, ultimately
ungovernable, nature of poetic reference:
Der Poet braucht die Dinge und Worte, wie Tasten und die ganze Poesie
beruht auf thatiger Ideenassociation - auf selbstthatiger, absichtlicher,
idealischer Zufallproduktion (zufallige - freye Catenation). [...] (Spiel.)65
And Derrida demonstrates the strange interrelation between chance and aphorism.
Relating his own series of aphorisms to the way in which the fate ofRomeo and
Juliet is structured by a kind of aphoristic dissociation, he states:
9. L'aphorisme ou le discours de la dissociation: chaque phrase, chaque
paragraphe se voue a la separation, il s'enferme, qu'on le veuille ou non,
dans la solitude de sa duree propre. Sa rencontre et son contact avec l'autre se
livrent toujours a la chance, a ce qui tombe, bien ou mal. Rien n'est
absolument assure, ni Fenchainement, ni l'ordre. Un aphorisme de la serie
peut arriver avant ou apres l'autre, avant et apres l'autre, chacun peut survivre
a l'autre - et dans l'autre serie.66
This aphoristic dissociation is the structure of life - also of the fragmentary series
and poetic production - to the extent that nothing is absolutely assured. The notion of
'chance' or 'accident' (unfortunate or otherwise) is questioned and complicated by
65 N III, p. 451, 'Das Allgemeine Brouillon', no. 953.
66 Derrida, Psyche, p. 520.
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the logic of supplementarity and we find that it is actually an essential structure. If
things go wrong, this is not an unlucky accident, a twist to what should have gone
right. Just as non-serious utterances are what make serious utterances possible,
'things going right' is just another version of 'things going wrong'.
'Au commencement il y eut le contretemps'
Derrida's above comments on the order of the aphoristic series naturally raise once
more the question of origins and ends: where do we start and where do we end (up)?
Having started to think about nonclosure, we now need to return to the idea of
beginnings which we looked at in the previous chapters. As far as the fragmentary
series is concerned, since the association of ideas and the reference of one aphorism
to another work in various directions, one can never determine an absolute starting-
point. The impossibility of identifying an originary idea or moment is mirrored in the
structure of self-consciousness, and such an origin is always already inaccessible to
both cognition and language. For Novalis, as for Derrida, the idea of an origin or a
beginning is every bit as problematic as that of an ending. His 'Fichte-Studien' make
it clear that in self-consciousness no reflection can be said to be originary:
[Ejine Mittelanschauung [muB] hervorgehen, welche selbst wieder durch ein
hervorgehendes Gefiihl und eine vorhergehende Reflexion, die aber nicht ins
BewuBtseyn kommen kann, hervorgebracht wird.67
67 N II, p. 115, no. 17.
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Attempting to identify an absolute starting point, the first moment, merely leads to
68the discovery ofwhat Kuzniar calls 'an unending string of antecedent moments'.
Novalis also says that an origin is actually 'ein 2er Moment'69 and that:
Alle Wirckung ist verkehrt etc. Jede Ursach erweckt Ursachen - die Caussa
prima ist nur das erste Glied der ursachlichen Reihe - diese Reihe ist aber
vorwarts und riickwarts unendlich. Nur unter Voraussetzungen und
willkiihrlichen Annahmen oder Datis giebts eine Caussaprima - nicht
absolut.70
The idea that the chain of ideas extends infinitely in two directions is very important
here. Attempts to locate the originary moment will be sabotaged by the never-ending
chain of ideas. So, just as Novalis postpones or defers the telos, as we have seen in
the chapter on self-consciousness, the moment of origin, too, is equated with
difference (but not with pure absence). Kuzniar refers to Novalis as 'writing in the
interim' and this is a useful way of describing the processes of self-consciousness
and those of philosophy and poetry while de-emphasising their terminal points. And
she underlines the fact that 'these points can in turn be dislocated, so that any
moment in the interim can designate another relative or arbitrary beginning'.71
Beginnings are just like endings - both share the same difficulties and the same
structure. As we have seen, the problem of beginnings and the impossibility of
locating origins is one ofDerrida's most frequent themes. Language cannot be held
to represent fully or to refer directly to extralinguistic 'ideas' or 'realities' - even
future or past ones. Instead, we have this (by now familiar) double movement where
68
Kuzniar, Delayed Endings, p. 84.
69 N II, p. 591, 'Vorarbeiten 1798: Anekdoten', no. 284.
70 N III, p. 376 'Das Allgemeine Brouillon', no. 615.
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Kuzniar, Delayed Endings, pp. 85-86.
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the notion of origins and endings is both courted and undermined. Whether in the
guise of an aphorism, or an aphoristic series, or whether they manifest themselves
through the various means of deferring closure in longer texts, fragmentariness and
nonclosure serve as reminders that language is self-referential - but they also remind
us that meaning and the other are always 'there', in the in-between, hiding behind the
signifiers which seem to reveal them but, at the same time, guard them jealously.
I would now like to consider Novalis's novel, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, as
an exercise in self-referentiality. This will help to elucidate the relation between self-
referentiality and nonclosure. In order to appreciate the similarity in the techniques
through which both Derrida and Novalis circumvent closure, I will juxtapose my
reading ofOfterdingen with Derrida's reading of the Kafka short story 'Vor dem
Gesetz' ('Before the Law'/ Though only a fraction of the length ofHeinrich von
Ofterdingen, Kafka's text thematizes the role which language plays in constructing
what are often regarded as extra-textual ideas or things. Novalis's novel is the story
of the life's journey and artistic development of a young poet and the Kafka text is
concerned with that most inaccessible of absolutes, the Law. Reading these texts
together, I hope to show how the re-marking of differance through nonclosure is
intimately related to self-referentiality.
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'Devant la loi'
'Devant la loi' is Derrida's detailed reading of the Kafka short story 'Vor dem
79
Gesetz'. Kafka's text illustrates nonclosure in very economical fashion. It relates
the arrival before the Law of a man from the country. Upon demanding admittance to
the Law, he is informed by the doorkeeper that access is possible but 'not at the
moment':
Devant la loi se dresse le gardien de la porte. Un homme de la campagne se
presente et demande a entrer dans la loi. Mais le gardien dit que pour l'instant
il ne peut pas lui accorder l'entree. L'homme reflechit, puis demande s'il lui
sera permis d'entrer plus tard. "C'est possible", dit le gardien, "mais pas
maintenant."73
The man remains there for many years, repeatedly begging admittance only to be met
with the same reply. He focuses all his attention on the doorkeeper, forgetting that
beyond this one are more doorkeepers, each more 'powerful' than the last. Finally,
he dies, without having gained what he sought and the doorkeeper's last words to
him - and they are also the last words of the text - are: 'Ici, nul autre que toi ne
pouvait penetrer, car cette entree n'etait faite que pour toi. Maintentant, je m'en vais
et je ferme la porte.'74
721 am going to quote from the French translation of the Kafka text (by Alexandre Vialatte et Marthe
Robert) which appears in Derrida's text. This is because the relationship of framing - the fact that
both Derrida's and Kafka's texts share the same (which, as we know is not synonymous with
identical) title, and the fact that the title and the first line of Kafka's story are the same - is one of the
themes of Derrida's reading. Page references are to the Derrida text: 'Prejuges: Devant la loi', in J.
Derrida, V. Descombes et al., Lafaculte de juger (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1985). Hereafter 'Devant
la loi'.
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Derrida's reading is in many ways an expression of his admiration for the
parable which is extremely concise in its demonstration that any transcendental
value, whether it be the law or the ultimate meaning of a text, is subject to precisely
the same structure. The beauty of the Kafka text lies in the fact that: 'II dit et produit
en son acte meme la loi qui le protege et le rend intangible. II fait et il dit, il dit ce
qu'il fait en faisant ce qu'il dit.'75 Just as the countryman naively expects that he may
gain access to the Law, stand in the full presence of the Law, so might the reader
believe in the possibility of accessing the proper meaning of the text. The
impossibility of entering into the Law as Absolute and the impossibility of accessing
the ultimate meaning of a text (the transcendental signified) are 're-marked' in the
story, quite literally by the letter of the law, the letter of the text. They are essences
without essence. As Kafka's countryman learns, the door was made only for him -
the law is not a universal generality but is itself an idiom, a kind of narrative:
Elle est l'interdit: cela ne signifie pas qu'elle interdit mais qu'elle est elle-
meme interdite, un lieu interdit. Elle s'interdit et se contredit en mettant
l'homme dans sa propre contradiction: on ne peut arriver jusqu'a elle et pour
avoir rapport avec elle selon le respect, ilfaut ne pas, il ne fautpas avoir
rapport a elle, ilfaut interrompre la relation. II faut rCentrer en relation
qu'avec ses representants, ses examples, ses gardiens. Et ce sont des
interrupteurs autant que des messagers.76
The doorman, as a representative of the law, pronounces the law but also prevents
access to it. In the same way, the meaning of a text seems to be revealed through its
words. Yet we can never directly access the meaning since the relation is interrupted.
The words not only function as messengers ofmeaning but also withhold and delay
75
Ibid., p. 129.
76 Ibid., p. 121.
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meaning even as they generate it. We need to emphasize that, in both instances, what
is desired - to be in the full presence of the law, or of the meaning - is impossible
because both are essences without essence. Of the law (and, of course,
simultaneously of the text) Derrida says:
par-dela un regard, par-dela l'etant (la loi n'est rien qui soit present), la loi
appelle en silence. Avant meme la conscience morale en tant que telle, elle
oblige a repondre, elle destine a la responsabilite et a la garde. Elle met en
mouvement et le gardien et l'homme, ce couple singulier, les attirant vers elle
et les arretant devant elle. Elle determine l'etre-pour-la mort devant elle.
Encore un infime deplacement et le gardien de la loi (Hitter) ressemblerait au
berger de l'etre (Hirt). Je crois a la necessite de ce 'rapprochement', comme
on dit, mais sous la proximite, sous la metonymie peut-etre (la loi, un autre
nom pour l'etre, l'etre un autre nom pour la loi; dans les deux cas, le
'transcendant', comme dit Heidegger de l'etre) se cache et se garde peut-etre
encore l'abime d'une difference.77
Instead of the presence ofBeing, or truth, or meaning, or law - though we cannot do
without them and must answer their call - there is difference, and differance.
This exemplary performative text, 'Vor dem Gesetz', says what it does by
doing what it says. But lest we see this as the perfect specular reflection, we realize
that this by no means gives rise to a complete and closed account of the text.
Jonathan Culler incisively expresses deconstruction's perspective on self-reflexive
writing, stressing at the same time the way in which the paradoxical structure blocks
the text's transparency to itself:
[...] the relation deconstruction reveals is not the transparency of the text to
itself in an act of reflexive self-description or self-possession; it is rather an
77 Ibid., pp. 123-24.
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uncanny neatness that generates paradox, a self-reference that ultimately
brings out the inability of any discourse to account for itself and the failure of
performative and constative or doing and being to coincide.78
Culler mentions other instances of self-reflection from the domain of mathematics
and logic which generate paradoxes. One point, and this will be familiar from
Chapter 1, is that any meta-textual commentary on the text within the text cannot
comment on itself while commenting on the text because for the whole text to be
truly self-reflexive the meta-textual commentary plus the text would require meta-
meta-textual commentary and so on. This textual self-referentiality recalls the self-
reflection of the subject in the attainment of consciousness. The aporia - the never-
ending oscillation or 'Rollentausch' - described by Novalis functions in precisely the
same way as the self-reflexivity of the text. In the activity of the ego, Being and
reflection never coincide and, like the meaning of the text, the Being of the ego is not
simply anywhere-, it is neither here nor there and if it can be said to be anywhere then
it is in-between. Like de Man and Schulte-Sasse, Culler links textual self-
referentiality with the attainment of self-consciousness, describing them as 'versions'
of one another:
The notion of a text accounting for itself is another version of self-presence,
another avatar of the system of s 'entendre parler. Texts work in self-
referential ways to provide concepts that are strategically important in
reading them, but there is always, Derrida would say, a lag or a limp. '£a
boite et 9a ferme mal.' Boxing itself in, a text does not produce closure.79
78 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism (London: Routledge
&KeganPaul, 1983), p. 201.
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Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 205. Culler cites Derrida, La carte postale, p. 418.
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The Kafka text, Derrida tells us, would be the door. The doorman's final
words, 'I am now going to shut it', are, Derrida tells us, the conclusion or closure of
the story. But in closing upon nothing closure becomes nonclosure:
En fermant la chose, il [le gardien; the doorman] aura ferme le texte. Qui
pourtant ne ferme sur rien. Le recit 'Devant la loi' ne raconterait ou ne
decrirait que lui-meme en tant que texte. II ne ferait que cela ou ferait aussi
cela. Non pas dans une reflexion speculaire assuree de quelque transparence
sui-referentielle, et j'insiste sur ce point, mais dans l'illisibilite du texte, si
l'on veut bien entendre par la 1'impossibility oil nous sommes aussi d'acceder
a son propre sens, au contenu peut-etre inconsistant qu'il garde jalousement
en reserve. Le texte se garde, comme la loi. II ne parle que de lui-meme, mais
alors de sa non-identite a soi. II n'arrive ni ne laisse arriver a lui-meme. II est
la loi, fait la loi et laisse le lecteur devant la loi.80
The contretemps inherent in the idea of'non-identity-with-itself is simply another
name for the differance which is re-marked by the strategies of nonclosure:
Differance jusqu'a la mort, pour la mort, sans fin parce que finie. Represents
par le gardien, le discours de la loi ne dit pas 'non' mais 'pas encore',
indefiniment. D'ou l'engagement dans un recit a la fois parfaitement fini et
brutalement interrompu, on pourrait dire primitivement interrompu.81
Derrida takes up again and again the theme of the literary text's non-identity with
itself. A text - any text - is never identical with itself. He begins the reading of 'Vor
dem Gesetz' by musing on the two versions of Kafka's story, one as a self-contained
story and the other as a story related in the novel, Der Prozess. These two versions of
the same tale serve to remind us that, as Borges's Pierre Menard discovered, even if
it is replicated to the letter, the text is immediately changed by context. But, as so
80
Derrida, 'Devant la loi', p. 128.
81 Ibid., p. 122.
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often with Derrida, this actually points to a more general non-identity of writing with
itself. No text could ever be identical with itself since language is not identical with
itself. The meaning which is generated and withheld by the words of a text is, like
self-consciousness and our relation to the other, subject to the ceaseless movement of
time with all the problems of the 'present' we have already encountered. However,
though no text could be said to be identical with itself, some texts more than others
seek to thematize this, to play with it. These texts are, in a sense, more honest and
more aware of the elusive nature of anything to which metaphysics or common-sense
would like to give the qualities of an absolute and unchanging presence or the
plenitude of a harmonious self-possession. To put it in Ponge's terms, these texts
sign properly, through a certain frankness and the re-marking of their own textuality.
Hardenberg's novel certainly belongs to the texts which make a theme of the non-
identity of writing with itself. We will now look to the ways in which, as Alice
Kuzniar puts it, Novalis's narrative 'never is that which it describes'.
Heinrich von Ofterdingen: Narrative Nonclosure
Because of its unfinished status, Novalis's Heinrich von Ofterdingen cannot strictly
be said to be, like 'Vor dem Gesetz', 'without end because ended' ('sans fin parce
que finie'.83) However, as I said above, the question of whether or not Novalis
planned to finish the novel, even though it has occupied critics for many years, is less
82
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relevant than its intrinsic fragmentariness. The novel embodies nonclosure in the
same kind of undecidability we have seen in 'Vor dem Gesetz'. Of course, as Derrida
reminds us, this essential undecidability is a possibility of any text, even if it does not
84
take as obviously a self-referential form as in this case. Heinrich von Ofterdingen is
self-referential but by no means as neatly as the Kafka story. However, we shall see
how, as well as residing in the various formal methods of circumventing closure
outlined in Novalis's fragments, nonclosure is directly related to the way in which
the novel 'exceeds' itself by continually referring to its own status as literature. What
Derrida says of'Vor dem Gesetz', also applies to Heinrich von Ofterdingen: 'II
designe aussi obliquement la litterature, il parle de lui-meme comme d'un effet
RS
litteraire. Par ou il deborde la litterature dont il parle.'
As we saw above, both Novalis and Derrida are aware that beginnings and
endings are of the same order. Heinrich von Ofterdingen begins medias in res with
the protagonist lying awake in bed, pondering the significance of the mysterious Blue
Flower:
Die Eltern lagen schon und schliefen, die Wanduhr schlug ihren einformigen
Takt, vor den klappernden Fenstern sauste der Wind; abwechselnd wurde die
Stube hell von dem Schimmer des Mondes. Der Jiingling lag unruhig auf
seinem Lager, und gedachte des Fremden und seiner Erzahlungen. 'Nicht die
Schatze sind es, die ein so unaussprechliches Verlangen in mir geweckt
haben,' sagte er zu sich selbst; 'fern ab liegt mir alle Habsucht: aber die blaue
Blume sehn' ich mich zu erblicken. Sie liegt mir unaufhorlich im Sinn, und
ich kann nichts anderes dichten und denken.'86
84 Ibid., p. 129: 'Cette possibility est impliquee en tout texte, meme quand il n'a pas la forme
evidemment sui-referentielle de celui-ci.'
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This cipher of 'die blaue Blume', the meaning ofwhich is endlessly displaced and
deferred, occurs again and again throughout the novel. But, though Heinrich is
puzzled by the significance of the flower and the strange new feelings it has
awakened in him, he himself is not the source of the idea of the Blue Flower. We
learn that he has heard the idea from a mysterious stranger some time before. And
later we discover that Heinrich's father dreamt in his youth of a beautiful flower.
Already any attempt to locate the source of the symbol or to discover an initial event
has been thwarted. As Mallarme's Pierrot mimes a non-event, we see that what is
being related here is also a non-event - that which sets the entire novel in motion is
itself a narrative. It is not originary but second-hand and derivative, located (if a non-
event can be said to be anywhere) in someone else's dream or in the tales of a
stranger. At this point in the novel, Heinrich is unable to articulate the feelings
inspired by the flower: 'Es muB noch viele Worte geben, die ich nicht weiB: wtiBte
ich mehr, so konnte ich viel besser alles begreifen.'87 Novalis's formulation is
interesting because it turns referentiality upside down by suggesting that words are
more than a secondary vehicle for conveying or communicating some anterior mental
activity. Heinrich puts words in the primary position: words facilitate, even create,
understanding. Alice Kuzniar draws attention to Heinrich's observation that he seems
to lack words at the moment. This suggests that the apparent promise of clarification
is being held back, perhaps deferred to a later part of the novel. Indeed, Heinrich's
father predicts that some kind of revelation will occur on the feast of St John. Yet the
second chapter commences with the cursory narratorial observation that St John's
day has come and gone. No further mention of revelation is made - the dream itself
87 Ibid.
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is not even referred to at this point. As Kuzniar puts it: 'The lack of a sufficient
interpretation propels the story forward, and the subsequent chapters carry with them
o o
the hope for resolution and Erfullung.'
That night Heinrich dreams of the Blue Flower. Kuzniar's commentary on
this dream sequence is extremely insightful. She points out that the narrative moment
at which the dream begins is uncertain. The narrator, whom we assume at first to be
omniscient, begins to question whether Heinrich is aware that he is dreaming. The
phrase 'es war ihm, als ob...' recurs throughout the narration of the dream. Kuzniar
says:
The effect on the reader is uncanny and estranging. Do people ever dream in
the subjunctive? Does Heinrich indeed dream what he is narrated to be
dreaming? The episode alerts the reader to its consciously Active irreality.89
Kuzniar sees the dream as inaugurating a search for origins. This recalls (or, strictly
speaking, anticipates, but this is all part of the text's temporal confusion) the famous
question articulated in the second part of the novel: 'Wo gehn wir denn hin?'90 The
answer is 'Immer nach Hause'91 and, as we shall see, the fruitless search for origins -
which are of the same order as endings - is thematized throughout the novel in both
content and structure. In this first dream, Heinrich enters a cave in which there is a
pool and fountain. After bathing in the pool, an almost baptismal rite, he swims
further along a stream into the mountain. At this point, he has another dream within
88
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the first: 'Eine Art von siiBem Schlummer befiel ihn.' Awakening from this
slumber, he finds himself next to another fountain beside (not in the centre of) which
he sees a light-blue flower the petals ofwhich surround the face of a girl. The
successive encapsulations - dream within dream within an overarching narrative -
underline the 'consciously fictive irreality' of the whole. And the way in which
Heinrich moves from one enclosure to the next in his dream landscape mirrors the
novel's structure of abyssal enclosures, caves within caves reflecting dreams within
dreams and tales within tales. However, what we have here is in no way a structure
of concentric circles in the centre ofwhich meaning could be located. As Kuzniar
says:
This process of encapsulation marks an effort to draw closer to the center or
origin of these manifold concentric circles. At each successive encapsulation,
the contained becomes the container, the unveiled the veiled, and the inner
the outer; the concentric shows itself to be excentric. Thus the successive
enclosings turn out to be a series of reversals instead. In the course of the
linear narrative, they appear as displacements of one another. This movement
carries on indefinitely because the center cannot be found.93
Tales within Tales: 'Arion-Sage', 'Atlantis-Marchen' and Klingsohr's tale
As with the dream, the inlaid fairytales pose problems of structural relation to the
wider narrative. But we also need to look at the fact that, taken one at a time, as self-
contained tales, the Mdrchen are self-referential in that their themes concern poetry
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his mother by the merchants who are their travelling companions. The first tale, the
'Arion-Sage', is a simple story, circular in structure, in which the power of poetry
brings about the return of lost treasure to the poet. Of course, we must consider the
stories in relation to the narrative in which they are embedded and here, too, we
sense that the 'Arion' tale reflects the novel's apparent movement towards a new
golden age, to be ushered in through the power of poetry. But we would be mistaken
to view the tale's happy ending as a kind of closure or even as a prefiguration of the
ultimate closure of the novel. The ending is relativized in several ways. Firstly, it is
relativized through the highly conscious fictionality of the story - this is not merely a
tale but a tale within a tale. Then there is the fact that it is set in the distant past and
relates a mystical, 'unrealistic' sequence of events. Most importantly, the return from
fairy-tale to the narrative takes the form of an abrupt caesura. The action of the novel
breaks in suddenly and, without comment on the Arion tale or its possible
significance, the merchants start to tell a new one.
As in the 'Arion-Sage', this second story tells of the magical power of verse
which restores happiness and order to a kingdom which had suffered from its lack of
respect for poetry. Even more consciously self-referential than the first, the 'Atlantis-
Marchen' ends with a poem composed by the poet-hero which is a re-telling of the
entire tale. Here, too, the perfect ending is relativized as we learn that the action of
the story has been played out in the mythical realm of Atlantis, and the tale ends with
the revelation that Atlantis can no longer be found in the world, but only in myths:
'Kein Mensch weiB, wo das Land hingekommen ist. Nur in Sagen, heiBt es, daB
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Atlantis von machtigen Fluten den Augen entzogen worden sei.'94 And the narrative
continues immediately, once again without pause for commentary or
reflection. The tale ends the third chapter and the fourth begins with the information
that Heinrich and his companions have been travelling for several days 'ohne die
mindeste Unterbrechung'. Kuzniar points out that, in view of the abrupt break in
continuity between chapters three and four, this reads almost ironically.95
The third and longest tale, told by the poet Klingsohr, ends the first part of the
novel, 'Die Erwartung'. It, too, is self-reflexive, and is a more complex, allegorical,
reformulation of the first two tales and, indeed, of the novel as a whole. Klingsohr's
tale also shares the triadic structure of the first tales. An initial state of harmony is
disrupted through the breaking of a taboo. Fabel, the child heroine who represents
poetry, takes on the task of restoring order and succeeds through her spinning of
tales. Critics have tended to regard the tale as a self-contained unit and have focused
on the utopic elements, primarily on the way in which resolution is once again
effected by the power of poetry. However, to read the tale as representing the
straightforward triumph ofpoetry over reason - reason is personified by the evil
'Schreiber' - is to ignore its inherent self-reflexivity and its relation to the over¬
arching narrative. As in the dreams and earlier narratives, self-reflexivity (and hence
nonclosure) is achieved by the successive and encapsulated episodes ofwhich the
story consists. Towards the end of the tale, in the court of the moon, a world within a
world, a theatrical representation of the story takes place. The reference is oblique, as
94 N I, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, p. 229.
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Kuzniar says, 'suggestively traced'.96 At the beginning of the tale, the song of a
beautiful bird forecasts the outcome:
Wenn Fabel erst das alte Recht gewinnt,
In Freya's SchooB wird sich die Welt entzunden
Und jede Sehnsucht ihre Sehnsucht finden.97
The idea that longings will not be fulfilled already starts to subvert the notion of the
'happy ending' and helps prevent closure. Later on, Fabel sings a song, foretelling
the harmonious end of the story. But, paradoxically, by pre-empting the ending in
this way, 'Novalis weakens the teleological movement of the tale. A repetitive
structure is grafted onto a teleological one. Fabel's song, while predicting, both
go
repeats and substitutes for the entire action.' The tale's introductory frame is also
very important. Klingsohr prefaces his story by telling Heinrich that poetry is a
difficult task, one to which the novice poet is rarely equal. He says that this particular
tale was composed in his youth and bears the marks of his immaturity. Kuzniar
remarks: 'Supposedly, though we hear no further critique of the Fabel Marchen,
Klingsohr has written better poetry, which the reader then never witnesses. Also
implied is that a future narration, presumably Heinrich's, will surpass Klingsohr's
abstract, allegorical tale, a product of the latter's inexperienced youth.'99
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The end of the first part of the novel is indeed 'intentionally incomplete,
anticipatory, or future oriented',100 and nonclosure is most apparent in the framing of
tales:
cast in the narrative framework, the tales either substitute for an intended
eschatological Utopia or tell us that this end state can only be repeatedly
approximated or circumscribed in poetical fictions. There never comes a
point where the frame and the tales coincide in what they desribe. The
narrative always reminds its reader that it is a vehicle of radical
temporality.101
En-closure: The Play of Framing
In 'Devant la loi' Derrida discusses the self-referentiality of Kafka's short story and
its status as literature, which also has to do with the play of framing:
Si nous soustrayons de ce texte tous les elements qui pourraient appartenir a
un autre registre (information quotidienne, histoire, savoir, philosophie,
fiction, etc., bref, tout ce qui n'est pas necessairement affilie a la litterature),
nous sentons obscurement que ce qui opere etfait oeuvre dans ce texte garde
un rapport essentiel avec le jeu du cadrage et la logique paradoxale des
limites qui introduit une sorte de perturbation dans le systeme 'normal' de la
reference, tout en revelant une structure essentielle de la referentialite.
Revelation obscure de la referentialite qui ne fait pas plus reference, ne refere
pas plus que l'evenementialite de l'evenement n'est un evenement.102
And, as we have seen in our consideration of the dreams and inlaid fairy-tales, the
play of framing constitutes the self-referentiality of Hardenberg's novel. It is the
,0° Ibid., p. 112.
101 Ibid., p. 110.
102
Derrida, 'Devant la loi', p. 131.
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various plays of framing in both texts which 'introduce a perturbation in the
"normal" system of reference'. In Heinrich von Ofterdingen, the circumvention of
closure is most apparent, as Kuzniar says, in the interstices between episodes. Thus
the tales are certainly self-referential but this only partially constitutes the novel's
nonclosure. Nonclosure is also achieved through the way in which all three of the
tales reprise or pre-empt the wider narrative. However, where the nonclosure of 'Vor
dem Gesetz' is achieved through the unreadability of a breathtakingly economical
and paradoxical self-referentiality, Novalis's novel embodies nonclosure by virtue of
an extremely complex structure of opaque referentiality in which multiple narratives
interact in a series of reversals, enclose and are enclosed, frame and become framed,
in an open-ended yet circuitous process of deferral. Closure becomes nonclosure and
differance is re-marked.
On his journey, the end ofwhich may well turn out to have been its
beginning, Heinrich chances upon a hermit. In the hermit's cave, he finds a
manuscript in the Proven9al language which tells of a medieval poet. The pictures
seem to resemble Heinrich and portray his life and journey. The self-referentiality
resides in the idea of the book within the book, reminding us that Heinrich's life is
itself a narrative. But also thematized here is the way in which language or symbolic
representations are not simply superadded to reality: the mysterious book suggests
that 'reality' is also affected and infected by the complex relation of supplementarity
which Derrida has described so well. As in 'Vor dem Gesetz', the self-referentiality
is not transparent and specular but oblique and undeterminable. It suggests the way
in which the general text or context, the 'out-work' ('hors-texte'), which constitutes
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the world, is marked by the traces of signs and substitutions in the same way as
language. We will see in the following chapter that, if language is essentially
aphoristic, structured by separation, so too are the workings of love and desire.
Furthermore, since the manuscript lacks both a beginning and an end, we are
prevented from seeking clues to Heinrich's origins and any desire to see the script as
somehow programming or prescribing his development is thwarted. Closure is
infinitely postponed - in the inscrutable self-referentiality there is differance until
death.
Throughout this chapter, I have often had recourse to Derrida's 'L'aphorisme
a contretemps' because, in that it embodies the theory of literature in poetic form, in
the best tradition ofGerman Romanticism, it can be regarded as literature as the
theory of itself- in this case, a series of aphorisms revealing the wider significance
of aphorism. The other texts we have considered here, 'Vor dem Gesetz', 'Devant la
loi' and Heinrich von Ofterdingen, also thematize and make explicit the way in
which meaning is an essence without essence, only to be glimpsed and then lost
immediately in the messengers and interruptors of language. Nonclosure is a way of
describing the thematization of the interruption of meaning and the aphoristic
structure of all language, and all texts. The functioning of language and the textuality
of the texts are constantly highlighted. These are re-marked through the various ways
in which the four texts perturb the 'normal' system of reference, their never-ending
self-referentiality reminding us that all texts are subject to contretemps and
differance. But all four texts remind us, too, that we cannot avoid entrusting the
secret to letters. The aphoristic non-identity of the text with itself ensures that the gap
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between word and meaning is never closed. This is what keeps alive the desire to
read and to write: Te desir ne s'expose pas a Taphorisme par hasard. II n'y a pas de
temps pour le desir sans Taphorisme. Le desir n'a pas lieu sans Taphorisme.'103
103 Derrida, Psyche, p. 521.
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Chapter 4
The Death of the Other
'Tout reste "en moi" ou "en nous", "entre nous" a la mort de l'autre.'1
Derrida, Memoires pour Paul de Man
'Soli ich getrennt seyn ewig? - ist Vorgefiihl
Der kiinftigen Vereinigung, dessen, was
Wir hier fur Unser schon erkannten,
• 2
Aber nicht ganz noch besitzen konnten —'
Novalis, 'Anfang'
Feminism and Romanticism
In 'L'aphorisme a contretemps', Derrida demonstrates that desire cannot find its
breathing space without an aphoristic separation. Paradoxically, the desire to read, to
know the secret which has been entrusted to letters, is only produced by the
separation and differance ofwriting, and yet these are the very things which prevent
its fulfilment. As Derrida says in Dormer la mort: 'Le lecteur sent venir la litterature
par la voie secrete de ce secret, un secret a la fois garde et expose, jalousement scelle
et ouvert comme une lettre volee.'3 However, 'L'aphorisme a contretemps' does not
explore only this textual desire. At the same time, through the tragic story ofRomeo
1 Derrida, Memoires pour Paul de Man (Paris: Galilee, 1988), p. 52.
2
Novalis, 'Anfang', Schriften, ed. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,
1960-88), vol. I, p. 386. Hereafter N I, N II, etc.
J Derrida, Donner la mort (Paris: Galilee, 1999), p. 175. Derrida is fascinated by Poe's 'purloined
letter', which is hidden and not hidden at the same time, remaining secret and concealed even as it sits
in full view.
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and Juliet, the text suggests that a similar paradox structures the way we relate to
other subjects, other people.
In the literature of the Friihromantiker, notions of intersubjectivity and
reflections on human relationships are often articulated through one of the most
enduring images ofRomanticism: that of the male poet/philosopher and his
(preferably dead) female muse. Indeed, a large arena hosting the debate on the
modernity of Romanticism has been feminist criticism. In many ways, the position
with regard to women adopted by male members of the Jena circle, especially
Novalis and the Schlegel brothers, can rightly be regarded as revolutionary for its
time. During an era which saw a proliferation of treatises concerning gender
difference,4 the early Romantics stand out for their promotion ofwomen as writers
and philosophers, and also for their attempts to move beyond the binary oppositions
ofEnlightenment thinking. Aspects of the early Romantic discussion of gender have
been dealt with in several feminist studies.5 These themes include the feminization of
philosophy, the significance of the female figure in the development of the male
poet, and the literary activity of the female members of the Jena group, Dorothea
Veit-Schlegel and Caroline Schlegel-Schelling. While some of the studies in question
recognize the progressive nature of the male Romantics' gender critique, feminist
critics tend to perceive the female figures in Romantic works as either the archetypal
siren-figure, barely concealed male fantasy, or silent statue-like muse, mother or
virgin. In short, as Alice Kuzniar points out, the female beloved is usually read as
variations on the familiar theme of the 'male ideological construction ofwoman [...]
4 For instance, Kant's Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht (1797) and Humboldt's Uber den
Geschlechtsunterschied und dessen Einflufi aufdie organische Natur (1796).
5
Examples of such studies are cited in Notes 6-12 below.
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the distorted mirror or speculum (Luce Irigaray's word), that the man has fashioned
to reflect himself.6
However, certain critics have attempted to revise this view and demonstrate
that it stems from an underestimation of the complexity of the early Romantics'
treatment of gender. Some critics have returned to Romantic texts in order to perform
what Adrienne Munich describes as reading signs of 'real female power untapped
because unexplicated'.7 This strategy, which Alice Kuzniar and James Hodkinson
have practiced with regard to Novalis, involves recognizing female voices - albeit
• •• 8...
sometimes as 'ventriloquistic products' - in writing by men, and draws on
poststructuralist methods of reading developed by Derrida, Barthes and other critics.
Such criticism works on the premise that any given text can give rise to several
different readings. But with the critical interest in the Romantic portrayal ofwoman,
we can detect another either/or approach. One group wants to highlight the invention
of the other, mere object or projection of the male ego (one might say a 'Nicht Ich' in
Fichtean terms), and the other group is interested in emphasizing the recognition of
the other, as an independent and autonomous subject, a 'Du', to borrow a term from
Novalis. Kuzniar argues that the former approach is by far the more prevalent, and
cites the work of several critics who see Mathilde as no more than a 'catalyst for
6 Alice A. Kuzniar, 'Hearing Woman's Voices in Heinrich von Ofterdingeri , PMLA, 107 (1992),
1196-1207 (1196). For examples of the kind of criticism which reduces the female figure in this way
see Regula Fankhauser, Des Dichters Sophia: Weiblichkeitsentwiirfe im Werk Novalis (Koln: Bohlau,
1997).
7
Adrienne Munich, 'Notorious Signs: Feminist Criticism and Literary Tradition', in Making a
Difference: Feminist Literary Criticism, ed. by Gayle Greene and Coppelia Kahn (London: Methuen,
1985), p. 252. Cited by Kuzniar, 'Hearing Woman's Voices', p. 1196.
8 Ibid. See also James Hodkinson, 'Genius Beyond Gender: Novalis, Women and the Art of
Shapeshifting' Modern Language Review, 96 (2001), 103-15.
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Heinrich's Bildung,'9 Then, on the other hand, there are critics, including Kuzniar
herself, who are interested in the recognition of the female other, an autonomous
subject in her own right, and, moreover, one who possesses qualities to which the
male poet aspires.10
Of course, the trouble with both these positions is once more the reduction
they entail. In a way, it is much more than mere reductionism or oversimplification.
It is to overlook entirely the possibility that, instead of being a helpless victim of
contradictions, Novalis is attempting to thematize or demonstrate the paradoxical
nature both of subjectivity and femininity. Certain critics, however, occupy a
position somewhere between these two and are less interested in deciding whether
the Romantics invent or recognize the other than they are in tracing the paradoxes
which do seem to accommodate both readings. Mary R. Strand's excellent study of
the female other, I/You: Paradoxical Constructions ofSelfand Other in Early
German Romanticism,'1 does not attempt to maintain one position at the expense of
the other and, as the title of her book suggests, preserves and highlights the
contradictory nature of early Romantic constructions of the other. Lisa Roetzel is
another critic who avoids an either/or approach. She argues that:
9
Kuzniar, 'Hearing Woman's Voices', p. 1197. She continues: 'In [Gail] Newman's reading, woman
is handmaiden to the construction of the Romantic, Fichtean ego. [...] Gerlinde Geiger similarly
interprets Mathilde as Heinrich's missing complement, and Katharine Padilla sees in her his
intermediary and intercessor.' See Gail Newman, 'The Status of the Subject in Novalis's Heinrich von
Ofterdingen and Kleist's Die Marquise von 0...\ German Quarterly, 62 (1989), 59-71, and Gerlinde
Geiger, 'Weiblichkeit in den Schriften von Frauen und Mannern: Ein Vergleich' in Kontroversen, alte
und neue, VI: Frauensprache - Frauenliteratur? Fur und wider einer Psychoanalyse literarischer
Werke (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1986), pp. 97-103.
10 Kuzniar's article takes as its starting point the idea that Mathilde embodies poetry. 'IfMathilde
personifies "[d]en sichtbare[n] Geist des Gesanges", and Fabel, in Klingsohr's tale, is what her name
betokens, then woman puts man in an impossible position: short of getting a sex change, he cannot
master what she already is.' 'Hearing Woman's Voices', p. 1198.
11
Mary R. Strand, I/You: Paradoxical Constructions ofSelfand Other in Early German Romanticism
(New York: Peter Lang, 1998).
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reading Early German Romanticism with respect to gender means situating
oneself within the tension between revolutionary approaches to the feminine
and the persistence of established gender politics. [...] Early German
Romanticism is progressive in its centering of the feminine in philosphical
discourse as well as its advocacy of women's rights to participate in the
philosophical discussion. However, it fails to recognize its own participation
in the oppression of women.12
The contradictory nature of the Romantics' gender critique and other questions raised
by feminist readings ofNovalis are fascinating in themselves. However, I am less
interested in general questions about the constructedness ofWoman than I am in
looking in more fundamental terms at the relationship between self and other. In
Heinrich von Ofterdingen, this plays out in the relationship between the protagonist
and a female other, but for Derrida it is the death of Paul de Man which provides the
impetus for several moving texts on friendship, mourning, and the impossible desire
to speak to the other who has died.
In Novalis's work, the role of the female beloved in the male poet's
attainment of identity relies on language, and one ofDerrida's major preoccupations
is the problem of language as the medium through which the subject comes into
1 T
being and the only means by which this subject can attempt to relate to the other.
Without going so far as to suggest that Derrida's work on the way in which we relate
to other subjects allows us to read Novalis in an entirely new way, I think that a
Derridean perspective on Novalis's portrayal of the (female) beloved provides a good
12 Lisa C. Roetzel, 'Feminizing Philosophy', in Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology ofEarly
German Romantic Writings, ed. by Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota
Press, 1997), pp. 361-381 (p. 363).
uPsyche: Inventions de /'autre, Memoires pour Paul de Man, and L 'oreille de 1'autre are some
examples of this but one could argue that Derrida's entire oeuvre is concerned with finding the trace of
the other.
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framework for considering it in the way that critics like Strand and Roetzel have
done; that is, without having to choose between the two stances taken by feminist
critics which I outlined above. Once more, it is the awareness of paradox, a
willingness to endure aporia, and respect for alterity which reveal interesting
correspondences between Novalis and Derrida. This is not to say that a paradoxical
relation to the other is not already in Novalis's texts, but in this chapter - perhaps to
a greater extent than in the others - an understanding of Derrida helps to shed more
light on the aporia. The idea of a paradoxical relation is essentially what emerges
from Novalis's approach to questions of the absolute. We considered in some detail
in Chapter 1 the way in which the endurance of aporia is the only possible relation to
the absolutely-other - or, as it turns out, a kind of non-relation. It is not that we can
directly equate the desire of philosophy to grasp the absolute with the human desire
to know another person. But tracing the movement of this desire and the ensuing
interrelation will reveal a paradoxical structure familiar to us from the philosophy of
consciousness. This chapter reprises all the themes from the earlier chapters and,
even more clearly than the others, reminds us - ifwe needed reminding - of the ways
in which writers like Derrida and Novalis can help us to understand much more than
philosophy and literature. The focus on how we relate to others in love and
friendship shows not only that 'real life', love, philosophy and literature are far from
mutually exclusive, but also that their mutual transformations make us who we are.
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Love and Poetry
Love has always been one of the major themes of writing, both 'philosophical' and
'literary'. This long and fruitful relationship can be traced from Plato through to
Petrarch, from Shakespeare to the eighteenth-century literature of Sensibility, and,
indeed, from Romanticism to the present day. Writers, it seems, have always wanted
to write about love. Because of this, the relationship between 'love' and 'literature' is
one in which it is relatively easy to see at work something akin to the logic of
supplementarity. By this I mean that we can view 'love' as something not only
outside literature, which literature takes as its object, but also as the creation, the
offspring, of literature: something called into being by the very writing which
pretends to (re)present it. But this is not all because, as we shall see, the logic of
supplementarity also requires us to see love, not only as the creation of literature, but
also as constitutive of literature. In other words, what we call literature cannot exist
without what we call love, what literature has taught us to call love. It is not only
twentieth-century writers who are aware of this. Emma Bovary is one literary heroine
who discovers the dangerous supplementarity in the relationship between love and
books and, in some of his love sonnets, Shakespeare plays with and deconstructs the
conventions of love poetry upon which the other sonnets rest. Jonathan Culler gives
an excellent example of this:
Shakespeare's sonnet 'My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun' takes up
the metaphors used in the tradition of love poetry and denies them ('But no
such roses see I in her cheeks') - denies them as a way of praising a woman
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who 'when she walks, treads on the ground.' The poem has meaning in
relation to the tradition that makes it possible.14
The play ofmutual transformations between love and literature, as well as the
confusion of boundaries, means that love is always a slippery concept, its meaning
and scope already subject to shifts in meaning from age to age, and from author to
author. And, in the works ofNovalis and the other Jena Romantics, 'Liebe' is a
particularly complex idea precisely because, like Plato, they are interested in love not
only as a social phenomenon or 'real-life' emotion, but also as a philosophical
concept and universal force - even as shorthand for a kind of literary operation. In
his introduction to a small collection ofNovalis's writings on love, Gerhard Kurz
describes how the concept of love takes on new dimensions in the eighteenth century
in the works of Goethe, Rousseau and Richardson:
In seinem [i.e. Novalis's], dem 18. Jahrhundert, dem Zeitalter der
Aufklarung, waren im Namen der Liebe nicht nur gesellschaftliche
Konventionen angegriffen worden, sondern man hatte auch begonnen, in der
Liebe dem Zusammenhang von Emotionen, Affekten und Trieben, von
Idealen und korperlicher Realitat nachzuspiiren.'3
One of the themes this chapter deals with, then, is the way in which Novalis and
Derrida articulate the connections between love and literature. Beginning with
Novalis's philosophical treatment of the subject-object relationship, we will go on to
examine the role of language in finding and inventing the other and, finally, to
mourning and the problematic of the mirror.
14 Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997), p. 34.
15 Novalis iiber die Liebe, ed. Gerhard Kurz (Frankfurt and Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001), p. 15.
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'Le Sujet est une fable.'16
In the work ofNovalis, the question of the relation between love and poetry is
inextricably bound up with the question of the self. As we saw in Chapter 1, the
Novalissian ego is constituted by its radical temporality. The 'Wechselwirkung' or
'Rollentausch', elaborated in the 'Fichte-Studien', operates between the knowledge
of the self as represented object and the state of absolute but already lost identity of
the self and self-consciousness - this already lost unity cannot be known; it is non-
knowledge. These are related by a process of continual representation which does not
allow for a coincidence of knowing and being. The important thing to remember
about the figure of the 'Rollentausch', for the purposes of this chapter on love and
the human other, is that neither pole is given precedence; indeed, the radical
temporality of self-consciousness means that each element is never even (present to)
itself. We discussed Novalis's questioning of Fichte's insistence on a stable and self-
identical transcendental ego, 'das Absolute Ich'. This absolute and unconditioned
ego ought to function as the ground of all knowledge and cognition. The external
world is, therefore, assimilated into the all-encompassing Absolute Ego, and Fichte's
system cannot be permitted to acknowledge that there is a radical alterity at work. In
Uber die Wiirde des Menschen (1794), he states: 'Die Philosophie lehrt uns alles im
Ich aufsuchen. Erst durch das Ich kommt Ordnung und Harmonie in die todte
formlose Masse.'17
16
Derrida, Points de suspension: Entretiens (Paris: Galilee, 1992), p. 279.
17 J.G. Fichte, Samtliche Werke, ed. J. H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit, 1845), vol. I, pp. 412-13.
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For Novalis, conversely, the ego relates to the external other, the world, in
exactly the same way that it relates to itself- that is, it represents the world to itself.
This difference between Fichte and Novalis, though certainly explicit in the 'Fichte-
Studien', is not always glaringly obvious in the other work. This explains in part why
the perception ofNovalis as the poet of a subjective idealism bordering on the
18
solipsistic has proved so persistent. However, it is a highly significant difference,
and the understanding ofNovalis's version of self-consciousness gives us the means
to identify paradoxical constructions of the (human) other in the more overtly
'literary' works, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, in particular. Geza von Molnar argues
convincingly that the insights of the 'Fichte-Studien' underpin all ofNovalis's work,
and he describes the difference between Fichte and Novalis as follows:
For Fichte, the decisive aspect is the ego's absolute autonomy and the
object's corresponding lack of it. [...] Novalis, on the other hand, is primarily
concerned with the ego's absolute unity in its empirical manifestation as that
common point of balanced neutrality which alone guarantees the harmonious
correspondence of subject and object. The harmonious correspondence of
outer world and inner world is the ego's absolute heritage, and it constitutes
the basis of all that we call experience.19
When Molnar calls the Novalissian ego 'that common point of balanced neutrality
which alone constitutes the harmonious correspondence of subject and object', he is
pointing towards a quasi-Levinasian concept of ethics which respects the radical
alterity and autonomy of the other. For Novalis the object - be it world or human
18 Gerhard Kurz indicates another factor contributing to the enduring perception ofNovalis as ' [ein]
todessiichtige[r] Traumer von ewiger Liebe als Kompensation fur die ihm versagte irdische'. Kurz
suggests that it stems partly from the fact that most ofNovalis's works emerged only after his death,
and then were published in bits and pieces over many years. Novalis iiber die Liebe, p. 15.
19 Geza von Molnar, Novalis' Fichte-StudiesThe Foundation ofHis Aesthetics (The Hague/Paris:
Mouton, 1970), p. 29.
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other - is not merely 'Nicht Ich'; the ego is not given a transcendental status and the
non-ego is not subjugated or assimilated. The whole concept of an absolute ego is
analogous to the way in which philosophy defines itself and takes its meaning by not
being an inferior or secondary other - myth, writing, or sophistics. For Novalis, the
ego stands in relation to an 'object' of consciousness (world or human other) which
is radically other. We can argue, following Levinas and Derrida, that this other is
not, strictly speaking, an 'object', with all that this word implies of appropriation and
assimilation. The following very important fragment from the 'Fichte-Studien'
reiterates this and, moreover, gives us a vitally important insight into Novalis's
model of the way in which the relation of the ego to the external other emerges in the
same way as the ego's relation to itself:
Kriticism [...] laBt uns die Natur, oder Aufienwelt, als ein menschliches
Wesen ahnden — Sie zeigt, daB wir alles nur so verstehn konnen und sollen,
wie wir uns selbst und unsere Geliebten, uns und euch verstehen. [...] Jetzt
sehn wir die wahren Bande der Verkniipfung von Subject und Object - sehn,
daB es auch eine AuBenwelt in uns giebt, die mit unserm Innern in einer
analogen Verbindung, wie die AuBenwelt auBer uns mit unserm AuBern und
jene und diese so verbunden sind, wie unser Innres und AuBres. [...] Nun
erscheint die sogenannte Transscendentalphilosophie - die Zurtikweisung
[sic] ans Subject - der Idealism, und die Kategorieen - der Zusammenhang
zwischen Object und Vorstellung in einem ganz neuen Lichte. [...] Selbstheit
ist der Grund aller Erkenntnifi - als der Grund der Beharrlichkeit im
Veranderlichen - auch das Princip der hochsten Mannichfaltigkeit - (Du.)
(Statt Nicht Ich - Du.)20
The shift in emphasis resulting from Novalis's replacement of the Fichtean 'Nicht
Ich' with 'Du' complicates the simple opposition of 'Ich' and 'Nicht Ich', whereby
the 'Ich' is reflected back to itself by the 'Nicht Ich', and inaugurates instead a far
more complex and asymmetrical process of interrelation with the other. Furthermore,
20 N III, p. 429-30, 'Das Allgemeine Brouillon', no. 820.
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since the process by which the ego relates to both the otherness within and the
external other consists of an ever-changing dynamic process - a 'Schweben' or
'
Wechselwirkung' between subjective and objective moments - Novalis's account of
the self cannot possibly accommodate the notion of a self which is identical with
itself and whose only act of reflection is thus a specular one. We might be tempted to
read the phrase, 'Selbstheit ist der Grund aller Erkenntnifi - als der Grund der
Beharrlichkeit im Veranderlichen', as a desire to re-inscribe an absolute and
immutable ground. However, the phrase can also be read as an acknowledgement
that even a de-centred, destabilized 'Selbstheit' is the only constant which guarantees
'Erkenntnis\ the cognition of the infinite multiplicity of the world. There is no
escaping the fact that it is the ego which opens up the very possibility of this respect.
Derrida, too, would concede this. But the point is that there would be no demand for
respect without the absolute alterity of the other. The Novalissian self can rightly be
regarded as a de-centred self. It is not a selfsame essence but rather a never-ending
process of inscription and re-inscription which takes place (ifwe can even talk of a
'takingplace' in this context) in time and in the attempts at communication between
the self and its various others. For Novalis, the self can only achieve its own identity
through its temporal interrelation with an other, be this the other within, the world, or
another human subject. Where Fichte's ego gives life to the 'todte formlose Masse'
of a reality entirely dependent on the ego, the Novalissian subject, as we can see
from the above quotation, always already perceives reality as a living and subjective
other. As Elizabeth Mitman and Mary Strand put it, this contrasts sharply with the
stasis which characterizes Fichte's absolute ego: 'Nature, as an "outside other",
prevents the I from ossifying itself from within: the I must rearrange its relationships
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21with the world as it encounters independent others, such as nature and the You.'
The shift from a 'Nicht-Ich' to a 'Du' is a beautifully concise way of conceptualizing
this vital difference between Fichte and Novalis, and provides a reference point for
mapping these affinities with poststructuralist thinking on the subject-object relation.
A New Realism
What Molnar calls the 'harmonious correspondence' between self and other is a
schema which also underlines the early Romantics' conception of literature. For
Novalis and Derrida, the acknowledgement of a radical alterity is essential - indeed,
is constitutive of self-consciousness. But beyond the otherness within, there is the
movement of an active desire to know the external other. It would be an
impoverished person indeed, who did not desire to know the other, even while
feeling the constriction of the double bind which dictates that this knowing would
destroy the very otherness which provokes the desire to know. It is in our attempts at
communication with others (through the signs and supplements from which the self
also emerges) that we evolve as complex human subjects. And poetry, too, would be
poorer without this desire for and interaction with the other. In the above quotation,
Novalis describes the 'Du' as the 'Princip der hochsten Mannichfaltigkeif. And, in
similar vein, Friedrich Schlegel maintains that, without actively seeking some kind of
21 Elizabeth Mitman and Mary R. Strand, 'Self and Other in Early German Romanticism', in Theory
as Practice: A Critical Anthology ofEarly German Romantic Writings, ed. by Jochen Schulte-Sasse et
al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp 47-71 (p. 52). Strand and Mitman also
recognize the remarkable affinities between Novalis's thinking on the subject and poststructuralist
theories of consciousness. They do not mention Derrida, however, focusing instead on Lacan's work
on language and psychoanalysis.
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interrelation with otherness, in the sense of the multiplicity of the world, poetry
would be lifeless.
This poetic desire is described as 'Liebe' in the 'Rede Uber die Mythologie'.
In this text, Schlegel points out that one of the dangers in the philosophical turn
towards the subject is a shift away from 'Natur' and the outside world. He praises the
insights of Transcendental Idealism into subjectivity and, furthermore, recognizes
that 'modern' poetry is the very expression of subjectivity and creative imagination.
However, he argues that Idealism alone is not enough, and laments the way in which
Spinoza, with his nature-philosophy, has been dethroned by philosophy's new gods,
22in particular, by Fichte. There is simply no room for nature in Fichte's system; as
Strand and Mitman put it, 'for this philosopher of consciousness, nature is in a sense
beyond the I'. Schlegel is not advocating the total abandonment of Idealism.
Indeed, he recognizes, in the wake of Descartes and Kant, that: 'in Gestalt der
Philosophic oder gar eines Systems wird der Realismus nie wieder auftreten
konnen.'24 The whole point about this new realism is that it emerges from Idealism,
and, according to Schlegel, only poetry can express this harmonious interaction:
Und selbst nach einer allgemeinen Tradition ist es zu erwarten, daB dieser
neue Realismus, weil er doch idealischen Ursprungs sein, und gleichsam auf
idealischem Grund und Boden schweben muB, als Poesie erscheinen wird, die
ja auf der Harmonie des Ideellen und Reellen beruhen soil.23
22 Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. by Ernst Behler (Munich: Schoningh,
1958-), vol. II, p. 316.
23 Strand and Mitman, 'Self and Other in Early German Romanticism', p. 52.
24
Schlegel, vol. II, p. 315.
25 Ibid.
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Schlegel calls for a new realism, a new 'Mythologie', which will revive the 'tote
Leichnam der Poesie' and asks: 'was ist jede schone Mythologie anders als ein
hieroglyphischer Ausdruck der umgebenden Natur in dieser Verklarung von Fantasie
und Liebe?'26 Novalis's Klingsohr, the poet who becomes Heinrich von
Ofterdingen's mentor, says in similar vein, 'die Liebe ist stumm, nur die Poesie kann
fur sie sprechen. Oder die Liebe ist selbst nichts, als die hochste Naturpoesie.'27
Love, then, is one name for the interrelation with an other which cannot
simply be reduced to that which is not I. Deconstruction is so pertinent to the
writings ofNovalis precisely because the power and fascination of deconstruction
comes from the awareness of the other which cannot be reduced to the same. We
have already discussed interesting similarities in the types of (mis)reading which
characterize the critical literature on both Novalis and Derrida. The specific problem
of the subject-object relation highlights further parallels between the way in which
the Romantic understanding of Idealism has been (mis)represented in some of the
older criticism and the way in which certain commentators have (mis)understood
deconstruction. Of the Romantics, Paul Roubiczek, for instance, says that the 'one¬
sided interpretation of Kant makes them both forget the impact of external reality and
the impossibility of absolute knowledge'. 8 Yet, as I have outlined above and as more
recent readings like those of Strand and Mitman have shown, Novalis's shift in
emphasis from 'Nicht Ich' to 'Du' - not to mention Schlegel's demand for a 'new
realism' - is clear evidence of a desire to escape from the specular reflection of the
26
Ibid., p. 318.
27 N I, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, p. 287.
28 Paul Roubiczek, 'Some aspects ofGerman Philosophy in the Romantic Period', in The Romantic
Period in Germany: Essays by Members ofthe London University Institute ofGermanic Studies, ed.
by Siegbert Prawer (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp. 305-25 (p. 306).
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Fichtean Absolute Ego and answer the call of that external other without which there
would be no need for language. Similarly, Derrida has repeatedly been forced to
answer the criticism of those who would claim that he is only concerned with the
empty play of self-referential signifiers, when he is actually concerned precisely with
that which is beyond such specular reflection. As he himself says, 'to distance
oneself [...] from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge our common
assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond




The shift from a Fichtean 'Nicht Ich' to a Novalissian LDu' certainly indicates 'an
openness towards the other'. We must now begin to consider this openness in terms
of the distinction between 'finding' and 'inventing' which I outlined above with
regard to readings of the female beloved. However, we cannot simply say that the
'Nicht Ich' is the self s invention of the other, while the 'Du' is the other which is
recognized or found by the self. The same logic of supplementarity which
complicates the oppositions we considered in Chapter 2 also infects the
TO
inventing/finding opposition. The love story of Heinrich von Ofterdingen and
29 Derrida, 'Deconstruction and the Other', interview with Richard Kearney, in Dialogues with
Contemporary Critical Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage, ed. by Richard Kearney
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 107-26 (pp. 123-24).
J° Gail Newman, in a fascinating comparative study ofNovalis with the British psychoanalyst D. W.
Winnicott, is also interested in complicating the finding/inventing opposition and in demonsrating that
the subject can be 'creative' and 'receptive' at the same time. See Gail M. Newman, Locating the
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Mathilde illustrates the complexity of this opposition. Heinrich meets Mathilde and,
thanks to her love and teaching, is finally able to bring his budding poetic potential to
fruition. The idea is repeatedly reinforced that, without love, the poet cannot attain
(poetic) self-consciousness. However, this does not simply reduce Mathilde to a
function ofHeinrich's development. A close reading of the love story, juxtaposed
with Derrida's writings on the loss of a loved one, will help us trace the strange logic
which infects the finding/inventing opposition and always already complicates the
subject-object relation.
In Donner la mort, Derrida tells us: 'Tout autre est tout autre.'31 The English
translation, even though - or perhaps because - it is more unwieldy, unpicks and lays
out the implications of the phrase. 'Autre' - and, of course, this also applies to
'other' - can be both noun and adjective. But the word 'tout' in French, as well as
signifying 'all' or 'every(one)', also functions as the qualifier 'complete' or
'completely'. Perhaps the best translation is something like 'every other (one) is
every (bit) other.' J. Hillis Miller points out, however, that any translation must
arrest the 'trembling' or 'vibrations'33 between several possible meanings of the
phrase. As well as declaring in tautological fashion that 'every other is every other',
it also says something like 'every other person is wholly other'. It is in this second
sense that Derrida tries to describe the respect we owe to the other person, who is
singularly other, radically other than us. And in Psyche, playing with the ambiguity -
Romantic Subject: Novalis with Winnicott (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997).
31 Derrida, Donner la mort, p. 98.
j2 This is the rendering of David Wills, translator of the original version of'Donner la mort', first
published in L 'ethique du don: Jacques Derrida et la pensee du don, ed. by Jean Michel Rabate and
Michael Wetzel (Paris: Metailie 1992). The translation was published as The Gift ofDeath, trans, by
David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
" J. Hillis Miller, 'Derrida's Others', in Applying: To Derrida, p. 162.
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in both English and French - of the phrase 'invention de l'autre', Derrida says in the
text which bears this title:
L'invention de l'autre, cela implique-t-il que l'autre reste encore moi, en moi,
de moi, aux mieuxpour moi (projection, assimilation, interiorisation,
introjection, appresentation analogique, au mieux phenomenalite)? Ou bien
que mon invention de 1'autre reste l'invention de moi par l'autre qui me
trouve, me decouvre, m'institue or me constitue? A me venir de lui,
l'invention de l'autre alors lui reviendrait.34
Seen in juxtaposition, these two quotations from Derrida highlight the peculiar
paradox of our relationship with otherness. It is this paradox which lies at the heart of
the final dream in the first part ofHeinrich von Ofterdingen - the one in which
Heinrich dreams ofMathilde's death. As the 'Fichte-Studien' make clear, for Novalis
the selfonly attains awareness of itself through some kind of interrelation with the
other. The 'essentially imperialistic'31' suppression of the otherness of the other by
the Fichtean Absolute Ego has no place in Novalis's schema. Novalis's other is a
'Du' which is - at least in theory - regarded as autonomous, a thinking subject in its
own right. In the view of some feminist critics, as we saw above, Novalis is
unsuccessful in creating female characters who convincingly embody this idea of
woman as 'Du', as autonomous subject, in the narrative texts. This applies perhaps in
particular to Mathilde in Heinrich von Ofterdingen. However, I would argue that we
must consider the possibility that Novalis is not just attempting to portray the
otherness of woman but reflecting on the idea of otherness itself, which involves
considering the (necessary and paradoxical) simultaneity of the construction of the
j4
Derrida, Psyche: Inventions de I'autre (Paris: Galilee, 1987), p. 10.
35
Newman, Locating the Romantic Subject, p. 21.
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other and communication with the other. In a sense, for Heinrich Mathilde only
exists within Heinrich. As Derrida reminds us:
C'est a l'interieur, si on peut dire (mais justement il y va d'une effraction de
l'interieur) du present vivant, cette Urform de 1'experience transcendentale,
que le sujet compose avec du non-sujet et que Vego se trouve marque, sans
pouvoir faire 1'experience originaire et preventative, par du non-ego et surtout
de Valter ego. L'alter ego ne peut pas se presenter, devenir une presence
originaire pour 1'ego.36
We have to keep in mind the apparent contradiction that Mathilde's otherness is both
recognized and invented, in as much as either of these is at all possible in life or
within the literary text. But perhaps it is more accurate to say that the distinction
between recognizing (or finding) and inventing is complicated by the folding back of
supplementarity. Derrida warns that true invention is impossible. Hillis Miller's
explication of Derrida's insistence on the impossibility of invention is admirably
succinct:
'Invention' in the rhetorical context (Latin inventio) means both innovation
and finding. The art of inventio is finding the appropriate material for a given
purpose (an argument or a poem), taking it from what is already there in the
storehouse of commonplaces or common places, places we all hold in
common as members of Graeco-Latin-Hebrew-Christian culture. As Derrida
argues, [...], powerful institutional assumptions in art, technology, science,
law, theology and philosophy urge us to think of invention as the discovery of
something which fits into the programme ofwhat is already known and
already institutionalised, something that is possible on the basis ofwhat we
already know. [.. .1 Such an invention 'revient au meme' (returns to the
37
same). It returns the other to the same.
36 Derrida, Points de suspension: Entretiens, p. 278.
37 J. Hillis Miller, 'Derrida's Others', in Applying: To Derrida, p. 167.
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In terms of the ego and its relation to others, we see how a similar confusion between
finding and inventing runs the risk of returning the other to the same. And yet we
have no choice but to invent and to fail to invent. The impossible becomes possible.
Newman finds two phrases from Novalis's texts which seem to name this
paradoxical simultaneity. What she calls the 'Novalian self engages in both finding
and inventing 'at the same time':
The Novalian self invests found objects and events with special significance,
-30
it is a 'Liebhaber des Schicksals'. At the same time, the Novalian self
creates objects and then declares them to exist objectively, it is a 'magischer
Idealist'.39
The complex narrative and temporal structure ofHeinrich von Ofterdingen reveals
the simultaneity of recognition and invention which constitutes our relationships with
other subjects. Upon meeting Mathilde for the first time, Heinrich recognizes her in
retrospect as the face in the blue flower which he has seen in dreams. This idea of
recognition is admittedly compatible with the view that Mathilde is a mere
concretization of her Platonic idea, which sits uneasily with the notion of true alterity
and autonomy. It is true that Heinrich does tell Mathilde:
'Konntest du nur sehn, wie du mir erscheinst, welches wunderbare Bild deine
Gestalt durchdringt und mir iiberall entgegen leuchtet, du wiirdest kein Alter
furchten. Deine irdische Gestalt ist nur ein Schatten dieses Bildes [...]; das
Bild ist ein ewiges Urbild, ein Teil der unbekannten heiligen Welt.'40
This and similar quotations have been used by critics to suggest that Mathilde is a
38
Nil, p. 597, no. 333.
39 N III, p. 384-85, no. 638. Cited by Newman, Locating the Romantic Subject, p. 41.
40 N I, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, p. 288-89.
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manifestation of the Ideal Woman, who merely functions as the male poet's mediator
between the earthly realm and the absolute, transcendental sphere. However, I find
this reading inadequate on several levels and would argue that we cannot identify
what Heinrich says at this point as representing one single coherent view. Nor should
it be confused with the voice ofNovalis. Throughout the novel, Heinrich is a
somewhat passive hero who gives voice to several conflicting ideas and perspectives.
In fact, John Neubauer sees this as one aspect of the novel which lends itself well to
postmodernist criticism. He asks: '1st nicht gerade die Abwesenheit eines starken
Subjektes, eines dominierenden Erzahlers, was Ofterdingen "dezentralisiert" und den
verschiedenen Stimmen erst Raum gewahrt?'41 It seems to me that the reading of
Mathilde as a mediator between earthly and transcendental spheres curtails
Heinrich's freedom as receptive and creative (if nonetheless de-centred) subject.
Secondly, the novel as a whole, as well as many ofNovalis's other works,
acknowledges the fictionality of any kind of absolute, including Platonic ideas or a
divine transcendental realm. Therefore, to read Mathilde as no more than a one-
dimensional concretization of the ideal entirely overlooks one of the most interesting
aspects of the novel - the role of language in the invention of the other. Novalis tells
us that 'das oberste Princip muB schlechterdings Nichts Gegebenes, sondem ein Frey
Gemachtes, ein Erdichtetes, Erdachtes sein'.42 As we have seen in Chapters 1 and 3,
the absolute, the 'unbekannte heilige Welt' and the golden age are necessary
constructs, but their status as constructs is acknowledged and all transcendental
underpinnings called into question.
41 John Neubauer, 'Novalis und der Postmodernismus', in Geschichtlichkeit undAktualitat: Studien
zur deutschen Literatur seit der Romantik: Festschrift fur Hans-Joachim Mahl, ed. by Klaus-Detlef
Mtiller et al. (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1988), pp. 207-20 (p. 215).
42 N II, p. 273, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 568.
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Heinrich von Ofterdingen, developing one of the main themes from the
philosophical studies, continually foregrounds the functioning of language in the
complex process of finding/inventing the other. The famous 'Blaue Blume' is not
invented by Heinrich but rather comes to him from an external source. Having
looked at the beginning of the novel in the chapter on nonclosure, I want to return to
it briefly because it demonstrates that Novalis is concerned with thematizing the
finding/inventing activity, and not only in relation to the human beloved. The blue
flower first appears in the tales of the mysterious stranger and, significantly, we do
not hear or read the tales first-hand in the text. The result of this second-hand
experience for both Heinrich and the reader is that any attempt to find the origin of
the blue flower outside narrative and language is thwarted. But we are certainly privy
to Heinrich's reception of the stories as he lies in bed, reflecting on what the stranger
has told him:
Der Jiingling lag unruhig auf seinem Lager, und gedachte des Fremden und
seiner Erzahlungen. 'Nicht die Schatze sind es, die ein so unaussprechliches
Verlangen in mir geweckt haben,' sagte er zu sich selbst; 'fern ab liegt mir
alle Habsucht: aber die blaue Blume sehn' ich mich zu erblicken. Sie liegt
mir unaufhorlich im Sinn, und ich kann nichts anderes dichten und denken.'43
On the very first page of the novel, we see a found or received object become part of
the subject, something which will continue to be re-invented as the novel progresses
('ich kann nichts anderes dichten und denken'). The received/invented blue flower is
thus never wholly other and is never wholly part of the protagonist's self. In the
dream which follows these thoughts, another manifestation of the 'found' flower
takes on a human face: 'die Bliitenblatter zeigten einen blauen ausgebreiteten
43 N I, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, p. 195.
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Kragen, in welchem ein zartes Gesicht schwebte.'44 At a later stage in his journey,
after his first meeting with Mathilde, Heinrich puzzles over the feeling that he
recognizes her face from a picture in the hermit's mysterious and obscure book:
Welcher sonderbare Zusammenhang ist zwischen Mathilden und dieser
Blume? Jenes Gesicht, das aus dem Kelche sich mir entgegenneigte, es war
Mathildens himmlisches Gesicht, und nun erinnere ich mich auch, es in
jenem Buche gesehn zu haben. Aber warum hat es dort mein Herz nicht so
bewegt?45
The meeting with the 'real' Mathilde, another human subject, but also in a sense a
found object, provides the focus for another re-working of the found symbol of the
blue flower. What we have here is, in effect, a conflation of finding and inventing. It
is impossible to tell where the 'real' Mathilde begins and where the 'invented'
Mathilde ends. She can never be wholly other and yet she can never be wholly the
same - she must remain radically other. That, as Derrida tells us, is the essential
paradoxical structure of our relation with all others. He says:
Nous ne pouvrons vivre cette experience que sous la forme de l'aporie, aporie
du deuil et de la prosopopee: la possible reste impossible, la reussite echoue,
Tinteriorisation fidele qui porte l'autre et le comporte en moi (en nous),
vivant et mort a la fois, elle fait de l'autre une partie de nous, entre nous - et
1'autre parait alors n'etre plus l'autre precisement parce que nous le pleurons
et le portons en nous, comme un enfant encore a naitre, comme un avenir.46
But he reminds us that, conversely, the failure succeeds: '1 'echec reussit,' in that we
must fail to fully assimilate or interiorize the other: Tinteriorisation qui avorte, c'est
44
Ibid., p. 197.
45 Ibid., p. 277.
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Derrida, Memoires pour Paul de Man, p. 54.
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a la fois le respect de l'autre comme autre, une sorte de tendre rejet, un mouvement
de renoncement qui le laisse seul, dehors, la-bas, dans sa mort, hors de nous.'47
Novalis, with his concept of the 'Mittelwesen', here reformulates the aporia, and
displays a similar awareness of the way in which mediation through signs prevents
direct and simple access to the other:
Das Ich glaubt ein fremdes Wesen zu sehen - durch Approximation desselben
entsteht ein andres Mittelwesen - das Produkt - was dem Ich zugehort, und
was zugleich dem Ich nicht zuzugehoren scheint - Die Mittelresultate des
Processes sind die Hauptsache - das zufallig gewordene - oder gemachte
Ding - ist das Verkehrt Beabsichtigte.48
Crucially, although signs and supplements are the only means of finding/inventing
the other, their necessity is precisely that which is entirely incompatible with the
unmediated experience of otherness. But what happens upon the death of the other?
When we can no longer speak to the other, but only to the memory of the other in
ourselves?
Mourning (of) the Other
Part of what makes Derrida's texts on de Man so moving is his description of the
terrible solitude we experience upon recognizing that the death of the other literally
brings us back to the self. No matter how much we wish to speak to the other we can
only speak to the memory of the other in ourselves:
47 Ibid.
48 N III, p. 372-73, 'Das Allgemeine Brouillon', no. 601.
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L'etre 'en nous,' l'etre 'en nous' de l'autre, dans la memoire endeuillee, ce ne
peut etre ni la resurrection proprement dite de 1'autre lui-meme (1'autre est
mort et rien ne peut l'en sauver, personne ne peut nous en sauver) ni la simple
inclusion d'un fantasme narcissique dans une subjectivite close sur elle-
49
meme.
But this does not mean only narcissism or pure 'interior speculation'. As Derrida
says, 'la structure narcissique est trop paradoxale et trop rusee pour que ce mot nous
donne le mot de la fin.'50 He continues:
Si narcissisme il y avait, sa structure resterait assez complexe pour que
l'autre, mort ou vivant, ne s'y reduise pas au meme. Deja installe dans la
structure narcissique, l'autre marque assez le soi du rapport a soi, il le
conditionne assez tot pour que l'etre 'en nous' de la memoire endeuillee soit
venue de l'autre, une venue de l'autre, et meme, si terrifiante que puisse
devenir cette pensee, lapremiere venue de 1'autre.51
Derrida suggests here that the self only emerges thanks to the other. If, indeed,
everything remains 'within me' or 'within us' upon the death of the other, we need to
ask what constitutes this 'within me'? Derrida expresses what we learnt from Novalis
in the first chapter: '[...] nous ne sommes jamais nous-memes, et entre nous,
52
identiques a nous, un 'moi' n'est jamais en lui-meme, identique a lui-meme.' With
bereavement we are thrown back upon memory, and just as Plato had to concede the
finitude ofmemory, we find that this finitude is death, and that the work ofmemory
consists only of traces of a past which has never been fully present. Memory is
49
Derrida, Memoires pour Paul de Man, p. 44.
50 Ibid., p. 52.
51 Ibid., p. 44.
52 Ibid., p. 49.
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always already constitued by the signs and supplements of the non-present with
which it is necessarily in relation.
The death of the other re-marks this finitude, sheds 'more light' on it. But the
other does not have to die for the mourning to begin. Death and mourning are always
already inscribed in the relation. In the following long quotation, Derrida begins by
speaking of the memory of the other who has died but he goes on to demonstrate
how this equally applies to our relation with the living other:
Si la mort arrive a l'autre et nous arrive par Tautre, l'ami n'est plus qu 'en
nous, entre nous. En lui-meme, par lui-meme, de lui-meme, il n'est plus, plus
rien. II ne vit qu'en nous. Mais nous ne sommes jamais nous-memes, [...] un
'moi' n'est jamais en lui-meme, identique a lui-meme, cette reflexion
speculaire ne se ferme jamais sur elle-meme, elle n'apparait pas avant cette
possibility du deuil, avant et hors de cette structure d'allegorie et de
prosopopee qui constitue d'avance tout 'etre-en-nous', 'en-moi', entre nous
ou entre soi. Le Selbst, le self, le soi-meme ne s'apparait que dans cette
allegorie endeuillee, dans cette prosopopee hallucinatoire - et avant meme
que la mort de Tautre n'arrive effectivement, comme on dit, dans la 'realite'.
L'etrange situation que je decris ici, par exemple celle de mon amitie avec
Paul de Man, m'eut permis de dire ce que je dis avant sa mort. II suffit que je
le sache mortel, qu'il me sache mortel — et il n'est pas d'amitie sans ce savoir
de la finitude. Et tout ce que nous inscrivons dans le present vivant de notre
rapport aux autres porte deja, toujours, une signature de memoires d'outre-
tombe.53
This shows not only how our relation to the other is structured by language,
separation and death, but also reminds us that the 'self is subject to this same
structure. Far from being a question of narcissistic subjectivity - there is no self
without the other. As Derrida puts it a little later:
53 Ibid.
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Le 'moi' et le 'nous' dont nous parlons alors ne surgissent ou ne se delimitent
comme ce qu'ils sont qu'a travers cette experience de l'autre, et de l'autre
comme autre qui peut mourir en laissant en moi ou en nous cette memoire de
l'autre. La terrible solitude qui est la mienne ou la notre a la mort de l'autre,
c'est elle qui constitue ce rapport a soi qu'on appelle 'moi,', 'nous,' 'entre
nous,' 'subjectivite,' 'intersubjectivite,' 'memoire'.54
As we saw in Chapter 2 - with regard to Rousseau, Plato and writing - language is
always already marked by separation, by the essential possibility that what I say may
be read or repeated in the case ofmy absence or, indeed, in the case of the ultimate
absence, my death. Our only possible interaction with the other - and, therefore, with
ourselves - must always already be marked by the death of the other.
Ich oder Du?: 'Das Sophienerlebnis'
All of this can be brought to our consideration of the so-called 'Sophienerlebnis', an
event to which Novalis critics have accorded enormous importance. From the earliest
days ofNovalis scholarship, the perception of his work - in particular, of the
Hymnen an die Nacht and Heinrich von Ofterdingen - has been governed by the
argument that it is a direct response to the loss of his young fiancee Sophie von
Kiihn, a kind ofprocessing of this painful experience. There are various models and
theories from critics who take this slant,55 but few critics have considered Novalis's
relationship to Sophie in terms of the structure of our relation to otherness as
described by Derrida. There are suggestions in Novalis's correspondence that he -
quite consciously and deliberately - constructs his own 'Sophie' even before her
54
Ibid., pp. 52-53.
55 For an overview, see Uerlings, pp. 278-83.
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actual death. This is borne out by the testimony ofNovalis himself, as well as that of
others, including his brother, Erasmus, who seem all too aware of a certain
discrepancy between Novalis's image of Sophie and their impressions of the real-life
boisterous twelve-year-old. This suggests the way in which we have always already
begun to construct - to invent - the other even before the real-life mourning which
always already haunts the relationship. As Derrida puts it in Memoires, the 'within
me' and the 'within us':
ne surgissent et ne s'apparaissent pas avant cette experience terrible ou du
moins avant sa possibility effectivement ressentie, inscrite en nous, signee.
Leur sens et leur portee, ils ne les detiennent que de cette portee en eux de la
mort et de la memoire de 1'autre 56
The dream sequences in Ofterdingen, with all that dreams imply of inner life and the
workings of consciousness, are a clever way of portraying both the process of
invention, and they also convey the way in which the subject is always already
marked by the death of the other. Heinrich and Mathilde's relationship can be read as
a literary representation of the radically temporal ego which Novalis works out in the
philosophical studies. Heinrich's premonition of the death of his beloved corresponds
to Novalis's position in the philosophical studies, namely that the subject is not a
self-identical separate entity, anterior to the encounter with the other. In particular,
we will focus on the sequence in which Heinrich dreams ofMathilde's death. It is
highly significant that Heinrich dreams of the death of his beloved before her actual
death in the narrative. The scene is thus an excellent literary representation of this
invention of the other, its relation to mourning and death, and also the intervention of
56 Derrida, Memoires pour Paul de Man, p. 53.
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signs and supplements which invent the other while simultaneously preventing the
experience of otherness.
Yet without death, and the aphoristic separation of language, there is no
desire. Our relation with the other shares the movement of differance, which as
Derrida says in this quotation from De la grammatologie, opens the possibility of
desire:
La mort est le mouvement de la differance en tant qu'il est necessairement
fini. C'est dire que la differance rend possible l'opposition de la presence et
de l'absence. Sans la possibility de la differance, le desir de la presence
comme telle ne trouverait pas sa respiration. Cela veut dire du meme coup
que ce desir porte en lui le destin de son inassouvissement. La differance
produit ce qu'elle interdit, rend possible cela meme qu'elle rend impossible.57
In the previous chapter, we looked at 'L'aphorisme a contretemps', comparing its
aphoristic structure with the fragmentariness ofGerman Romantic texts. Derrida's
beautifully poetic reading ofRomeo and Juliet, as well as reminding us that the play
is perhaps the best-known love story of all, shows how it may be the best love story
of all, and not only for its motifs of traditional romantic love. The strange fate of the
'star-cross'd lovers' gives Derrida a wonderful way to trace the configuration which
links separation with desire, and death with language. As we saw in Chapter 3, their
tragedy is not an unfortunate accident but a necessary possibility. In missing each
other, twice, and surviving each one in turn to witness the 'death' of the other, their
story re-marks the essential impossibility of ever sharing the living present of the
other. I can never share the time of the other. But this separation is not to be
57
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mourned, because love cannot find its breathing space without this fundamental
separation between self and other:
J'aime parce que 1'autre est 1'autre, parce que son temps ne sera jamais le
mien. La duree vivante, la presence meme de son amour reste infiniment
eloignee de la mienne, eloignee d'elle meme dans ce qui la tend vers la
mienne, et celajusque dans ce que Ton voudrait decrire comme l'euphorie
amoureuse, la communion extatique, l'intuition mystique. Je ne peux aimer
l'autre que dans la passion de cet aphorisme. Celui-ci n'advient pas, il ne
survient pas comme le malheur, la malchance ou la negativite. II a la forme
CO
de l'affirmation la plus aimante - il est la chance du desir.
There would be no need for language without aphoristic separation - if I
could share the living present of the other, there would be no need to speak.
Language simultaneously promises and withholds the possibility of 'breaking the
mirror', of penetrating and reaching the other (side). The fact that, in Ofterdingen,
death is inscribed in Mathilde's relationship with Heinrich from the moment of their
first meeting has been used as proof of the absolutization of the love object or as an
indication of her status as mediator between the earthly and transcendental spheres.
However, I want to consider this dream - in which Heinrich foresees Mathilde's
death - in terms of the Derridean re-mark because the scene thematizes the way in
which death is already inscribed in language and always haunts our relationship to
the other. For Novalis and Derrida, separation - the idea of death - is always already
there in the relationship between self and other. Derrida often reflects upon the way
in which death haunts the proper name. My name will survive me. Juliet discovers to
her cost that 'Romeo' is not Romeo. In 'L'aphorisme a contretemps', Derrida
58
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highlights the terrible irony of Juliet's desire that Romeo 'doff his name'. She argues
that it names no part of him, is not him. But in the end it is Romeo who dies -
'Romeo' survives:
Romeo et Juliette sont des aphorismes, et d'abord dans leur nom qu'ils ne
sont pas (Juliet. 'Tis but thy name that is my enemy (...) Romeo. My name,
dear saint, is hateful to myself, /Because it is an enemy to thee: /Had I it
written, I would tear the word), car il n'y a pas d'aphorisme sans langage,
sans nomination, sans appellation, sans lettre meme a dechirer."9
And, as Derrida demonstrates in 'Signature Evenement Contexte', what makes
language language is the essential possibility that what I say and write may be
repeated after my death; separation and death are the very conditions of language. It
is death which makes the breaking of the mirror at once more necessary and more
difficult, more impossible, so to speak.
Breaking the Mirror
In 'Invention de 1'autre', Derrida employs the thematics of the mirror to elucidate the
double bind of our desire to speak to the other. In particular, his reading of Ponge's
poem 'Fable' demonstrates at the same time the similar paradox which structures the
self-referentiality of poetic language. Here is the complete text of'Fable':
39
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FABLE
Par le motpar commence done ce texte
Dont la premiere ligne dit la verite,
Mais ce tain sous l'une et l'autre
Peut-il etre tolere?
Cher lecteur deja tu juges
La de nos difficultes ...
(APRES sept ans de malheurs
Elle brisa son miroir).60
Derrida's discussion of the poem is at the same time a meditation on the recent death
ofPaul de Man. He reprises some of the questions of referentiality and the
specularity of language, which we dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3. His reading of
'Fable', dedicated to the memory of his friend, demonstrates that these questions are
inseparable from our desire to speak (to) the other. Derrida says:
On dirait dans un autre code que Fable pose en acte la question de la
reference, de la specularity du langage ou de la litterature, et de la possibility
de dire l'autre ou de parler a l'autre. Nous verrons comment elle le fait mais
des maintenant nous savons qu'il y va justement de la mort, de ce moment du
deuil ou le bris du miroir est a la fois le plus necessaire et le plus difficile. Le
plus difficile parce que tout ce que nous disons, faisons, pleurons, si tendus
que nous soyons vers Fautre, reste en nous. Une partie de nous est blessee et
e'est de nous que nous nous entretenons encore dans le travail du deuil et de
VErinnerung. Meme si cette metonymie de l'autre constituait deja la verite et
la possibility de notre rapport a l'autre vivant, la mort la manifeste dans un
plus de lumiere.61
The final dream scene in Heinrich von Ofterdingen (although certainly in less
economical fashion than Ponge's poem) also stages what Derrida describes above as
60 Francis Ponge, 'Fable', Ouevres (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), vol. 1, p. 114. Cited by Derrida, Psyche,
p. 19.
61
Derrida, Psyche, p. 20-21.
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the question of the possibility of stating the other or speaking to the other. We saw in
Chapter 2 that writing re-marks the essential power of death at the heart of living
speech, because it seems to be at an even further remove from the logos. Death,
being as it is inscribed right from the start in Mathilde and Heinrich's relationship, re¬
marks - or sheds 'more light' ('un plus de lumiere') on - the essential impossibility
of the coming together of self and living other. In the night which follows their first
meeting, Heinrich dreams that Mathilde is sitting in a canoe on a deep blue stream.
Significantly, we are told that she is floating on the 'glatte Flciche' and that 'ihr
himmlisches Gesichte spiegelte sich in den Wellen [my emphasis]':
Auf einmal fing der Kahn an sich umzudrehen. Er rief ihr angstlich zu. Sie
lachelte und legte das Ruder in den Kahn, der sich immerwahrend drehte.
Eine ungeheure Bangigkeit ergriff ihn. Er stiitzte sich in den Strom; aber er
konnte nicht fort, das Wasser trug ihn. Sie winkte, sie schien ihm etwas sagen
zu wollen, der Kahn schopfte schon Wasser; doch lachelte sie mit einer
unsaglichen Innigkeit, und sah heiter in den Wirbel hinein. Auf einmal zog es
sie hinunter. Eine leise Luft strich iiber den Strom, der ebenso ruhig und
glanzendflofi, wie vorher [my emphasis].62
This episode, which takes place entirely within Heinrich's dream, illustrates perfectly
the impossible desire to say something to the 'other in ourselves', and also to hear
something from the other. Derrida says: 'Tout ce que nous disons alors de l'ami, et
meme ce que nous lui disons, pour Tappeler, le rappeler, souffrir pour lui avec lui,
tout cela reste desesperement en nous ou entre nous les vivants, sans franchir le
miroir d'une certaine speculation.'63 We cannot fully traverse the mirror and reach
the other, the stream/mirror remains 'ebenso ruhig und glanzend wie vorher'. At this
point, Heinrich loses consciousness. When he awakes, he is under the stream but,
62 N I, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, p. 278.
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significantly, he is unaware that this is so - Mathilde has to point out the blue waves
overhead:
'Wo sind wir, liebe Mathilde?' - 'Bei unsern Eltern.' - 'Bleiben wir
zusammen?' - 'Ewig,' versetzte sie, indem sie ihre Lippen an die seinigen
driickte, und ihn so umschlofi, daB sie nicht wieder von ihm konnte. Sie sagte
ihm ein wunderbares geheimes Wort in den Mund, was sein ganzes Wesen
durchklang. Er wollte es wiederholen, als sein GroBvater rief, und er
aufwachte. Er hatte sein Leben darum geben mogen, das Wort noch zu
64
wissen.
Even in this dream-glimpse of the other side of the stream, we find ourselves
witnessing the enactment of a Derridean double bind. Here, the lovers appear to have
achieved what Heinrich describes in the love-dialogue as the 'geheimnisvolles
ZusammenflieBen unsers geheimsten und eigentiimlichsten Daseins' but it is only in
this dream-death where for the brief duration of a silent embrace words are no longer
necessary. But words come back and we see, after all, that the mirror of language is
not broken. Derrida, in his reading of 'Fable', suggests:
Car nous l'avons vu, si le deuil n'est pas annonce par le bris du miroir mais
survient comme le miroir lui-meme, s'il arrive avec la specularisation, le
miroir n'advient a lui-meme que par 1'intercession du mot'. C'est une
invention et une intervention du mot, et meme ici du mot 'mot'. [Here,
Derrida is referring to the first line of Ponge's poem, 'Par le mot par
commence done ce texte,'] Le mot lui-meme se reflechit dans le mot 'mot' et
dans le nom du nom. Le tain qui interdit la transparence et autorise
l'invention du miroir, c'est une trace de langue [...].65
Returning to Novalis, we see that the mirror of language, and with it life and longing,
are re-introduced when Mathilde says the 'wonderful secret word' into Heinrich's
64 N I, p. 279.
65 Derrida, Psyche, p. 31.
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mouth (not his ear), and though it resonates through his entire being, he awakens
immediately and the living, waking Heinrich cannot remember it. 'Er hatte sein
Leben darum geben mogen, das Wort noch zu wissen.' And, in fact, he would have
to die in order to know the word. And so the novel continues. The impossibility of
ever knowing the secret word of the other is the condition of life and of language.
The gap between self and other, like the gap between word and meaning, is what




As we have seen, both Romanticism and poststructuralism question the idea that a
text can or should be closed neatly and definitively. Nevertheless, we can - without
promising to be neat or definitive - try to draw together some of the findings which
emerge from the direct comparison of a Romantic writer with a poststructuralist. To
do so, though, we must return to the beginning and consider once more the either/or
approaches to reading which have tended to characterize past discussions of the
modernity of Romanticism. In the introduction, I took Nicholas Saul's remarks on
the relationship between Romanticism and postmodernism as a starting point. Saul's
argument entails setting up a clear alternative: the Romantic is suffused with
'longing for metaphysical plenitude' while the postmodern writer operates in the full
awareness of 'metaphysical void.' The two positions are regarded as mutually
exclusive. According to such an interpretation, a Romantic poet like Novalis must, in
the end, be so utterly different from a postmodern theorist like Derrida that attempts
to identify similarities between them can only be regarded as, at best, extremely
difficult, and, at worst, redundant. However, as I have shown, the very opposition set
up by Saul is itself guaranteed to maintain an unbridgeable gap between
Romanticism and poststructuralism. It is by no means so clear-cut when we come to
actual Romantic and poststructuralist texts - texts such as those I have read in this
study.
In the first chapter we saw that Novalis's outline of a 'de-centred' ego,
constantly changing in the flow of time, reveals remarkable affinities with Derridean
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thinking on temporality: time, for Derrida, is what constitutes the differance of
language as much as it does the signs and supplements which make possible the
subject's relation to itself. And in more general terms, the discussion of the
philosophy of consciousness demonstrates parallels between Romanticism and
deconstruction when it comes to addressing the concerns of traditional metaphysics.
Novalis's questioning of the attempts of his contemporaries such as Fichte to locate
the absolute foundation ofphilosophy is analogous to Derrida's subversion of
philosophy's desire to domesticate the absolutely other in 'violent' prepositional
discourse. Apart from striking linguistic resonances in the ways in which they both
express their resistance to metaphysics, perhaps the most important similarity
between the two writers is manifest in their attention to paradox and aporia. Novalis
attitude is best summed up when he asks:
Sollte das hochste Princip das hochste Paradoxon in seiner Aufgabe
enthalten? Ein Satz seyn, der schlechterdings keinen Frieden lieBe - der
immer anzoge, und abstieBe - immer von neuen unverstandlich wiirde, so oft
man ihn auch schon verstanden hatte? Der unsre Thatigkeit unaufhorlich rege
machte - ohne sie je zu ermiiden, ohne sie je gewohnt zu werden?1
Novalis's insistence on an impossible yet necessary absolute is a paradox which
excites further thought and reflection. In Derrida's words, such a paradox can
provoke the 'thinking of the path': l'experience de l'aporie [...] donne ou promet la
pensee du chemin, provoque a penser la possibility meme de ce qui reste encore
r • • • 2
impensable ou impense, voire impossible.
1 N II, pp. 523-24, 'Logologische Fragmente', no. 9.
2
Derrida, Memoirespour Paul de Man (Paris: Galilee, 1988), pp. 129-30.
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Moving on in the second chapter to examine literature and philosophy as
specific forms of discourse, we saw that both Novalis and Derrida reject the
assumption that a clear distinction can be drawn between literary and philosophical
writing. We found that early Romanticism's desire to address philosophy's failure to
accommodate the notion of the absolute has led to a particular conception of
literature. This new literature shares features of both philosophy and literature, as
well as what we have come to call 'literary theory'. Like modern theory, in particular
poststructuralist theory, Romantic literature operates in a self-questioning mode and
its self-referentiality, fragmentariness and eschewal of closure articulate the
necessary incompatibility of language and the absolutely other. Our reading of
Novalis's 'Monolog' revealed affinities with Derridean thinking on language and the
subject's control over language, as well as providing an example of how the textual
articulation of paradox can give rise to the never-ending undecidability characteristic
of Romantic literature.
Further examination ofNovalis's and Derrida's strategies for evading or
problematizing closure form the main focus of Chapter 3. We saw that the
Romantics' preference for fragmentary texts draws attention to the necessary and
constitutive incompleteness of all linguistic formulations. To the same end, Derrida
not only strives to 're-mark' the textuality of his own texts but also admires writers
like Kafka and Mallarme who do the same. For both Novalis and Derrida, only
language which plays with its status as language has a chance of respecting the
alterity of the Other which cannot be made a direct object of discourse. The final
chapter was concerned to show how these questions of respect for alterity extend
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beyond literature to describe our relationships with other people. For both Derrida
and Novalis, the paradoxical simultaneity of invention of the other and respect for its
radical alterity constitutes our relationships with those whom we love.
What links the themes of all four chapters is the significance accorded to
paradox in the thought of both Novalis and Derrida. Each chapter encounters
different manifestations of the same paradoxical situation. Any absolute - be it total
self-presence, the neat closure of the text upon itself, or perfect communion with the
Other - would (even if it were possible) mean the end of language, philosophy, time
and desire. Derrida expresses succinctly the aporia or double bind in which we find
ourselves: 'Plenitude is the end (the goal), but were it attained, it would be the end
(death).' And Novalis says in the 'Fichte-Studien': 'Es konnen goldne Zeiten
erscheinen - aber sie bringen nicht das Ende der Dinge - das Ziel des Menschen ist
nicht die goldne Zeit.'4 But this in no way gives us licence to dismiss all references
to transcendence and fulfilment; on the contrary, as I have demonstrated, these play
an important role in the works of both Derrida and Novalis. Each in his own way,
both writers acknowledge that it is the impossibility of coincidence between
discourse and the absolute which keeps alive the desire to think, read and write. And
only the unattainability of perfect communion between self and other can give love
its breathing space.
Readings which are governed by alternatives such as 'longing for
plenitude/awareness of metaphysical void' are radically unfaithful in that they simply
3 Derrida, 'Afterword: Toward an Ethic ofDiscussion', Limited Inc, trans, by Samuel Weber
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 129.
4 N II, p. 269, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 565.
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cannot reveal the paradoxes which structure the texts ofNovalis and Derrida. Such
readings, therefore, cannot do justice to the complexity of their texts. This also
applies to Paul de Man's argument that the Romantic writer can be read as either
'ironist' or 'mystified self. It is important to note that, for readings which eschew
either/or alternatives, it is not a matter of combining or conflating the 'either' and the
'or' in order to achieve a kind ofHegelian sublation of differences. It is, rather, a
certain willingness to allow the 'either' and the 'or' to remain open and eternally
linked by the logic of the aporia. Such a willingness can certainly be attributed to
Novalis, a writer who argues that paradox is necessary and displays at times a real
delight in allowing a paradox to remain without attempting to achieve a final
synthesis. Derrida, as we saw, sometimes describes deconstruction as an
'aporetologie', and the importance he places on aporia has helped shed more light on
Novalis's insistence on the irresolvable nature of paradox. Like the other German
Romantics, Novalis finds the word 'Schweben' useful for conveying the idea of an
irresolvable tension between alternatives:
Alles Seyn, Seyn iiberhaupt ist nichts als Freyseyn - Schweben zwischen
Extremen, die nothwendig zu vereinigen und nothwendig zu trennen sind.
Aus diesem Lichtpunct des Schwebens stromt alle Realitat aus.5
The texts of both Novalis and Derrida operate in a state of profound tension.
Both writers are content to 'endure' aporias without seeking definitive synthesis or
resolution. The concept of a paradoxical relation to that which cannot be finally
articulated is of central importance for any reading which seeks to bring together
5 N II, p. 266, 'Fichte-Studien', no. 555.
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Romanticism and poststructuralism. Tracing the paradoxical formulations in his texts
suggests that the image ofNovalis - the poet of the Blue Flower, yearning for the
unreachable absolute - is simply inadequate in the face of his repeated insistence on
an impossible yet necessary absolute, what he describes as 'eine nothwendige
Fiction'.6 The perception of the Romantic poet 'yearning for metaphysical
plenitude' is analogous to the one-sided interpretations ofDerrida which are
commonplace in literary criticism today. Derrida's fascinating analyses of the signs
and supplements which constitute both language and the ways in which we come to
know ourselves and others have led to his being condemned as a sceptic, who insists
on the 'prison walls of language' and takes an 'evil' pleasure in mocking a whole
tradition. And yet, as we have seen again and again throughout this thesis, his
rigorous analyses by no means preclude an interest in that which lies beyond
language and an insistence upon our ethical obligation to respect the alterity and
autonomy of the Other.
One of the most important conclusions to be drawn from a comparison of
Novalis and Derrida, then, is that 'either/or' approaches to reading are simply
inadequate when it comes to appreciating not only their proximity to each other but
also the complexity of their texts themselves. And, in a sense, this is a two-pronged
conclusion. Firstly, to see the Romantic writer as yearning for absolute plenitude is to
underestimate the complexity of the Romantics' thinking on subjectivity, language
and literature and, indeed, on the interrelation between all three. But this is only half
the story because Derrida, the postmodern writer, must be painted as a sceptic or
6 N II, p. 179,'Fichte-Studien', no. 234.
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nihilist in order to maintain the gulf between Romanticism and postmodernism and
avoid disturbing the neatness of the opposition. I have demonstrated in this thesis
that readings which adhere too strictly to black-and-white alternatives cannot be
attuned to the contradictions and paradoxes through which, to put it in the very
simplest terms, Novalis's 'scepticism' is every bit as apparent as Derrida's interest in
that Other which always already escapes language.
Thinking beyond the scope of this study: readings which complicate an
either/or approach and pay attention instead to Romantic paradoxes have a wider
relevance for the debate on the modernity of Romanticism, and can tell us something
about where we find ourselves in relation to the Romantic era. It cannot be denied
that Novalis and other early Romantics, such as Friedrich Schlegel, refer unceasingly
to notions such as the infinite and the absolute. Given the preponderance in their
work of images relating to the golden age, it is easy to see how the image of the
Romantic poet, who longs for plenitude and yearns for mystical transcendent
communion, has come to be an established critical truth and, as we have seen, a very
persistent one. However, as I have argued, such a reading threatens to overlook a
vitally important aspect of Romanticism. Even without the insights or critical
terminology of poststructuralism, we can read these ciphers of transcendence -
golden age, the infinite, the absolute and related concepts - as explicitly fictional
constructs in the works of both Novalis and Schlegel.
Ultimately, then, my direct comparison of a Romantic with a poststructuralist
complicates and disturbs what Culler describes as the 'historical scheme that
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contrasts romantic with post-romantic literature and sees the latter as a sophisticated
or ironical demystification of the excesses and delusions of the former'.7 Reading
Novalis and Derrida together, paying attention to the paradoxes which structure their
texts, we can no longer in all rigour subscribe to such a clear distinction between 'us'
and 'them'. It is by no means certain that, when placed next to the Romantics, we
will always find ourselves and our literary theory in the position of greatest
awareness and self-awareness.
7 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism (London: Routledge
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1. Aphorisme est le nom.
2. Comme son nom l'indique, l'aphorisme separe, il marque la dissociation (apo), il
termine, delimite, arrete (orizo). II met fin en separant, il separe pour
finir — definir.
3. Aphorisme est un nom mais tour nom peut prendre figure d'aphorisme.
4. Un aphorisme expose a contretemps. II expose le discours - le livre a contretemps.
Litteralement - parce qu'il abandonne une parole a sa lettre.
(Ceci pourrait deja se lire comme une serie d'aphorismes, l'alea d'une premiere anachronie.
Au commencement, il y eut le contretemps. Au commencement, il y a la vitesse. La parole et
facte sontpris de vitesse. L'aphorisme gagne de vitesse.)
5. Abandonner la parole, confier le secret a des lettres, c'est le stratageme du tiers, le
mediateur, le Frere, le marieur qui, sans autre desir que le desir des
autres, organise le contretemps. II compte sur des lettres sans compter avec elles:
In the mean time, against thou shalt awake,
Shall Romeo by my letters know our drift,
And hither shall he come...
6. Malgre les apparences, un aphorisme n'arrive jamais seul, il ne vient pas tout seul. II
appartient a une logique serielle. Comme dans la piece de Shakespeare,
dans la profondeur en trompe-l'oeil de ses paradigmes, tous les Romeo et Juliette qui font
precedee, il y aura ici plusieurs series d'aphorismes.
7. Romeo et Juliette, les heros du contretemps dans notre mythologie, les heros positifs.
lis se sont manques, comme il se sonts manques! Se sont-ils
manques? Mais ils ont aussi survecu, et tous deux, et I'un a I'autre survecu, dans leur nom,
par un effet savant du contretemps: croisement malheureux, par chance, de series
temporelles et aphoristiques.
8. Par aphorisme, il faut dire que Romeo et Juliette auront, par aphorisme, vecu, et
survecu. Romeo et Juliette doit tout a l'aphorisme. Celui-ci peut devenir,
sans doute, procede de rhetorique, le calcul retors en vue de la plus grande autorite,
une economie ou une strategic de la maitrise qui s'entend a potentialiser le sens
('voyez comme je formalise, j'en dis toujours plus qu'il n'y parait en si peu de mots').
Mais avant de se laisser ainsi manipuler, l'aphorisme nous livre sans defense a
1'experience meme du contretemps. Avant tout calcul mais aussi a travers lui, au-dela
du calculable meme.
9. L'aphorisme ou le discours de la dissociation: chaque phrase, chaque paragraphe se
voue a la separation, il s'enferme, qu'on le veuille ou non, dans
la solitude de sa duree propre. Sa rencontre et son contact avec l'autre se livrent
toujours a la chance, a ce qui tombe, bien ou mal. Rien n'y est absolument assure, ni
1'enchaTnement ni l'ordre. Un aphorisme de la serie peut arriver avant ou apres
l'autre, avant et apres 1'autre, chacun peut survivre a l'autre - et dans l'autre serie.
Romeo et Juliette sont des aphorismes, et d'abord dans leur nom qu'ils ne sont pas
(Juliet. T/.v but thy name that is my enemy (...) Romeo. My name, dear saint, is
hateful to myself /Because it is an enemy to thee: /Had I it written, I would tear the
word), car il n'y a pas d'aphorisme sans langage, sans nomination, sans appellation,
sans lettre meme a dechirer.
10. Chaque aphorisme, comme Romeo et Juliette, chaque serie aphoristique a sa duree
propre. Sa logique temporelle l'empeche de partager tout son temps
avec un autre lieu du discours, avec un autre discours, avec le discours de l'autre.
Synchronisation impossible. Je parle ici du discours du temps, de ses marques, de ses
dates, du cours du temps et de la digression essentielle qui disloque le temps des
desirs, et deporte le pas de ceux qui s'aiment. Mais cela ne suffit pas a caracteriser
notre aphorisme, il ne suffit pas qu'il y ait dissociation, dislocation, anachronie pour
que l'aphorisme ait lieu. 11 lui faut encore une forme determinee, un certain mode.
Lequel? Le mauvais aphorisme, le mauvais de l'aphorisme est sentencieux, mais tout
aphorisme tranche par son caractere de sentence: il dit la verite dans la forme du
jugement dernier, et cette verite porte la mort. L'arret de mort, pour Romeo et Juliette,
c'est un contretemps qui les condamne a mort, l'un et l'autre, mais aussi un
contretemps qui arrete la mort, en suspend la venue, assure a tous deux le delai
necessaire pour assister et survivre a la mort de l'autre.
11. L'aphorisme: ce qui livre les rendez-vous au hasard. Mais le desir ne s'expose pas a
l'aphorisme par hasard. II n'y a pas de temps pour le desir sans
l'aphorisme. Ce dont Romeo et Juliette font l'experience, c'est l'anachronie
exemplaire, l'impossibilite essentielle d'aucune synchronisation absolue. Mais ils
vivent, et nous, en meme temps, ce desordre des series. Disjonction, dislocation,
separation des lieux, deploiement ou espacement d'une histoire a cause de
l'aphorisme, y aurait-il du theatre sans cela? La survie d'une oeuvre theatrale suppose
que, theatralement, elle dise quelque chose du theatre meme, de sa possibility
essentielle. Et qu'elle le fasse, theatralement done, par le jeu de l'unique et de la
repetition, en donnant lieu chaque fois a la chance d'un evenement absolument
singulier comme a l'idiome intraduisible d'un nom propre, a sa fatalite (f'ennemi'
que 'je hais'), a la fatalite d'une date et d'un rendez-vous. Les dates, les calendriers,
les cadastres, les toponymies, tous les codes que nous jetons sur le temps et l'espace
comme des filets pour reduire ou maTtriser les differences, pour les arreter, les
determiner, ce sont aussi des pieges contretemps. Destines a eviter les contretemps, a
accorder nos rhythmes en les pliant a la mesure objective, ils produisent le
malentendu, accumulent les occasions de faux pas ou de fausses manoeuvres, revelent
et accroissent a la fois cette anachronie des desirs: dans le meme temps. Quel est ce
temps? II n'y a pas de place pour une question dans 1'aphorisme.
12. Romeo et Juliette, la conjonction de deux desirs aphoristiques mais tenus
ensemble, maintenus dans le maintentant disloque d'un amour ou d'une
promesse. D'une promesse dans leur nom, mais a travers et au-dela de leur nom
donne, la promesse d'un autre nom, sa demande plutot: 'O be some other name...'
Le et de cette conjonction, le theatre de ce 'et', on l'a souvent presente, represente
comme la scene du contretemps fortuit, de l'anachronie aleatoire: le rendez-vous
manque, l'accident malheureux, la lettre qui n'arrive pas a destination, le temps du
detour prolonge pour une purloined letter, le remede qui se transforme en poison
quand le stratageme d'un tiers, d'un frere, le Frere Laurence, propose a la fois le
remede et la lettre (And ifthou dar'st, I'll give thee remedy... (...) In the mean time,
against thou shalt awake, /Shall Romeo by my letters know our drift, /And hither
shall he come...). Cette representation n'est pas fausse. Mais si ce drame s'est ainsi
imprime, surimprime dans la memoire de l'Europe, texte par-dessus texte, c'est que
l'accident anachronique vient illustrer une impossibility essentielle. II deconcerte une
logique philosophique, celle qui voudrait que les accidents restent ce qu'ils sont,
accidentels. Cette logique, du meme coup, rejette dans l'impensable une anachronie
de structure, 1'interruption absolue de l'histoire en tant que deploiement d'une
temporalite, d'une temporalite une et organisee. Ce qui arrive a Romeo et Juliette n'a
pas rencontre par hasard le poison, le contretemps ou le detour de la lettre. Pour que
cette rencontre ait lieu, il fallait avoir deja institue un systeme de marques (les noms,
les heures, les cartes des lieux, les dates et les toponymies dites 'objectives') pour
contrecarrer, si on peut dire, la dispersion des durees interieures et heterogenes, pour
cadrer, organiser, mettre de l'ordre, rendre possible un rendez-vous: autrement dit
pour denier, en en prenant acte, la non-coYncidence, la separation des monades, la
distance infinie, la deconnexion des experiences, la multiplicity des mondes, tout ce
qui rend possible un contretemps ou le detour irremediable d'une lettre. Mais le desir
de Romeo et Juliette est ne au coeur de cette possibility. II n'y aurait pas eu d'amout,
le serment n'aurait pas eu lieu, ni le temps, ni son theatre sans la discordance. Le
contretemps accidentel vient remarquer le contretemps essentiel. Autant dire qu'il
n'est pas accidentel. II n'a pas, pour autant, la signification d'une essence ou d'une
structure formelle. Ce n'est pas la condition de possibility abstraite, une forme
universelle du rapport a l'autre en general, une dialectique du desir ou des
consciences. Plutot la singularity d'une imminence dont la 'point aceree' aiguillonne
le desir a sa naissance - la naissance meme du desir. J'aime parce que l'autre est
l'autre, parce que son temps ne sera jamais le mien. La duree vivante, la presence
meme de son amour reste infiniment eloignee de la mienne, eloignee d'elle meme
dans ce qui la tend vers la mienne, et cela jusque dans ce que l'on voudrait decrire
comme l'euphorie amoureuse, la communion extatique, l'intuition mystique. Je ne
peux aimer l'autre que dans la passion de cet aphorisme. Celui-ci n'advient pas, il ne
survient pas comme le malheur, la malchance ou la negativite. II a la forme de
1'affirmation la plus aimante - il est la chance du desir. Et il ne coupe pas seulement
dans l'etoffe des durees, il espace. Le contretemps dit quelque chose de la topologie
ou du visible, il ouvre le theatre.
13. Inversement, pas de contretemps, pas d'aphorisme sans la promesse d'un
maintent commun, sans le serment, le voeu de synchronic, le partage desire
d'un present vivant. Pour que le partage soit desire, ne doit-il pas etre d'abord donne,
entrevu, apprehende? Mais le partage, c'est justement un autre nom de l'aphorisme.
14. Cette serie aphoristique en croise une autre. Parce qu'il trace, l'aphorisme
survit, il vit plus longtemps que son present et il vit plus que la vie. Arret de
mort. II donne et porte la mort, mais pour en decider ainsi d'un arret, il la suspend, il i'arrete
encore.
15. II n'y aurait pas le contretemps, ni l'anachronie, si la separation entre les
monades disjoignait seulement des interiorites. Le contretemps se produit a
1'intersection entre l'experience interieure (la 'phenomenologie de la conscience intime du
temps' ou de l'espace) et ses marques chronologiques ou topographiques, celles qu'on dit
'objectives', 'dans le monde'. II n'y aurait pas de series autrement, sans la possibility de cet
espacement marque, avec ses conventions sociales et l'histoire de ses codes, avec ses
fictions et ses simulacres, avec ses dates. Avec les noms dits propres.
16. Le simulacre leve le rideau, il revele, grace a la dissociation des series, le
theatre de l'impossible: deux etres se survivent tous deux l'un a l'autre. Le
certitude absolue qui regne sur le duel (Romeo et Juliette est la mise en scene de tous les
duels), c'est que l'un doit mourir avant 1'autre. L'un doit voir mourir l'autre. A n'importe
qui je dois pouvoir dire: puisque nous sommes deux, nous savons de fafon absolument
ineluctable que l'un de nous mourra avant l'autre. L'un de nous verra l'autre mourir, l'un de
nous survivra, ne fut-ce qu'un instant. L'un de nous, l'un de nous, 1'un de nous seulement,
portera la mort de l'autre - et son deuil. II est impossible que nous survivions tous deux l'un
a l'autre. Voila le duel, 1'axiomatique de tout duel, la scene la plus commune et la moins
dite - ou la plus interdite - de notre rapport a l'autre. Or I'impossible a lieu, non pas dans la
'realite-objective' qui n'a pas ici la parole, mais dans l'experience de Romeo et Juliette. Et
sous la loi du serment, celle qui preside a toute parole donnee. lis vivent tour a tour la mort
de l'autre, pendant un temps, le contretemps de leur mort. lis portent tous deux le deuil - et
veillent tous deux sur la mort de l'autre. Double arret de mort. Romeo meurt avant Juliette
qu'il a vu morte. lis vivent, survivent tous deux la morte de l'autre.
17. L'impossible - ce theatre de la double survie - dit aussi, comme tout
aphorisme, la verite. Des le serment qui lie deux desirs, chacun porte deja le
deuil de l'autre, lui confie sa mort aussi: si tu meurs avant moi, je te garderai, si je meurs
avant toi, tu me porteras en toi, l'un gardera l'autre, l'aura deja garde depuis la premiere
declaration. Cette double interiorisation ne serait possible ni dans l'interiorite monadique ni
dans la logique de l'espace ou du temps 'objectifs'. Elle a pourtant lieu chaques fois que
j'aime. Tout alors commence par cette survie. Chaque fois que j'aime ou chaque fois que je
hais, chaque fois qu'une loi m'engage envers la mort de l'autre. Et c'est la meme, la meme
double loi. Un gage peut toujours s'inverser qui garde la mort.
18. Telle serie d'aphorismes en croise une autre, la meme sous d'autres noms, sous le
nom du nom. Romeo et Juliette s'aiment a travers leur nom, malgre
leur nom, ils meurent a cause de leur nom, ils survivent dans leur nom. Puisqu'il n'y a ni
desir ni serment ni lien sacre (sacramentum) sans la separation aphoristique, le plus grand
amour nait de la plus grande force de dissociation, celle qui oppose et divise les deux
families en leur nom. Romeo et Juliette portent ces noms. Ils les portent, les supportent
meme s'ils ne veulent pas les assumer. De ce nom qui les separe, mais qui aura du meme
coup tendu leur desir de toute sa force aphoristique, ils voudraient se separer. Mais la
declaration la plus vibrante de leur amour appelle encore le nom qu'elle denonce. On
pourrait etre tente de distinguer ici, autre aphorisme, entre le prenom propre et le nom de
famille qui ne serait nom propre que dans l'element de la generality ou de la classification
genealogique. On pourrait etre tente de distinguer Romeo de Montaigu et Juliette de
Capulet. Peut-etre sont-ils, l'un et l'autre, tentes de le faire. Mais ils ne le font pas, et on doit
remarquer que dans la denonciation du nome (acte II, scene 2), ils s'en prennent aussi a leur
prenom, du moins a celui de Romeo, qui semble faire partie du nom de famille. Le prenom
porte encore le nom du pere, il rappelle la loi de la genealogie. Romeo lui-meme, le porteur
du nom n'est pas le nom, c'est Romeo, le nom qu'il porte. Et faut-il appeler le porteur par le
nom qu'il porte? Elle I'appelle pour lui dire: je t'aime, delivre-nous de ton nom, Romeo, ne
le porte plus, Romeo, le nom de Romeo:
JULIET.
O Romeo, Romeo! Wherefore art thou Romeo
Deny thyfather, and refuse thy name;
Or, ifyou will not, be but sworn my love,
And I'll no longer be a Capulet.
Elle parle alors dans la nuit et rien ne l'assure qu'elle s'adresse a Romeo lui-meme, present
en personne. Pour demander a Romeo de refuser son nom, elle ne peut, en son absence, que
s'adresser a son nom ou a son ombre. Romeo - lui-meme - est dans l'ombre et il se
demande s'il est temps de la prendre au mot ou s'il doit encore attendre. La prendre au mot,
ce sera s'engager a se deprendre de son nom, un peu plus tard. Pour l'instant, il decide
d'attendre et d'ecouter encore:
ROMEO (aside).
Shall I hear more, or shall I speak at this?
JULIET.
'Tis but thy name that is my enemy;
Thou art thyself though, not a Montague
What's a Montague? it is nor hand, norfoot,
Nor arm, nor face, nor any otherpart
Belonging to a man. O! be some other name.
What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
Retain that dearperfection which he owes
Without that title. Romeo, doffthy name;
Andfor that name, which is no part of thee,
Take all myself.
ROMEO.
I take thee at thy word.
Call me but love, and I'll be new baptiz'd
Henceforth I never will be Romeo.
JULIET.
What man art thou, that, thus bescreen'd in night;
So stumblest on my counsel?
ROMEO.
By a name
I kriow not how to tell thee who I am:
My name, dear saint, is hateful to myself,
Because it is an enemy to thee:
Had I it written, I would tear the word.
JULIET.
My ears have not yet drunk a hundred words
Ofthat tongue's uttering, yet I know the sound:
Art thou not Romeo, and a Montague?
ROMEO.
Neither, fair maid, ifeither thee dislike.
19. Quand elle s'adresse a Romeo dans la nuit, quand elle lui demande '0 Romeo!
pourquoi es-tu Romeo? Renie ton pere et refuse ton nom', elle semble
s'addresser a lui, lui-meme, a Romeo porteur du nom Romeo, a celui qui n'est pas Romeo
puisqu'il lui est demande de renier son pere et son nom. Elle semble done l'appeler au-dela
de son nom. Or il n'est pas present, elle n'est sure qu'il soit la, lui-meme, au-dela de son
nom, c'est la nuit et cette nuit abrite l'indistinction entre le nom et le porteur du nom. C'est
dans son nom qu'elle l'appelle encore, et qu'elle Pappelle a ne plus s'appeler Romeo, et
qu'elle lui demande, a lui Romeo, de renier son nom. Mais c'est, quoi qu'elle dise ou denie,
lui qu'elle aime. Qui, lui? Romeo. Celui qui s'appelle Romeo, le porteur du nom, qui
s'appelle Romeo bien qu'il ne soit seulement celui qui porte ce nom et bien qu'il existe,
sans etre visible ou present dans la nuit, hors de son nom.
20. La nuit. Tout ce qui se passe la nuit, pour Romeo et Juliette, se decide plutot dans la
penombre, entre la nuit et le jour. L'indecision entre Romeo et le porteur de ce nom,
entre 'Romeo', le nom de Romeo et Romeo lui-meme. Theatre c'est, dit-on, la visibilite, la
scene. Ce theatre-ci appartient a la nuit parce qu'il met en scene ce qui ne se voit pas, le
nom; il met en scene ce qu'on appelle parce qu'on ne voit pas ou n'est pas assure de voir ce
qu'on appelle. Theatre du nom, theatre de nuit. Le nom appelle au-dela de la presence, du
phenomene, de la lumiere, au-dela du jour, au-dela du theatre. II garde, d'ou le deuil et la
survie, ce qui n'est plus present, l'invisible: ce qui desormais ne verra plus le jour.
21. Elle veut la mort de Romeo. Elle 1'aura. La mort de son nom ('Tis but thy name that
is my enemy), certes, la mort de 'Romeo', mais ils ne pourront pas
se deprendre de leur nom, ils le savent sans le savoir. Elle declare la guerre a
'Romeo', a son nom, en son nom, elle ne gagnera cette guerre qu'a la mort de Romeo,
lui-meme. Lui-meme? Qui? Romeo. Mais 'Romeo' n'est pas Romeo. Justement. Elle
veut la mort de 'Romeo'. Romeo meurt. 'Romeo' survit. Elle le garde mort dans son
nom. Qui? Juliette, Romeo.
22. L'aphorisme: la separation dans le langage, et en lui par le nom qui ferme
l'horizon. L'aphorisme est a la fois necessaire et impossible. Romeo est
radicalement separe de son nom. Lui, lui-meme vivant, desir vivant et singulier, il n'est pas
'Romeo'; mais la separation, l'aphorisme du nom reste impossible. II meurt sans son nom
mais il meurt aussi parce qu'il n'a pu se delivrer de son nom, ou de son pere, encore moins
le renier, repondre a la demande de Juliette (Deny thyfather, and refuse thy name).
23. Quand elle lui dit: mon ennemi, c'est seulement ton nom, elle ne pense pas
'mon' ennemi. Elle-meme, Juliette, elle n'a rien contre le nom de Romeo.
C'est le nom qu'elle porte (Juliette et Capulet) qui se trouver en guerre avec le nom de
Romeo. La guerre a lieu entre les noms. Et quand elle dit cela, elle n'est pas sure, dans la
nuit, d'atteindre Romeo lui-meme. Elle lui parle, elle le suppose distinct de son nom
puisqu'elle s'adresse a lui pour lui dire: 'Tu es toi-meme, non un Montaigu.' Mais il n'est
pas la. Du moins ne peut-elle s'assure de sa presence. C'est en elle, en son for interieur, que
dans la nuit elle s'adresse a lui, mais encore a lui dans son nom, et dans la forme la plus
exclamative de 1'apostrophe: O Romeo, Romeo! wherefore art thou Romeo? Elle de lui dit
pas: pourquoi t'appelles-tu Romeo, pourquoi portes-tu ce nom (comme un vetement, un
ornement, un signe detachable)? Elle lui dit: pourquoi es-tu Romeo? Elle le sait: si
detachable et si dissociable, si aphoristique soit-il, son nom est son essence. Inseparable de
son etre. Et en lui demandant de se departir de son nom, elle lui demande sans doute de
vivre enfin, et de vivre son amour (car pour vivre vraiment soi-meme, il faut echapper a la
loi du nom, a la loi familiale faite pour la survie et me rappelant sans cesse a la mort) mais
elle lui demande aussi bien de mourir, car sa vie est son nom. II existe dans son nom:
wherefore art thou Romeo? O Romeo, Romeo! Romeo est Romeo, et Romeo n'est pas
Romeo. II n'est lui-meme qu'a se departir de son nom, il n'est lui-meme que dans son nom.
Romeo ne peut s'appeler lui-meme que s'il departit de son nom, il ne s'appelle qu'dpartir
de son nom. Arret de mort et de survie: deux fois plutot qu'une.
24. Parlant a celui qu'elle aime en elle et hors d'elle, dans la penombre, Juliette
murmure la plus implacable analyse du nom. Du nom et du nom propre. Implacable:
elle dit la sentence, I'arret de inort, la verite fatale du nom. Impitoyablement elle analyse,
element par element. Qu'est-ce que Montaigu? Rien de toi, tu es toi-meme et non Montaigu,
lui dit-elle. Non seulement ce nom ne dit rien de toi en totalite mais il ne dit rien, il ne
nomme meme pas une partie de toi, ni la main, ni le pied, ni le bras, ni le visage, rien qui
soit humain! Cette analyse est implacable car elle annonce ou denonce l'inhumanite ou
l'anhumanite du nom. Un nom propre ne nomme rien qui soit humain, qui appartienne a un
corps humain, une ame humaine, une essence de l'homme. Et pourtant ce rapport a
l'inhumain d'advient qu'a l'homme, pour lui, chez lui, au nom de l'homme. Seul il se donne
ce nom inhumain. Et Romeo ne serait pas ce qu'il est, etranger a son nom, sans ce nom.
Juliette poursuit alors son analyse: le nom des choses n'appartient pas plus aux choses que
le nom des hommes n'appartient aux hommes, et pourtant il en est autrement separable.
Exemple de la rose, une fois de plus. Une rose reste ce qu'elle est sans son nom, Romeo
n'est plus ce qu'il est sans son nom. Mais Juliette fait comme si, pour un temps, Romeo
pouvait ne rien perdre en perdant son nom: comme la rose. Sois comme une rose, lui dit-elle
en somme, et sans genealogie, 'sans pourquoi'. (A supposer que la rose, toutes les roses de
la pensee, de la litterature, de la mystique, cette 'formidable anthologie', absente de tout
bouquet...)
25. Elle ne lui demande pas de perdre tout nom, seulement de changer de nom: O! be
some other name. Mais cela peut vouloir dire deux choses: prends un autre
nom propre (un nom humain, cette chose inhumaine qui n'appartient qu'a l'homme);
on bien: prends une autre sorte de nom, un nom qui ne soit pas un nom d'homme,
prends done un nom de chose, un nom commun qui, comme le nom de la rose, n'ait
pas cette inhumanite qui consiste a affecter l'etre meme de qui le porte alors qu'il ne
nomme rien de lui. Et apres les deux points, e'est la question:
O! be some other name.
What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
Retain that dearperfection which he owes
Without that title.
26. Le nom ne serait qu'un 'titre', et le titre n'est pas la chose qu'il nomme, pas
plus qu'un titre de noblesse ne prend part a cela meme, la famille, l'oevre, a qui on
le dit appartenir. Romeo et Juliette reste aussi le titre - survivant - de toute une famille de
pieces de theatre. Ce qui se passe dans ces pieces, nous devons le dire aussi des pieces, de
leur genealogie, de leur idiome, de leur singularity, de leur survie.
27. Juliette propose a Romeo un marche infini, le contrat en apparence le plus
dissymetrique: tu peux tout gagner sans rien perdre, question de nom. En
renon?ant a ton nom, tu ne renonces a rien, rien de toi, de toi-meme, ni rien
d'humain. En echange, et sans avoir rien perdu, tu me gagnes, et non seulement une
partie de moi, mais moi toute entiere: Romeo, doffthy name; /Andfor that name,
which is nopart ofthee, / Take all myself. II aura tout gagne, il aura tout perdu: le
nom et la vie, et Juliette.
28. Le cercle de tous ces noms en o: words, Romeo, rose, love. II a accepte le
marche, il la prend au mot (/ take thee at thy word) au momen oil elle lui
propose de la prendre tout entiere (Take all myself). Jeu de l'idiome: en te prenant au mot,
en relevant le defi, en acceptant cet echange incroyable, impayable, je te prends tout entiere.
Et contre rien, contre un mot, mon nom, qui n'est rien, rien d'humain, rien de moi, sinon
rien pour moi. Je ne donne rien en te prenant au mot, je n'abandonne rien et te prends tout
entiere. En verite, et ils connaissent tous deux la verite de l'aphorisme, il perdra tout. lis
perdront tout dans cette aporie, cette double aporie du nom propre. Et pour avoir accepte
d'echanger le nom propre de Romeo contre un nom commun: non pas celui de rose, mais
celui de love. Car Romeo ne renonce pas a tout nom, seulement au nom de son pere, c'est-a-
dire a son nom propre, si on peut encore dire: I take thee at thy word./Call me but love, and
I'll be new baptiz 'd, /Henceforth I never will be Romeo. II se gagne et se perd a la fois dans
le nom commun, mais aussi dans la loi commune de l'amour: Call me love. Appelle-moi ton
amour.
29. La dissymetrie reste infinie. Elle tient encore a ceci: Romeo ne iui adresse pas la
meme demande. II ne demande pas a celle qui sera secretement sa femme de
renoncer a son nom ou de renier son pere. Comme si cela allait de soi et n'appelait pas un
tel dechirement (il parlera dans un instant de dechirer son nom, l'ecriture ou la lettre de son
nom, si du moins il l'avait ecrit lui-meme, ce qui est par principe exclu, justement,
originairement). Paradoxe, ironie, renversement de la loi commune? Ou repetition qui
confirme au contraire la verite de cette loi? D'habitude, dans nos cultures, le mari garde son
nom, celui de son pere, et la femme renonce au sien. Quand le mari donne son nom a sa
femme, ce n'est pas, comme ici, pour le perdre, ou pour en changer, c'est pour l'imposer en
le gardant. Ici elle lui demande de renier son pere et de changer de nom. Mais cette
inversion confirme la loi: le nom du pere devrait etre garde par le fils, c'est a lui qu'il y a
quelque sens a l'arracher, nullement a la fille qui n'en a jamais req:u la garde. Terrible
lucidite de Juliette. Elle connatt les deux liens de la loi, le double bind qui lie un fils au nom
de son pere. II ne peut vivre que s'il s'affirme singulierement, sans le nom d'heritage. Mais
l'ecriture de ce nom, qu'il n'a pas ecrit lui-meme {Had I it written, I would tear the word),
le constitue dans son etre meme, sans rien nommer de lui, et il ne peut que s'aneantir en le
deniant. II peut tout au plus, en somme, le denier, le renier, il ne peut l'effacer ni le dechirer.
II est done perdu de toute fa?on et elle le sait. Et le sait parce qu'elle l'aime et elle l'aime
parce qu'elle le sait. Et elle lui demande sa mort en lui demandant de garder sa vie parce
qu'elle l'aime, parce qu'elle sait, et parce qu'elle sait que la mort ne lui arrivera pas par
accident. II y est voue, et elle avec lui, par la double loi du nom.
30. II n'y aurait pas de contretemps sans la double loi du nom. Le contretemps suppose
cette inadequation inhumaine, trop humaine, qui toujours disloque un
nom propre. Le mariage secret, le serment (sacramtentum), la double survie qu'il engage,
son anachronie constitutive, tout cela obeit a la meme loi. Cette loi, la loi du contretemps,
est double puisqu'elle est divisee; elle porte Laphorisme en elle-meme, comme sa verite.
L'aphorisme, c'est la loi.
31. Meme s'il le voulait, Romeo ne pourrait pas renoncer de lui-meme a son nom et a
son pere. II ne peut pas le vouloir de lui-meme, alors que pourtant cette
emancipation lui est presentee comme la chance d'etre enfin lui-meme, de s'inventer au-
dela du nom - la chance de vivre enfin, car il porte le nom comme sa mort. II ne peut pas le
vouloir lui-meme, de lui-meme, car il n 'est pas sans son nom. II ne peut le desirer que
depuis l'appel de l'autre, et s 'inventer au nom de 1'autre. II ne hait d'ailleurs son nom qu'a
partir du moment ou Juliette le lui demande, si on peut dire:
My name, dear saint, is hateful to myself,
Because it is an enemy to thee:
Had I it written, I would tear the word.
32. Quand elle croit le reconnaitre dans la penombre, au clair de lune, le drame du nom
est consomme (Juliet. My ears have not yet drunk a hundred words / Of
that tongue's uttering, yet I know the sound: /Art thou not Romeo, and a Montague?
Romeo. Neither, fair maid, ifeither thee dislike.) Elle le reconnaTt et l'appelle de son nom
(N'es-tu pas Romeo et un Montaigu?), elle Yidentifie d'une part au timbre de sa voix, soit
aux mots qu'elle entend sans image, d'autre part au moment ou il a, obeissant a l'injonction,
renie son nom et son pere. La survie et la mort sont a l'oeuvre, autrement dit la lune. Mais
ce pouvoir de mort qui parait au clair de lune, il s'appelle Juliette, et le soleil qu'elle vient a
figurer tout a coup porte la vie et la mort au nom dupere. Elle tue la lune. Que dit Romeo a
l'ouverture de la scene (qui n'est pas une scene puisque le nom la voue a l'invisibilite, mais
qui est un theatre puisque la lumiere y est artificielle et figuree)? But soft! What light
through yonder window breaks? / It is the east, and Juliet is the sun! /Arisefair sun, and
kill the envious moon, / Who is already sick andpale with grief...
33. La face lunaire de cette piece d'ombre, une certaine froideur de Romeo et
Juliette. Tout n'y est pas de glace, ni de miroir, mais la glace n'y vient pas
seulement de la mort, du marbre auquel tout parait voue (the tomb, the monument, the grave,
the flowers on the lady's grave), dans ce destin de gisants qui enlace et separe, des leur nom,
ces deux amants. Non, la froideur qui gagne peu a peu le corps de la piece et comme
d'avance la cadaverise, c'est peut-etre l'ironie, la figure ou la rhetorique de l'ironie, le
contretemps de la conscience ironique. Celle-ci se disproportionne toujours entre le fini et
l'infini, elle joue de l'inadequation, de l'aphorisme, elle specule, elle analyse, elle analyse,
elle analyse la loi de desidentification, l'implacable necessite, la machine du nom propre qui
m'oblige a vivre cela meme, a savoir mon nom, dont je meurs.
34. Ironie du nom propre, telle qu'elle est analysee par Juliette. Sentence de verite
qui porte la mort, l'aphorisme separe, et d'abord me separe de mon nom. Je ne
suis pas mon nom. Autant dire que je pourrais lui survivre. Mais d'abord il est destine a me
survivre. II m'annonce ainsi la mort. Non-coYncidence et contretemps entre mon nom et
moi, entre I'experience selon laquelle je m'appelle ou m'entends appeler et mon 'presant
vivant'. Rendez-vous avec mon nom. Untimely, intempestif, au mauvais moment.
35. Changer de nom: le bal, la substitution, les masques, le simulacre, le rendez¬
vous avec la mort. Untimely. Never on time.
36. Ce qui se dit ironiquement, c'est-a-dire au sens rhetorique de la figure
ironique: faire entendre le contraire de ce qu'on dit. Ici, Vimpossible, done: 1)
deux amants se survivent tous deux, fun a l'autre, chacun voyant mourir l'autre; 2) le nom
les constitue sans etre riens d'eux-memes, les condamnent a etre ce qu'ils ne sont pas sous
le masque, a se confondre avec le masque; 3) les deux sont unis par cela meme qui les
separe, etc. Et voila ce qu'ils enoncent clairement, le formalisent meme comme une
speculation philosophique ne l'aurait pas ose. Une veine, par la pointe aigue de cette
analyse, refoit la potion distillee. Elle n'attend pas, elle ne donne pas le temps, pas meme
celui du theatre, elle vient aussitot glacer le coeur de leurs serments. Cette potion serait le
vrai poison, la verite empoisonnee de ce theatre.
37. Ironie de l'aphorisme. Dans VEsthetique, Hegel se moque de ceux qui,
prompts a encenser les ironistes, ne se montrent meme pas capables d'analyser
l'ironie analytique de Romeo et Juliette. II vise alors Tieck: 'Mais quant on croit que se
trouve ici la meilleure occasion de montrer ce qu'est l'ironie, par exemple dans Romeo et
Juliette, on est de?u, car d'ironie il n'est plus question.'
38. Autre serie, elle vient recouper toutes les autres: le nom, la loi, la genealogie,
la double survie, le contretemps, bref l'aphorisme de Romeo et Juliette. Non
pas de Romeo et Juliette mais de Romeo et Juliette, la piece de Shakespeare ainsi intitulee.
Elle appartient a une serie, au palimpseste encore vivant, au theatre ouvert des recits qui
portent ce nom. Elle leur survit, mais grace a elle ils survivent. Telle double survie aurait-
elle ete possible 'without that title', comme disait Juliette? Et les noms de Matteo Bandello,
de Luigi da Porto survivraient-ils sans celui de Shakespeare qui leur survecut? Et sans les
innombrables repetitions sous le meme nom singulierement gagees? Sans les greffes de
noms? Et d'autre pieces? O! be some other name...
39. L'aphorisme absolu: un nom propre. Sans genealogie, sans la moindre copule.
Fin du theatre. Rideau. Tableau (Les deux amants imis dans la mort d'Angelo
dall'Oca Bianca). Tourisme, soleil de decembre a Verone (Verona by that name is known).
Un vrai soleil, l'autre {The sun, for sorrow, will not show his head)}
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